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PREFACE
The central purpose of this dissertation is to trace
and analyze Arthur Balfour's response to the complicated
and controversial Irish Question during his lengthy and
distinguished political career « Balfour is often reputed
to have made an objective, rational and realistic ^.d^ust-
ment to the dynamic forces of the modern world. His
contributions to the evolution of the British Conuncnv^ealth,
through his work on the Coirimittee of Imperial Defense and
at the imperial conferences following World V/ar I, have
led to tliiG evaluation* V/hile tMs study of Balfour and
Ireland is not pxiiiarily intended to challenge xhi?i la.uda-
tory assessments it v^'ill^ I believe, add some ucieful
perspective;^ on Balfour's ability to adapt to derrccratic
nationaiisrat cultural diversificaticn as wsXl as tlio
decline of Br.Tt5.i~h iriperialii-m* This analysis of Balfour's?
role in the Ivish ^iuostion may provide farther insights
on the Brltis;h Estabiishnont 's general attitudes to
Ireland and h<;w Ii-i^h affairs influenced Britain. Finally^
this ludy of Balfour may help explain the longevity of
the Jtr-'icir, Qucf-Jtion in British politics and the violent
and tragic denouonent of 1919-^'1'»
Arnon.^; tiic irr.portant t-heraos that will be examined
are the impact of Balfour "s actions and idear.? on Ireland
from the late 'eighties ur).til the signing of the Anglo-
Irish Treaty in 1921. Special consideration v/ill be
directed to his motives and accomplishments as Irish Chief-
Secretary, and subsequently as Leader of the House of
Coriimons, Prime Minister* and Unionist party leader. liis
role in the critical events between I9IC and 1914 v;ill \:-q
examined in dets.il. The dis^iertaticn v;ill concludu v/ith
a description 3nd analysis of Balfour's posture when event's
in Ireland as well as v/artime and diplomatic pressures
called for empathy, imagination and bipartisan compromise
to solve the Irish imbroglio.
To the r.iany people v^hcr>e help and encouragement have
made the completion of this project possible, I express my
fiincere gratitude. Particular thanl'^s are owed to Profet":-
sors T, r^esmond Williamnp ?., Dudley iidvards, Kevin B,
Nowlar^ and the la"e ivirs* I>;aure?n Wall of University Coj.legc,
Dut^liiJ for initi?<..lly o/j':;oura;n;ing my invectigaticnr> on
Balfour and I'nionj.cm. I-iy research v/as facilitated greatly
by th? Jiind cooperation extended to me by the staffs of
the follov;ing libraries and repositories > The Manuscripts
Divinicn cf the British Museum^ th^-i Public Record Offices
of England, Northerr. Ir^rla\]d ar.a the Hapublic of Ireland,
Plunkett House in London^ the Ka'cional Lib'-s.ry of Irol?j^d,
the Docurnents Division of 3^amcnt Library at Harvard Univer-
Bity, and the University of :vlassachusettc Library. 1 wish
to thank Professor JGov;?:h Kernon for r^orving as my
adviser and dissertation o>iairman af.^ v/ell as Professors
Franklin V/ickwire and Michael Wolff for their help, I
wish to thank those of my colleagues in the History Depart-
ment at Westfield State College v/ho have helped and
assisted nie in a variety of ways to complete ray graduate
studies. Professor Elizabeth Teall deserves special thanks
for reviving my occasionally flagging enthusiasm, I am
grateful to Mrs. Helen Ganney for typing the manuscript
and for her technical advice. Special thanks arc due to
my parents and my family for their help and enco\iragement
during the research and writings and especially for
patiently enduring whatever anrioyancos I have caui:ed tlvvr.i
in the course of this work.
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Directed byi Frof, Joseph M. Kernon
Arthur Balfour's parliamentary career coincided
neatly with the most dynamic and controversial eras in
modern Anglo-Irish relations. Beginning with his appoint-
ment as Irish Chief-Secretary in March 1867, Balfour
played a significant role in formulating the Irish policy
of the Unionist Party. Although the yoMr.g Chisf-Sor-rc- t.p.ry
quickly attacked rural disorder and crimes he introduced
a positive and progressive iwrte to a hitlierto negative and
repressive Irish policy. Believing that poverty and dis-
satisfaction with the dual owner-oh:. p Xarid sys':,..!i.x v/ere the
real catalysts of the Home Rule- movement, Balfour devel-
oped a policy "best 'ie;icribed as 'contrtructlvo iin.ionism ' o
The most important component of thin policy was the Ir^nd
purchase program v/hich enabled IrhSn sonants to purchase
thf-tir holdingfj with the aid of .1 ov/-: ntrroct, long-ten.i
Treasury guaranteed l?ari.-?» U'he cufuuia».iv3 effect of the
Unionist purchase program developed and encouraged by
Balfour dov/n to 190.? v;r...3 to revolutioni2^e Irish landholding
and destroy the Gcci-u. ir:'iMuence of the AngJ o- ish
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Ascendency. Other planks in Balfour's 'constructive
unionism' were state aid for railway construction, fishery
development, and agricultural and technical instruction.
The establishment of the Congested Districts Board under
Balfour's Land Act of I89I brought aid to the severely
depressed areas of Connaught and Western H'.unster, Balfour's
ameliorative measures were intended to inculcate in the
Irish people those values and virtues v;hich he associated
with the prosperity and progress of late Victorian England.
Self-help, thrift, sobriety, initiative and independence
of thought he believed v;ould ultimately lift the Irish
people out of poverty and bring them into the 'rrtcdern
world', Kis 'modern world* was, of course, an Anglo-Saxon
world. Although this program of social and economic con-
ciliation had some success in developing these Anglo-iSaxon
values, it did not destroy Irif'h political aspirations for
a national legislature. The domccratization of Irish local
governiTjent under Gerald Balfour in IB93 further stimulated
the Home Rule movement. It tr.ught inciependencG and pro-
vided yet another blow to the political and social monopoly
of the Protestant A*5oendency,
V/hcn. 'ffii^ 19C9--1G DuCget crisis b:x>ught ."oino RuJ.e
v'ltj?lr,. realm cf possibility, Balfour led the Unionist
Tarty in re;iectin<g any Irish ccmpromise. Alter the passage
of the Fa.rj.iamo2:,t Act in 1911» IBalfour enthui^iah^tically
joined other Unionists in attempting to uss the Ulster
issue to defeat Home Rule and precipitate a Liberal defeat.
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The results of this policy were to paralyze the Army and
virtually destroy the Home Rule Bill by early 1914,
The growth of Sinn Fein republicanism in Ireland
after I916 clearly demonstrated that the Irish were not
content to emulate British values and institutions as
Balfour hoped they eventually would. With the exception
of the six counties of Protestant Ulster* Balfour thus
abandoned all interest in maintaining the Union, He played
an important role in developing the legisilation that ulti-
mately led to the partition of Ireland in I920,
Although he made significant contributions to the
economic and social improvement of Ireland, Balfour
o>±ibited many of the anti-Irish and anti-Catholic atti-
tudes that v^ere characteristic of late Victorian England,
Despite evidence to the contrary» Balfour never substan-
tially modified his conviction that the native Irish were
politically untrust^vorthy and intellectually and socially
inferior. Balfour's role in and response to the Irish
Question from 18?^ to 1922 subst«nt3.ates the degree to
which a peaceful soiutlca was hindered by class av:d naticn-l
pre^iudices as well as by partisan pclitics. While the
•constructive unionism' originally exocuted by Balfour
helped to chape the contours of modorn Ireland, tho unc un-
promising resistance of Balfour and the Unionist Party to
Irish political aspirations and pleas lor national unity
was an important factor in precipitating the violent clirr-ax
in Anglo-Irish relations between 1916 and 1921. The
Xpolitical and sectarian violence v/hich periodically has
scarred twentieth century Irish life must also be included
in the Balfourian and Unionist legacy to Ireland,
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CHAPTSR I
BALFOUR AND THE EMERGING IRISH QUESTION, 187^^-188?
Arthur James Balfour was born at vVhittingehame in
East Lothian, Scotland to the wealthy and influential
James and Blanche Cecil Balfour on 25 July 1848. James
built up a considorable fortune during the railroad boom
as Director of the North British Railway « Arthur's rcoth-.jr.
Lady Blanche, was the daughter of the second Marcuej.iJ3 of
Salisbury, and the sister of Lord Robert Cecil, later the
third ivlarquess of Salisbury. Although his father died
when Arthur was only eight years old, tha family inherit-
ance and promj-nencs as v/ell as his mother's training and
discipline proved valuable assets to young Balfour durir.g
his ri88 to preeminence in the Conservative i-arty and the
House of CoiTimons, Like his father, after finishing Kton
Arthur went to Trinity College, Cambridge, 'where he read
for the nev/ly estjiblished Moral Science Tripos, v;hich
included philosophy and political economy* Having acquii-ed
his degree and control of a isif,OOOtOOO fortune in I869r
young Balfour spent the next lev; yec.r^ enjoying the care-
free existence of a v;rialthy and v;'ell-connected bachelor.
London society, rnusiCf tennis ^ tra^f-el and weekend p3,r'^;5es
at V/hittingehame and other ariarooratic country houses
absorbed Balfour's tiirie and i.aterest until IB72. Subse-
quent to his liiotl'ier'G death in that ;y'ear, Balfour curtailed
his social activities to surf rviso the fiinily business and
2financial affairs in Scotland. In 187^4, at the invitation
of his 'Uncle Robert', now the third Marquess of Salisbury,
Balfour stood as the Conservative candidate for Hertford,
and was returned unopposed in the January I874 election.-^
Arthur Balfour's parliamentary career coincided
rather neatly with the most dynamic and disruptive eras
in the bitter and rancorous Anglo-Irish imbroglio of Kodern
times. Although the abortive Fenian revolt had occurred
when he was a young man, there is no evidence that Balfour
displayed any interest in the Irish Question in the 1860's
and 18?0's, Balfour and his political contemporaries soon
found that English indifference to the Irish Question becaitie
increasingly impossible and dangerous as each year of the
last quarter of the nineteenth century unfolded. >Vithin
eight years of Balfour's parliamentary debut in l8?^-f the
gravity of the Irish situation was dramatically forced
upon the consciousness of the English ruling clasf'-^es and
the public hy the assassinatio-'i of the Chief-Secretary, '
Lord Frederick Cavendishs and his assistant, Ivir. T. H,
Burke, in Phoenix Park» Dublin, on 6 May 1882, inorcover,
the effective application of Joiseph .Bii>gar"s obstruction-
ist tactics in the Hou:?e of Goimnoj:)...! by the Irish Parlia-
Kontary Party j^'^blicised as never before Irit^h grievances.
-^These details of Balfc^jr's early life are taken from
Sydney Zebel, Iliifour* A jPiOltiCLSl J^io,g:£..^£iy (Carwbi'idge $
University Press, 1973) • PP« 1"13^ Hereafter citf^d -iebel.
3This parliamentary agitation under the direction of Charles
Stuart Parnell was matched by a campaign of rural agita-
tion of boycotting, rick-burning and rent strikes in the
Irish countryside under the supervision of the ex-Fenian
Michael Davitt and his lieutenants in the Land League,
This coordinated program of parliamentary and rural agita-
tion» known as the "New Departure", compelled both Liberals
and Gon.servatives to search for a definition of the Irish
Question and for appropriate policies to cure this fester-
ing cancer in British political and parliamentary life.
vVhat was the Irish Question which Balfour and his
contemporaries faced in 1880-1? The Irish Question then,
as now, was not easily defined. The intertwining and over-
lapping of political, economic, religious and social
grievances was further complicated by the bitter historical
Lieraories of land confiscations, famines and religious perse-
cutions, Ever since the seventeenth century the Irish
Question had encompassed these diverse elements, but by
1880 Irish alienation from the British government and the
Ascendency system which it supported readied new and unpre-
cedented proportions. The causes of this heightened
exacerbation were varied, and a brief description of these
factors is crucial to an objective assessment of Arthur
Bo.lfour*9 response to, and role in, the Irish Question in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
English Tory indifference to Ireland during the I870's
was an important cause of increased alientation.
Notwithstanding his astute definition of the Irish problem
in IQkk as '...a starving population, an absentee aris-
tocracy, and an alien church, and in addition the weakest
executive in the world.,,,* Disraeli once perched on the
greasy pole paid scant attention to Ireland and her prob-
2lems. Lord Salisbury, Balfour's political mentor, never
displayed much interest in Ireland until the strength of
the Irish Parliamentary Party forced him to do so in the
1880 's. Salisbury visited Ireland only once, in 1893 p "to
participate in an anti-Kome Rule demonstration at Belfast.
The growing political power of the Irish Parliamentary
Party and the land agitations had turned Salisbury's indif-
ference into bitter disdain by 1391 v/hen he declared:
The revelations of the experience of the last
five years is that Vife know the Irish cause to
be what it is. The English people know the
setimy character of Irish heroism, and they know
th£it" the character of men to wnom xhey are
asked to hand over their friends and brothers
in Ulster is such as to cover with disgrace
any nation who for any cause made such tremen-
dous sacrifices and exertions.
3
Balfour's aunt, lady Salisbury, seems to typify this indif--
ference and later disdain in her comment:
...as to Ireland I have made a vow never to read
any speeches on the subject on either side, there
is nothin'-- much to be said but lies on ons side
^F. S. L, Lyons, :i>3.ianii gincs £amn£, rev. ed. aoYvion
Fontana, 1973). P. l^^' Hereafter cited Lyons, lZ2liinfl
^•Shsi liiiii?^, 22 April 1891.
and contradictions on the other, and as I neverbelieve the first, why should I trouble about'
the last.^
This Tory indifference, along with Ascendency appre-
hensions over the consequences to their privileged position
of Gladstone's Irish Church Disestablishment Act and the
Land Act of I870, helped to generate Issac Butt's Home
Rule movement in the early 1870's.- Westminster's attitude
became more exasperating as the disastrous effects of
v^orld-v;ide depression and agricultural competition became
apparent in the late 1870' s and early 1880's. while Ascen-
dency financial difficulties were undoubtedly genuine,^
the consequences of government neglect were more acutely
felt by the Irish tenant farmers. Faced with the worst
economic situation since the ISkO'St the tenant farmers
responded to the agrarian theories and leadership of
Michael Davit;t and John Cillon in their efforts to redress
the grievances of those on the bottom rung of Irish soci-
ety. Under the leadership of Charles Stuart Parnell, by
Frances Balfour, M 0]2llYiS£iiriS . DXum £ori:ei (i>ondon»
Hodder and Stoughton, 1930). 11, p. 5^i, hereafter cited
Frances Balfour, iia pbliviscarlv':: > On one occasion lady
Balfour suggested, "The only cure for the evils of Ireland
io the total oxterinination of the inhabitants," A, B.
Cooke and J. Vincent, SJjJi Goyernlng i^Si-llom QsMm^t
QsC£!irjm^ii. r,ud lisx.ty, ZgIIIlIxis., 2MSzM (Brighton, Jin,?!land.
Harvester i-ress, 197^)9 p. 65, Hereafter cited, Cooke
and Vincent, !Sh3. Governing £aS£Lii2Il.
'The best description of Butt's career and his founding of
the Home Government Association is David Thornley's Issac
jOiLtl and Home KiiJji (London: KacGibbon and Kee, 196^).
'Barbara Solow, The LsDil bM llifJ. Jrisii t^onsm
(Cambridge! Harvard University i^ress, 197^).
61879 the tenant farmers and their advocates succeeded in
usurping control of the hitherto aristocratic Home Rule
movement. For the next quarter century the Hone Kule
movement was closely bound up with the economic aspira-
tions of the Irish farmers, and the Irish Parliamentary
Party effectively impressed this upon the previously indif-
ferent Tories and public.
The depression of the ffiid-l870"s v.-as the first
serious interruption in mid-Victorian prosperity. Ireland,
hov/ever, was even more severely affected ovdng to her
'
lower ability to cushion temporary reverses through sav-
ings o The combined impact of free trade plus American,
Canadian, Russian, and Argentinian agricultural competi-
tion drove the value of Irish agricultural produce down by
4.14,000,000 betv.'eon 18?6 and I879. The depression in
English agriculture along with the beginnings of farm
mechanization eliminated the opportunities for the poorer
peasants to supplement their meagre incomes as migrant
agricultural workers. Cormaught, inhabited by the poorest
and most debilitated peasants, lost in 187^ -^2505000 \\y
migrant wages which usually were earned in England by Con-
naught laborers. To mal^e ma.tters worse, the last barrier
against starvation for the poorer families was eliminated
when in 1879 Ireland experienced the worst potato failure
since the Great Famine. The 1879 potato crop of 1 million
tons v,'as valued at t3, 500, 000 whereas in I876 it had b«>en
^ raillicn tons valued at i-12,500,OOo7 With tenant fanr.prs
deeply in debt and often starving, even moderate rents
fell into abeyance so that by the end of the decade arrears
reacbciJd nev/ heights, IHany lajridlordG, bui-dened with over-
populated and encumbered and often archp.icaliy managed
estates* responded to the agricultural crisis by resorting
to widespread evictions. The sequel to these evictions
was a ri^e in agrari.<m outrages across the country. The
eviction and crirae statistics of the late 'sevc'nties and
the early 'eighties evidence the seriousness of the situa-
tion, V/hilG in 1879 1000 families were evicted, the rate
doubled in 1680,. arid two years later 5201 families werv^
evictfid. The agrarian outrages or felonies rose in direct
proportion, frcm 2500 in 1660 to 3-'i-32 in 1832.*^^ Although
many of the evicted fsunilies subsequently returned to
their holdings, the evictions th'.^r-'Vvelve!a and the pubJ.lcity
given thoip had a profound impact upon public opinion both
in Ireland and in iingland, Irish alienation increased
vfhile BritiM^h fear and distrust of the Irish rr.ounted.
External factors v/ere not completely responsible for
the depressed state of the Iri?-.h economy in the J.G80':>»
Although GladGtcne'v^ X^and Act of I870 gjranted coi/;].''er:.sation
for tenant-conctructed iinproveuienta and pade landlords pay
Lyons, ^imji Eimim.* pp. -'6'J'5.
^lyons, Ir!:i.i:iM iiiiM itha Sir^. pp. l68"70f l. p. Curtiii,
S:i;ii^y Xa Oo/UiliU:x^:;.S,YO ^}.lXkonX^ (irrinceton: i-Tince^:on
UriiYorBity .^Teas, 1963)» P« Hereafter cited Curtis,
8dearly to evict for causes other than nonpayment of rent,
landlords were still free to raise rents. Tanants v.-ith
arrears enjoyed no protection under the I870 legislation.
Faced with falling markets and prices, landlords hiked up
rents and tenants defaulted » Even had Ireland not been hi
with the agricultural depression, poor transportational
facilities, archaic agricultural methods, and lack of any
cor'rective schemes of technical education joined with
exacerbated landlord-tenant relations to make Irish coi^.~
mercial agriculture a risky business. Gladstone's second
land bill, drawn up in response to Davitt's agitation of
I879-I88O, granted the 3 f 's, fixity of tenure, fair rents
and free sale of improveraents , However, thirj laeasur'i;
seemed successful only in flooding tha newly-establishsd
lajid courts with increased litigation, expensive to the
lajidlordfs and tenants as well as to the governw'jnt. More-
over ^ Gladstone's 1881 measure did i?ot elimina'ce rural
agitation^ cv^ing to the exclusion froro its provisions of
280 J 000 leaseholders axid occupiers in arreax's* The defi--
ciencies of the I^nd Acts of I870 and 1381 rind tlie gravity?"
of the Irish economic probleiis in general v,'^re indicated
by the persistence of the land issue in xh^ political
activities of the Nationalist forces throughout the next
tv/o decades.
The political components of -zhe Irish question encom
passed every Isvel of government p.nd aa;/iinistrati on. The
Kostt obvious ir.Eae waa tha demand ff)r a natiorial
9legislature on the lines of Grattan's parliament. This
had been the principal aim of constitutiomil political
moveraents ever since the Repeal campaigns of Daniel
O'Connell in the ISifO's, The failures of Repeal, of the
IQkQ Rebellion and the abortive Fenian revolt in 186?
stimulated, rather than dampened, the de ::ermination of
Irish nationalists to secure a Dublin parliament. More-
over, ever since 1868 the Irish Republican Brotherhood in
Ireland and the Clan na Gael in America tried clandes-
tinely to push the constitutional movement in a more radi-
cal direction tov;ards republican nationalism. Even under
Butt's leadership, Fenians managed to infiltrate the Home
Rule mo\'ernent,^ and Parnell had to walk a thin line between
constitutional nationali£'in and Fenianism during the first
years of his leadership. Forced to masquerade much of his
iimato consei'vatisra, Parnell never repudiated the Fenian
goal of complei;o independence. In addition, the Irish
bishops, disappointed by Gladstone's failure to provide a
«atisracjto).y univei.\3it5'' bill for Irifc?h Roman Catholics and
fionsitiva to the dL^sperate economic situation of their
people f moved steadily tovjard active support for the Home
Rule gofil. The impact of V/, E, Fornter's two coercion
bills, the effectiveness of obstruction at Westminster
from 1880-02, cmd of Davitt's agrarian agitation, combined
to attract many of the previously politically apathetic
9lyons, irjilsuod ^in^ ihs. Emin&r p. 15C».
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people to the Home Rule banner by 18B2. Parnell's support
for tenant demands from I879 to 1881 convinced the Irish
farmers that Home Rule would solve their economic griev-
ances. In short, by the mid-eighties, notwithstanding their
different motives, the political aim of the Irish Parlia-
mentary Party commanded the sympathy and support of the
majority of Irishmen,
The absence of a national legislature was not the
only political grievance of the Irish population by I885.
Throughout the United Kingdom the franchise reforms of 186?
and 188^ along with the Secret Ballot Act of I872 stimu-
lated interest in replacing the oligarchic grand juries
with democratically elected county officials. The politi-
cal motivation to abolitih the grand juries was reinforced
by the tremendous pressures which n2v.r sanitary and public
health legislation had thrust upon local authorities.
Centraliz-ation and uniformity had to be brought to the
Biultifarious and often overlapping organs hitherto entrusted
with local affairs. While in Ireland the administrative
confusion was no less serious* reform was politically
imperative because the grand juries were the bastions of
the Protestant landlord Ascendency, and hence entirely out
of sympathy with the majority of the population. Since
grand jury eligibility depended upon holding freehold lands
of -hSO value of leasehold lands or ilOO value the majority
of Irishmen v/ero eliminated when the county high sheriff
appointed the grand jurors. These financial qualifications
coupled with the fact that the high sheriff usually owed
his own appointment to the patronage of the county lord-
lieutenant insured that grand jury lists were confined to
the lan.ded gentry. Hence it was almost inevitable that
an era of rising national consciousness v/ould produce
increasing demands for the abolition of these Ascendency-
dominated grand juries. Irish Nationalists had seen how
the democr?.tically elected i-oor Law Guardian Boards could
be used to publicize and forward Home Rule, and they loo]cPd
to democratic local government reform as another step
towards the restoration of legislative independence. More-
over, since the grand juries were notorious for their
parsimony, Irish local services in housing, health and
education were seriously deficient. Democratic local
government reform was essential if the economic and social
needs posed by late nineteenth-century developments wone
to be met successfully.
Tlic wide administrative and semi-legislative powoni
exercif^ed by numerous Dublin Ca*3tle officials and bc.irds
represented yet another facet of the Irish political griev-
ance. Joseph Chamberlain summarized the general Irish
attitude to the Castle system v^hen he described it ar.
«
.eea system as completely centi\.4.1i7.ed nnd
bureaucratic as th-^-t wliich Rusuia governs
Poland, or as that which was con)mon at Venice
under the Austrian^?. An Irishman at this moment
cannot move a step, he cannot lift a finger
in any parochial, municipal, or educational
work without being cora'^ronted, interfered with,
controlled by an English official appointed by
a foreign governments and without a shadow or
shade of representative authority. 10
The religious and social components of the Irish
Question derived from and emphasized the political and
economic factors described. Similar to the Negroes in
late nineteenth and early t-v/entieth century America, the
majority of Irish Roman Catholics occupied the lowest
social and economic status, and suffered from inadequate
and often nonexistent opportunities for technical or uni-
versity education, Disml housing conditions abounded in
the countryside for tenant farmers, and most especially
for the large class of agricultural laborers. The Dublin
urbaji dv/ellers lived in slums universally described by
contemporaries as the worot in Europe, Other cities v/ith
serious housing deficiencies for the laboring classes were
Corkf Limerick, and Ennis. While high unemployment was a
big factor in the Dublin situation, in industrialized
Belfast competition betv/een Catholics and Protestants for
housing tended to escalate rents to exorbitant leve3.s for
the ordinary worker, and most espejcially for the Catholic
operatives. Poor nutrition, disease and high mortality
rates, post especially amoiig the children, were the natural
^^Chamberlain at Islington, ThO. Ilffiiia* 18 June I885.
Chamberlain's comparison of Dublin Castle to these
repressive regimes wacj the prelude to his attempts to
forward the national councils scheme in the summer of
1885, C. D, H. Howard, "Joseph Ghamberlnin, Parnell and
the Irish 'central board' scheme, 1884-5," IriuJi iiXz-
tQrical Studies
,
8, No. 32 (September 195.3). PP. 324-61.
sequels to these horrendous economic and social conditiono.
Given these grim realities of Irish life, the bitter
historical memories harbored by both Catholics and Protes-
tants as well as the Ascendency's anxieties over their
eroding economic status and the rise of democratic national
isra, it was inevitable that the innate religious tensions
between Catholics and Protestants would be seriously
exacerbated in the late 1870' s and 1880 's, ^'hile there
v/as a strong democratic tradition among many Ulster Presby-
teriaiis in the 1870' s and the early 1880 's, once the Home
Rule movement gained momentum, fears of Roman Catholic
domination drove these more liberal Ulstermen into alliance
with the Ascendency. Other explanations for the Ulster
Presbyterian loyalty to the Union have been the subject of
long and lengthy debate. Suffice to say that Ulster, with
its different religious, economic, and social cliaracter-
istics, constituted an explosive component to the already
critical Irish Question by 1880, Since the Ulster situa-
tion was central to the v/hole question of Irish nationalis'm
Balfour's viev.'s toward it will be considered in details
A final factor which helped to ripen the Irish Ques-
t5.on by the «;id~8ighties was the gradual democratiaation
of the parliamentary franchise by the acts of I867, 3 884
and the Redistribution Act of the following year. More
important than the haJ.f-raillion now Irinh voters were the
large nuraber of newly enfranchised English and Scottish
voters who had an interest in settling the Irish question.
While Irish immigrants to Britain and their descendants
were naturally quite sympathetic to the New Departure,
many English working-class voters and even middle
-class
voters were anxious for a solution so as to free west-
minster from long and contentious Irish debates. Ivlany
believed that the Irish Question was preventing Jr-arliament
from directing its energies to housing, educational, indus-
trial and local political reforms, A great portion of the
English electorate had a vital interest in settling the
Irish Question. Parnell, therefore, by 1884-5 had a tre-
mendous bargaining power within Great Britain, and the
taciturn Irish leader quickly demonstrated his recognition
of this advantage in late 1885 when he used the Irish vote
in Great Britain as bait to dangle before Libenil and Con-
servative politicians. By the 1880 's English politicians
and statesmen, under the pressure of a variety of political,
economic, and social factors, were forced to focus atten-
tion on Ii'ish problems and grievances,
Similar to his Uncle Robert until the risB of the
Home Rule •ovement, Balfour displayed little concern for
the Irish Question, and he typified his class and family
in his negative attitude toward the Irish. He deemed the
Irish multitudes as more potentially dangerous tVian English
multitudes, asserting that the former were more easily led
by demagogues. The English at least demanded some external
appearances of reason from their agitators according to
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the young Cecilian.^^ When Gladstone's second adrainistra-
tion was beseiged with Irish difficulties generated by the
economic depression and the land war, Balfour's comments
on Ir-ish affairs were directed chiefly to embarrassing the
Liberals rather than to any deep or probing analysis of
the multiple causes of Irish discontent or to any recom-
mendations for solving the difficulty. The rising pattern
of rural violence impelled Balfour, a strong advocate of
law and order and parliamentary tradition, to support
Foroter's Coercion Bill in 1881, thereby disappointing
Randolph Churchill who wished to turn the Liberals cut by
an Irish-Conservative-Radical alliance. -^"^ whan Irioh
obstructionist tactics in the Commons dr?.ined the patience
even of the sympathetic Prime Minis t^^r, Balfour supported
Crladstone'B closure resolutions,"^^ Once Gladstone reverted
back to conciliation with the land bill of 1881, which
established dual ownership for landlord and tenant, Balfour
abandoned his nonpartisan stance toward the Liberal's
Irish policy* In the second reading debate on 't\•^^ 1881
measure Balfour echoed his uncle's firm belief thci; the
prinoiplas inherent in the measure were destructive of
'•••the pla3-n principles of property and freedom of
^''Arthur J. Balfour, "Cobden and the fenci.ester School,"
Essays and Addresses (iidinburgh: David Douglas, 1893 )»
p. 189.
3 2
i^ebel, ££UX<2iiC. p. 3'^.
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contract...' for the whole kingdom. He showed anxiety
that the rent-fixing powers of the land court might estab-
lish a precedent for interfering with freedom of contract
in other industries. Besides condemning these allegedly
socialistic aspects of the bill, Balfour sarcastically
reminded the Commons of the past Liberal assurances that
Church disestablishment and later the I870 Land Act would
settle the Irish Question. He questioned the Liberal
assumption that one bill could remedy the deep seated and
long standing ills of Ireland. He condemned Gladstone's
measure as a capitulation to, and a reward for, agitation.
Characterizing the government's Irish policy as '^..well
meaning administrative weakness, followed by a Coercion Act
of unexampled severity, followed by wild legislation,..,'
he asserted that any permanent improvement in Ireland would
come only slowly and gradually. Balfour, however, did not
suggest any program of gradual and slow reform,
Because the 1881 bill did nothing to i^eliove tenants
in arrears p Parnell acquiesced in contirmed boycotting and
intimidation in the countryside. Gladstone responded by
authorizing the impris onjnent of Parnell and the other
leaders of the agitation. When the incarceration of those
leaders failed to curb the rural violence, in May 1882,
Gladstone granted Parnell 's release aiid pi-omised an arrears
bill in exchange for the Irish leader's promise to check
"^^3 tlan^f^xd, cclx, I61I-15.
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tha land agitation. This agreement, known as the Kilmain-
ham Treaty, precipitated another attack by Balfour upon
the governraent for its apparently inconsistent Irish
policy. A fortnight later, in the wake of Forster's
resignation and the murders of Cavendish and Burke in
Phoenix Park, Balfour's indignation led him to charge the
Liberals with 'negotiating with treason'. The Kilraainham
Treaty
p he predicted, would cripple every future govern-
laant in dealing with Irish disaffection and disloyalty.
Gladstone's policy was teaching Irish agitators that by
alternating threats of violence and promises of peace, they
could exact whatever legislative measure they desired from
English ministers,
By 188 3 the previouis four years of rural violence as
well as the legal and administrative complications of the
1881 act stimulated Balfour to venture beyond partisfm
attacks on the Liberals. He heartily endorsed Lord George
Hamilton's June 1883 resolution that the purchase provi-
Siions of the 1881 Act be eased by full treasury-guaranteed
loans and extended payment periods. Convinced that the
land question was the 'alpha and omega' of Irish politics,
he criticised dual ownership as a stupid attempt to return
to tribal ov/nership. According to Balfourj only the estab-
lishment of a. peasant proprietorship v/ould free Ireland of
"'^3 Hani-ard. cclix, I63-6,
^^3 Hanaarja, ccixix, 83^-37.
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the semi-socialistic agitation. Once the Irish farmers
became owners, they would uphold the law and the inviolable
principles of private property. Balfour's advocacy of
peasant purchase derived in part from an anxiety over the
lessons which ringlish urban and country poor were drawing
from the theories and actions of the Irish rural agitators,
"The safety of society", he said, "in this country abso-
lutely depended on the solidity of those sentiments about
property which were the permanent basis of our society".'^''
To tamper with them in Ireland was to expose the whole
kingdom to infinite harm. Wage-earners as well as land-
lords, he predicted, would suffer from the spread of Irish
property theories. Three years later, when heading the
Scottish Office, Balfour attributed the Crofter no-rent
campaign to the contagious example of Irish rural agita-
tors.^^
Criticism of the Liberals' Irish policy was easy and
politically advantageous for occupiers of the Opposition
benches. Once Balfour and his Conservative colleagues
carried the weight of the Irish Question upon their own
shoulders practical politics required that thoy deal
17
3 Emi^j:^, cclxxx, 426,
J
o
3 Umi?i?.Jl^t cccviii, 9^2. Lord Cranbrook shared Balfour's
belief that Irish agitation was contagious. After a
summer holiday in the highlands in 1885 he wrote (regard-
ing the National League) to Carnarvon j "The same law-
lessness is being reproduced in the highlands and impunity
will increase the evil in both countries and possibly
extend it to r^n.Tland," Cranbroo): to Carnarvon, 3 January
1886, cited. in Cooke and Vincent, Xh2. fifiYSrains AOlSsloil,
p. 299.
delicately with the Irish Parliamentary Party, and ulti-
mately devise, as an alternative to Home Rule, a program
to diminish rural crime and economic chaos. Indeed,
despite his natural inclination tov/ard a strong law and
order policy, Salisbury let coercion lapse during the Care-
taker Ministry of late I885. To have done otherwise would
have sacrificed the Irish support which had helped to
precipitate the defeat of Gladstone's government in June
1885
.
Moreover, at this juncture, there was some sympathy
for trying a conciliatory approach within the upper eche-
lons of the Tory party, Carnarvon, Randolph Churchill
and Kicks Beach were the most conspicuous in their .desire
to have the Conservatives reap the benefits of appeasing,
if possible, Irish disaffection."^^ Salisbury was not
especially enthusiastic about any new conciliatory approach.
Balfour ssems to have been in substantial agreement with
his uncle. There is no evidence that Balfour considered
Lord Carnarvon's recommendations for a federal solution of
the Irish Question appropriate or practical. During the
Caretaker Ministry, Salisbury and Balfour were so absorbed
in quashing the federalist sympathies of Carnarvon and the
more pronounced Home Rule sympathies of his top Dublin
Castle administrators, G, Jenkinson and Sir Robert
Hamilton, that conciliation hardly received a fair trial.
Although later in his career Balfour made notable efforts
^Curtis
r C^rciODt p. 35v
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in -the cause of university education for Ireland, there is
no indication that he gave Carnarvon any support in his
efforts to get the Prime Minister and the Cabinet to
approve a i6000 grant to finance Roman Catholic Higher
20iiducation. The sole conciliatory measure of any sig-
nificance to emerge from the brief Caretaker Ministry was
the Ashbourne Act of 1885 which provided i-S, 000^000 to
finance peasant purchase. To Balfour, the advantages
of this legislation, which enabled the tenants to borrow
the entire purchase price at kfo for 49 yeara, were signifi-
cant. This arrangement preserved the principles of private-
property and freedom of contract which Gladstone's 1881
legislation had defied. Similar to his uncle, Balfour
believed that single ownership was the real aim of Parnell
and the driving force behind the Irish tenants ' loyalty to
??
the Irish Parliamentary Party,'' Salisbury's 7 October
1885 Newport speech revealed the paucity of the Tories'
IriKh program. The Prime Minister's promise to introduce
democratic local government to Ireland was so hedged with
conditions regarding the disappearance of rural agitation
that a long postponement v/as inevitable. In any event,
20Curtis, C^^jrnii2Ii» p. ^5.
?]
' Churchill did pilot the Irish Educational F-ndowment Bill
through the Commons in August, and there was a limited
measure providing for 99 year compulsory leases to facili-
tate the building of laborers' cottages, Curtis, CQ^roii^Q,
p. 46.
22Curtis, Coercion, p. 45.
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Salisbury was not disposed to beg publicly for Irish votes
in the approaching election by promises of political and
social amelioration.
After the November 1885 elections convinced Glad-
stone that an immediate solution of the Irish Question
along Home Rule lines was essential to the preservation of
the two-party parliamentary system, Balfour exercised a
critical role both in informing Salisbury of Gladstone's
Home Rule proclivities ejid in reinforcing his uncle's oppo-
sition to Gladstone's suggestions of a bipartisan effort
to frame an Irish Home I^^uie Bill. Balfour was convinced
at this point that Home Rule would bring havoc to whatever
English party espoused it.^^ Firstly, he was cognizant of
the anxiety which Carnarvon's federal proposals excited
among the Tory ministers in late summer. He knew of his
uncle's belief that federalism no less than Home Rule would
ultimately produce separation dangerous to imperial unity. "
In additionp the preservation of party unity was funda-
mental to both Salisbury and Balfourt and neither showed
Q.ny inclination to endanger that unity by tinkering with
the Act of Union, In November Salisbury had first rejected
Carnarvon's suggestions for an Irish solution through a
bipartisan approach and later Churchill's recommendations
^-^Balfour to Salisbury, 23 December I885, cited in Blanche
Dugdale, Aythur James Balfour (London: Hutchinson, 19^9 )»
Ip 9^4-5. Hereafter cited Dugdale,
^^Curtis, Qs^^JLisnii po 66 c
2.Z
for a coalition on the grounds that he could not imitate
Peel.^^rJven more central to Balfour's recommendation for
rejection of Gladstone's December overtures was his Icnow-
ledge that the home Rule approach did not command the full
support of Gladstone's former Cabinet colleagues. Harting-
ton and Chamberlain in particular were known to be opposed
to Gladstone's new departure. Once convinced that Glad-
stone was too committed by the Hawarden Kite to retreat
from Home Rule, the Tory strategy was to keep silent on
Ireland and thereby force the Liberal leader to sacrifice
Liberal unity upon the Irish Home Rule program. After
December it was only a matter of time before the Tories
would court a defeat and leave Gladstone free to split his
party.
Despite the political excitement generated by the
Giadstonian conversion, Balfour did not speak during the
1886 Home Rule debates. His silence should not obscure
the deep impact which the dramatic and controversial devel-
opments from June 1885 to January 1886 had upon his per-
ception of the Irish Question and its relation to British
party politics. As Salisbury's protege, Dalfour undoubtedly
shared his uncle's conviction that Gladstone's enthusiasm
•^^Curtis, Ooerc ion f pp. 61, 65,
^*^Curtis, Coercion, ppc 73-55 Dugdale, BalfmiCt If 9^J
Catherine B. cihannon, iiP^ramsul in ireland, tJio
i:flLli±JLcs aad M.adnirJ;j:.'iilan, unpub, M.A. thesis, Univers-
ity College, Dublin, I963. Hereafter cited Shannon,
iiimLniiioni Jin Jx-SiimiA.
for Home Rule derived more from office-hunger than from any
moral principles or a genuine desire to satisfy the out-
standing Irish political grievance. Just before the
Kawarden Kite and during the period when Carnarvon and
Churchill v/ere pressing Salisbury to consider an Irish
compromise, the Prime Minister wrote to Churchill: "The
fact that Gladstone is mad to take office will force him
into some line of conduct which will be discreditable to
him and disastrous, if we do not prematurely gratify his
27hunger." This assessment was shared by other Tories, as
Lord Cranbrook's comments to Carnarvon after Hav/arden
illustrate
«
•I am all for letting him (Gladstone) try his
harid if he will. All the world seeir.f? convinced
of the insatiable eagerness of the old man for
office and his is the hand which, having
destroyed the principle of property sacred and
profane, ohoula r.ttenpt the parricidal task of
putting an end to Imperxe.l unity in the so-
called United Kingdom. '^^
Balfour's inveterate and consistent suspicion of the genu-
ineness of the Liberal commitment to Irish national
aspirations surfaced twenty-five years later during the
Home Rule crisis of 1910-1^}', He then painted Asquith and
the Liberals in the same colors which adorned Gladstone
in 1885~6. Moreover, Salisbury's firm rejection of any
compromise on the Act of Union, either through federalism
"^"^Cited in Curtis, Coercion, p. 68.
Cranbrook to Carnarvon, 1? December 1885, cited in Curtis,
Cosx^^ism, p. 69.
or a joint party effort for Home Rule, provided a precedent
which Balfour was loathe to negate when he v.as party
leader. Just as Salisbury had encouraged the Liberals to
commit themselves fully on Home Rule as a tactical device
to regain office, Balfour tried to pave the way for the
return of the Unionists during 1912-U by manipulating the
Ulster issue.
The Home Rule debates of 1886 need not detain us,
and it is convenient to focus attention on August 1886
when, following the July election, Lord Salisbury resumed
office, backed by a majority of 118, of whom 7^- were
former Liberals who had deserted the Gladstonian ranks
over Home Rule. The defeat of the Home Rule Bill did not
give the Prime Minister and his colleagues any respite from
the complications of the Irish Question, As in the days
of the Caretaker Ministry, parliamentary realities demanded
that the Tories find an alternative to mere resistance to
Home Rule, The Liberal Unionists, and especially those
from Ulster, although vehemently opposed to Home Rule,
were loathe to give up their commitment to comprehensive
land legislation and government-supported economic devel-
opment. Soon after Hicks Beach assumed the Irish Office,
the Ulster Liberal Unionists sent a deputation to Dublin
Castle requesting that the government adopt as its policy
extended land purchase, development of Irish resources
through drainage schemes and transportational improvements,
25
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1881 legislation. Both Hicks Beach and his undersecretary.
Sir Redvers Buller, discreetly attempted to convince Irish
landlords to reduce voluntarily rents in order to avoid all
the local and parliamentary difficulties associated with
32
evictions.-" The Chief-Secretary 's admonitions to the
Irish Isjidlords did little to quiet the countryside, and
in October 1886 the rent boycott known as the Plan of Cam-
paign was initiated by Timothy Harrington, v/illiara O'Brien,
and John Dillon of the National League, when H:»cks Beach
pressed for action on the Catholic University Question and
on local government in late 1886, Salisbury's anxieties
about his Irish chief increased. -^-^ By the end of 1886 the
Prime Minister was as disenchanted with Hicks Beach's
-
general Irish policy and his reluctance to apply coercion
as he had been over Carnarvon's during the Caretaker Minis-
try. By February he vvas convinced that Hicks Beach like
Carnarvon had gone green in Dublin. It must have been with
some relief mixed with regret over a colleague's illness,
that Salisbury accepted the resignation of- hir> Irish Chi'sf-
Secrctary in early March 188?.
The increasing effectiveness of the Plan of Campaign,
pressures from government supporters, as well as Salisbury^,
own strong views on law and order, demanded that tlie next
Irish chief be a vigorous administrator and absolutely
32Curtis, CoerciQn, PP. I26-30, I'll,
-^^ilU.^., pp. 166-69.
sound on property rights, law enforcement and the Union.
In Salisbury's opinion, Arthur Balfour was the man who
possessed all these characteristics, a man who would not
be deterred from applying the Gecilian formula of resolute
government. Between 188? and I89I, Salisbury had no cause
to regret his nephew's appointment to the Irish office.
Indeed, Balfour ventured beyond resolute government to
develop perhaps the most effective Irish policy of any
Chief-Secretary in the late nineteenth century. The next
chapter will discuss how Balfour dealt with the complicated
and explosive Irish Question of the late 'eighties.
GHAPTjiR II
ARTHUR BALFOUR AS IRISH CHIiiF-oECRn-'TARY
28
Arthur Balfour's appointment as Irish Chief
-oecretary
in March 188? shocked the parliamentary world, //ithin the
recent past, men of considerably more political experience
and physical stamina such as W. r). Forster and Sir Michael
Hicks Beach had cracked under the strains of the Irish
office. Consequently, the ministerial announcement was not
greeted with much enthusiasm or confidence in the Tory and
Unionist ranks. The Nationalist members seemed rather sur-
prised but gleeful that Salisbury had obliged them with such
an inexperienced and seemingly delicate target for the par-
liamentary and political attacks traditionally launched upon
Irish secretaries. The Irish representatives and the politi-
cal pundits took delight in formulating sobriquets such as
'Tig3r Lily', 'Niminy-Piminy
' ,
'Daddy Long Legs' and 'Clara'
to describe the youthful delicate new Irish Secretary."^
Despite this initial ridicule, charges of nepotism, and
Balfour's relative youth, Lord Salisbury was confident of
his nephew's abilities and potential to grapple with the
difficult Irish Cluestion. This confidence derived from
three considerations. Firstly, close family ties as well
as a common political and intellectual perspective insured
that the Irish Office would be directed and managed along
29
lines that were agreeable to the lord of Hatfield. In other
words, the Prime Minister was quite sure that his nephew
would not 'go green' in Dublin as Carnarvon and Hicks Beach
had done earlier. Secondly, the coalition discussions of
1685-6 indicated that Balfour was as sound as the Premier on
the inviolability of the Union. If under the pressure of
office Balfour deviated from postures acceptable to Salisbury,
the close relationship between the two facilitated a moder- •
ating influence, or at least, insured an opportunity to
settle differences privately, and thereby guard against fis-
sures within the Cabinet. This was no mean consideration in
light of the difficulties which the Irish Question had posed
to both Tories and Liberals in the previous four decades.
A third consideration accounting for Salisbury's
confidence undoubtedly rested upon his nephew's experience
as Secretary for Scottish affairs from August 1886. Although
his tenure was brief, Balfour had demonstrated considerable
administrative skill in handling the Crofter agitation in
the Highlands. In combatting the no rent agitation of 1886-?
in the Hebrides, he gave firm backing to the police and dis-
played some initiative in tackling the Crofter problem at
its roots by investigating immigration schemes. Balfour's
parliamentary defense of his Scottisii administration, vhile
not brilliant, was more than adequate, and indicated potential
parliamentary abilities, Moreover, the problems plaguing
many sections of Ireland were analogous in kind, .if not in
scale, to those the youn{/ Cecilian faced in Scotland.
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Balfour's short sojourn in the Scottish Office was an
appropriate and proraising apprenticeship for the new Irish
2Secretary.
Within nine months of his appointment, Balfour proved
that his uncle's confidence had not been misplaced. Sharing
Salisbury's view that peasant purchase was the only accept-
able solution to the land question, the new Chief-Secretary
quickly directed his energies to studying the short and long,
term requirements for stimulating the purchase provisions
of the Ashbourne Act. In dealing with the Plan of Campaign
and th2 rural agitation in general he proceeded quicJcly and
decisively. The major barriers to effective law enforcement
were identified as an inability to obtain evidence from
victims of rural crime, and the impossibility of obtaining
jury convictions. Intimidation and boycotting of witness
and jurors were the root of these difficulties.-^ Similar
in outlook to his uncle, Balfour thought 'resolvite govern-
ment' the most appropriate immediate response. Therefore,
in his first House appearance as Chief-Secretary, he intro-
duced a Crimes Bill which provided for summary justice with
a maximum of 6 months at hard labor for persons who engaged
in or incited offenses such as intimidation, boycotting,
^.Dugdale, Balfour, I» 107-119; Bernard Alderson, MifmjX
(London: G. Richards, I903), chap. 1. Hereafter cited
Alderson, Balfour .
'h h2J:i^^» cccxii, 1633.
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rent conspiracies, unlawful assembly and obstruction of
evictions. The bill was designed to establish extraordinar;
justice only in those areas or counties where the local
crime statistics caused the lord-lieutenant to request its
application. This eliminated the hostility which summary
justice would create in the more pacific counties. Unlike
previous coercion bills, Balfour's was to be a permanent
feature of the Irish legal code. Its permanency avoided
the parliamentary difficulties of reenacting coercion when
circumstances v;arranted it.
In defending the Crimes Bill Balfour dismissed the
idea that remedial legislation was the proper cure for the
current lawless condition of Ireland. Not until respect
for the law and for the sanctity of contracts were restored
could remedial legislation effect any lasting benefit in
Ireland, Otherwise, he predicted
...every tenant in Ireland will believe that
he has only to go upon the same linss which
they have been pursuing, and the property of
every landlord will be whittled down... and
ultimately by slow but sure degrees he will
get his land for nothing.^
The Chief-Secretary attacked the characterization of the
National League as an organization engaged in collective
bargaining similar to English trade unions. He insisted
that the League was a reincarnation of the Land Loaguo
which Gladstone had labelled conspiratorial only six years
h.
3 Hansard f cccxii, 1184,
5earlier."^
If the Irish party entertained any hopes that obstruc-
tionist tactics would defeat the coercion bill, they were
sorely disappointed. For four months, Balfour, always v/ell
equipped with criminal statistics and detailed reports of
intimidations, boycotting, etc. gathered from Dublin Castle,
and Assize reports, waged a tenacious but successful par-
liamentary battle against his Irish and liberal critics.
The Royal Assent for the Crimes Act was secured on 18 July.
The Tims, expose on 'Parnellism and Crime', although subse-
quently discredited by the forgery of R, ligott, materially
assisted the government in securing the votes of the J^iberal
Unionists whose natural inclinations went against coercion.
From August 188? until late I889 Balfour loft no
doubt of his determination to prosecute any person, irre-
spective of v/ealth, religion or position, vmo aided and
abetted the Plan of Campaign or the rural agitation encour-
aged by the National League* Speaking at Manchester in
December, I887 he warned the Irish m. p.'s,
Mere abuse could be treated with contempt, but
yihen it comes to open advocacy of crime, when
men who come over here and speak sofxly to the
iinglish people, go back to Ireland and urge the
excitable peasantry of that country to resist
the law, then I say you have ceased to be poli-
ticians , and you have become criminals^ and as
criminals I shall proceed against you,^
5
3 limsaxdr cccxii, 1181-2
»
^Alders on, Baii;.o_ui:* p. 78,
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John Dillon and William O'Brien were among the 26
Irish members who found Balfour true to his word. The
English Radical Home Ruler C. A. V. Conybeare was incar-
cerated for his participation in eviction obstruction,
while Wilfred S. Blunt, a cousin to Balfour's secretary,
found that his acquaintance with the Chief
-Secretary in
the 'Souls' group did not exempt from conviction his
inciting agrarian offenses.
Upon coming into office Balfour was disturbed by the
nervous reluctance of the Irish Lav; Office and the Irish
bench to prosecute and convict leaders of the National
League, most especially members of parliament and priests.
Declining morale within the Royal Irish Constabulary fol-
lowing the Gladstonian conversion and the renewal of
agrarian v/arfare were other barriers to -^b effective imple-
mentation of the Crimes Act, barriers which Balfour was
determined to break down» The Chief-Secretary 's defense of
the police and the resident magistrates in the Mitchelstown
affair of 9 September 186?, irrespective of strong evidence
of police indiscretion and bad judgement, restored the con-
fidence of the Consta/bulary and the resident magistrates.''
"^Curtis, QmJZQj^Qiit 197-200. The trial of William O'Brien
and John I.landeville (for inflamatory speeches) at Liitchels-
town on 9 September 1887 precipitated a protest meeting by
the National League. John Dillon and Henry Labouchere
were the keynote speakers for the occasion. v*hen the
efforts of the local magistrates and the jjolice to clear
a way for the police reporter were resisted by the crowd,
fighting broke out between the police and the crowd. Out-
numbered by 100 to 1, the police withdrew into the local
barracks, and took up defensive positions. Confused and
3^
Balfour and Under-Secretary Ridgeway constantly prodded the
Law Office in Dublin Castle to end their 'eternal minuting'
of cases, sjid proceed with prosecutions. As his name would
indicate, the promotion to tlie Attorney-Generalship of
•Peter the Packer' O'Brien in 1888 did much to shore up the
administration of the Crimes Act.^ Not too many months
elapsed before the Irish replaced the sobriquet 'Niminy-
Fiminy' for 'Bloody Balfour', while laudatory remarks about
Balfour's administration circulated within the Cabinet and
Irish Unionist ranks. ^ In fact, on occasions Balfour vir-
tually outdid his uncle in advocating 'resolute government'.
Parliamentary and political exigencies impelled the Prime
Minister to intervene when his nephew planned to prosecute
Irish newspaper publishers- and high ranking Catholic
clerics for supporting the Plan of Campaign."''"^
panicked, they opened fire on the crov;d with the result
that tv;o were killed, and several were wounded. The epi-
sode had some striking parallels to the infamous "Peterloo
Massacre' of 1819.
8Curtis, CsmrsL2s>j}t pp. 186-208.
9
-^R. fecGeagh to Hugh de F. Montgomery, 12 November 1888,
Montgomery Papers , P . R , 0 . N . I
, ,
Dod/627A28/6I
.
10Curtis, GasiKilQu, pp. 210-1^; Dugdale, Balfour ^ I, 153"^.
11Curtis, CQsxsilsmt pp. 2y^-6, When estimating the effect
of the Crimes Act on the league and on its utility in
getting the support of 'a better class of Roman Catholics',
Balfour corcmentedJ 'It is a curious fact that vigorous
Measures of suppression appear to produce a less exas-
perated frame of mind in the people than the impunity
v/hioh attended disloyal action during the period which
preceded the passing of the Bill.' Cabinet Memo on the
Crimes Act, n. d.p B. M. Add. MS ^I9>.822, f. lk-7
,
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While Balfour's rigorous law enforcement produced
abundant Nationalist propaganda and generated barrages of
protest from the Irish benches, it did accomplish a sub-
stantial reduction in agrarian crime by late 1088. From
both a cabinet and parliamentary perspective, this was a
necessary preliminary to the introduction of conciliatory
legislation for Ireland, The Cecilian insistence upon the
Irish first learning respect for the law was a pragmatic
and realistic assessment of the mood of ^Vestminster as much
as it was a product and reflection of Victorian anti-Irish
prejudice. Given the continued allegiance of many British
politicians to 'laissez-faire', and their deeply
, imbedded
suspicions of the Irish people, definite progress towards
•law and order' v/as essential before the canons of r>Ian-
chesterian economics could be violated by Irish remedial
legislation. As distasteful as Balfour's law enforcement
was to the Irish, it did create a parliamentary climate in
which desperately needed programs of land purchase and eco-
nomic development could not be easily jettisoned on grounds
of 'intolerable state intervention' or 'crim.inal statistics'
Until recently the bitter parliamentary debates gener-
ated by 'coercion' obscured the more constructive and
enduring aspects of Balfour's Irish policy."'"^ Only shortly
12Curtis, CQgrc.ign» chaps, 13-15; Catherine B. shannon, Lpi;a
Covg ri2.nifi.alc In Irslanii, ihs. i^litj.c.s. sM ihs. Administmti.oN
unpub, I.'], A, thesis. University College, Dublin, 1963,
chap. 5. Hereafter cited shannon, Lo^oii Coveynment in
Xraland..
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after assuming office, the Chief
-Secretary acknowledged
the need to temper Tory anti-Home Rule sentiment and repres
sion with conciliation. Defining Cromwell's mistake as
relying upon coercion alone, he promised to be
...as radical as any reformer in redressing the
grievances and especially in removing every
cause of complaint in regard to land. It is
on the tv/o fold aspect of my policy that 1 rely
for success. Hitherto the English governments
have stood first upon one leg and then UDon the
other. They have either been all for reoression
or all for reform. I am for both? repression
as stern a.s Cromwell; reform as thorough as
Mr, Parnell or anyone else can desire,J3
Over the next tv/o decades in his position as Chief-
Secretary and influential cabinet ministers Balfour was
generally faithful to the promise cited above. Viewing the
land problem as the seed from which all the agrarian and
separatist agitation germinated, Balfour concluded that
only the abolition of dual ownership and the establishment
of peasant proprietorship could bring peace to Ireland.
His first months in the Irish office sealed his conviction
that the 1881 settlement had failed. Home Rule sentiment,
he believed, would disappear in direct proportion to the
governiiient 's ability to secure, in the short run, rent
adjustments consistent with the 1885-6 plunge in agricul-
tural prices, and in the long run? a comprehensive program
of land purchase. The March 188? Report of the Cowper
Commission echoed Balfour's views in its lecommendation
T, Raymond, Mc. Balfour (London» W, CollAns, 1920),
p. ^11.
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for a government sponsored and guaranteed purchase program.
The Commissioners, the i:;arls of Cowper and Kiltown, James
Caird, J. G. Neligan and Thomas iCnlpe condemned dual owner-
ship as absolutely destructive of industry, initiative and
prosperity. This Commis£,'ion along with the First Report
of the Royal Commission on Irish Public Works also called
for extensive government action in initiating drainage
schemes and railway and harbour construction."^^ The Liberal
Unionists of Ulster had been pressing the Ministry for these
schemes ever since Hicks Beach v/as in office.-^'-^
Despite the time consuming debates on the Crimes Bill^
Balfour's study of the various dimensions of the Irish land
question led to his Cabinet memorandum by early April 188?
in which he outlined a step by step policy designed to cure
Ireland's historic land ills. Although stressing to his
colleagues the ultimate purchase solution, he recommended
a temporary measure along the lines of Darnell's Tenants
Relief Bill which Parliament rejected the previous year.
Plunging agricultural prices made an immediate reduction
of non-judicial rents absolutely essential if the government
1^
pp, 9t 18 (c. 4969} H.'C. 188?', xxvi. Hereafter cited'
Cowper Comraicsion Report. See also Fj^xsi Rep_oxt £l\ the
-toal. CrujialiislQn on Irish Piil)JJji iiorJis (c."5038) h," c.
10 67, XXV.
'-'I'hg. i!l3iQr Mkpxal iinioiiisj; Asj?.QQ.ijktiont a ^iis@ie.h oL lis.
HA^^toryf .lIi^-19JiA (Belfast j 191^+), P- 22. Hereafter
cited uiiiiiic ijjiiiraJ. Jinloniai AasLOiiiaiiyi:.
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was to check further expansion of rent boycotts. Indeed,
the government-appointed Gowper Commission supported the
Nationalist contention that the judicial rents fixed under
the 1881 legislation were exorbitant. However. Balfour was
reluctant to interfere here lest the Irish tenants conclude
that legal contracts could be suspended whenever bad times
arose. 1^ Meanwhile the larger purchase scheme and action
on the Congested Districts would have to be postponed until
the combined effects of a tenants relief measure and the
Crimes Bill restored order in the countryside. The tenants'
relief measure that Balfour subsequently introduced in July
188? recommended opening up the Land Courts to I50.OOO pre-
viously excluded leaseholders. In an effort to reduce the
bad effect which newspaper reports of Irish evictions v/ere
having upon English public opinion, Balfour recommended that
the "first eviction' which was usually followed by a six-
month re-entry and redemption option, be replaced with a
written notice of intent to evict unless arrears were forth-
coming. The Chief-Secretary also planned to enable Irish
tenants to declare bankruptcy if their insolvency was not
of their own making. Anticipating the objections of recal-
citrant -landlords and their Cabinet sympathizers who might
c3-aira 'violation of property rights', Balfour reminded his
colleagues that these proposals were an essential part of
16
Balfour's Cabinet Memorandum on land policy, 8 April I887,
B. M. Add. KS 49,822, ff. 38-50? Dugdale, Balfour . I, 128j
Curtis, Cpsssiim, p. 337
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any plan to restore law.
The landlords must not consider it in isolation.
They must take it in connection with the wholepolicy of the governrcenx; and they must feel
that the sacrifice asked of thera (if sacrifice itbej IS absolutely required if. the Union and all
the union means to them, is to be maintained. 17
As expected, Balfour's proposals were attacked by the
Conservatives in both Houses for going too far, while the
Nationalists raised a hue and cry over the absence of any
provision to adjust the terms and prices of judicial rents, -^-^
After a long parliamentary battle concessions were granted
to both sides. The Liberal Unionists and the Nationalist
demands for revision of judicial rents and a triennal term
were granted, while landlord anger v/as partially appeased
by the cancellation of the bankruptcy clause. In an effort
to calm the tempers and turmoil which the Crimes Bill simul-
taneously produced in Parliament, Balfour instructed Under-
secretary Buller to defer until the passage of the relief
bill those evictions v/here it appeared the tenants had been
treated harshly by their landlords, Although he kept it
hidden from public view, Balfour was extremely exasperated
by landlords like Clanricarde and O'Callaghan who pushed
their proprietory rights to the limit during the I887-8
17
'Balfour's Cabinet Memorandum on land policy, 8 April 188?
,
B. M, Add, r.:S -^^9.822, ff, ^9~50.
^^3 Hansara, cxxxvii, 372-90, S?2-7-^c
^^Dugdale, MlXsm^t I» 137: Balfour to Buller, 11 and 23
June 1887, cited in Curtis, Coerciony p. 243.
^0
crisis. As he later recalled to Lord Northbrook,
not unjuot, as far as 1 know, to his tenants he
?rr!ta?in.^at'7t"'"^'i;'^'^ '''''''' a^d"cspeiia!lyi i t g a tirae when it behoved everybodvinterested m law and order to support the Govern-
1 ^n^'^J'-^"^ ^^^^^ difficulties ofother landlords and the Government who had topro-cect them.'^O
In fact Balfour was so enraged by Clanricarde 's refusal to
forego evictions and to accept rents arbitrated by Bishop
Healy of Clonfert that he drew up legislation giving the
Land Court power compulsorily to take over and manage the
estates of unreasonable landlords. Cabinet hesitancy on
the basis of property rights was too strong to overcome, and
this plan to reduce unnecessary evictions v/as lost.^-"-
Once passage of the Tenant's Relief measure was
assured, Balfour and Salisbury hoped to introduce a compre-
hensive land purchase bill as quickly as possible. They
based their anxiety upon a number of considerations. First,
so long as dual ownership existed ^ the Irish wordd have a
theatre to expound their socialistic property theories.
The demonstrations and riots connected with the agitation
of the Social Democratic Federation in the late summer and
fall of 1887 seemed to substantiate the contagious nature
of Irish property theories. Men of Salisbury's and Balfour's
wealth and position could not be indifferent to this
20Balfour to Lord I^orthbrook, 5 June 1S99» B. M.Add. hiS
49,853. f. 13.
21Curtis, iLcimiifiii, pp. 256-7.
^1
situation, and they hoped to convert tho peasants of Ireland
to capitalistic values through land purchase. Secondly,
many Irish landlords, in the face of downward rent revisions,
boycotts and generally declining land values, were anxious
to sell before prices sunk too low. and before Nationalist
agitators convinced the tenants that their holdings would
be obtained for nothing within a few years. Lord i^nsdowne.
an old school chura of Balfour's and Hugh de F. Montgomery,
were typical of many Irish landlords who ultimately advo-
cated purchase in order to cut their losses. The critical
situation of many landlords is exemplified by the losses
Lansdowne incurred on his Irish estates, v/here his net
rentals fell from i23,000 to ^500 by 1888.^^ In addition
to the pressure of vested interests, rapid action on pur-
chase was continually pressed upon the Tories by the Liberal
Unionists smarting under a coercionist label. The ministers
were repeatedly reminded by the Liberal Unionists and their
leader, Joseph Chamberlain that the terms of the coalition
included land purchase, and remedial legislation for educa-
tion, drainage, railways and democratic local government.
2? -
j.^ord North brook to Montgomery » 26 February 1889, i- r.R. O.N. I.
.
Dod/627A' 28/83? R. i-iacGeagh to Jiontgomery, 17 November
1888, Dod/62?A28/8l; Montgomery to G, de v/illis, 26 April
1889, Bod/627A28/98s Saiiuel Black to Montgomery, 29 Sep-
tember 1888 f Dod/627/^28/56.
23
•^Curtis, (kLQTJils^ni p. 3^7.
2if
Salisbury to Balfour. 26 JuJy 1892^ B. I.I, Add. MS ^1-9,690,
f. 66? Uislsr Liilgiai Unionist Assoc iation f pp. 1-22.
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Despite the urgency felt by Balfour and the Cabinet,
a comprehensive scheme had to await the settlement of a
number of problems, such as determining a price fair to
tenant and landlord alike, choosing the proper machinery to
supervise sales, setting up the necessary Treasury guarantees,
and deciding upon the justification of compulsion on those
estates where the landlord-tenant relations had been espe-
cially acrimonious. The Congested Districts in the West
presented even greater difficulties since most holdings
there were inadequate in size or quality of soil to merit
purchase. Not until late I889 were all these matters set-
tled, so that Balfour's first venture in land purchase was
fairly limited in scope. The 1888 Act did prove the govern-
ment's commitment to purchase by providing i>3, 000, 000 to
supplement the Ashbourne Act. The reduction of the purchase
price from 18 year 3 months rental value to 1? years
insured that annuities v/ere not greater than rents, and
thereby induced more tenants to apply for purchase, By
I890 purchase applications totaling tL9, 127,388 had been
26
submitted by 23 p 348 tenants,
Balfour's legislative efforts v/ere not confined to
land purchase. Partially in response to Liberal Unionist
^^John FJ. Pomfret, Hi£ IsiT l^M in Jrfilanci (Prince-
tonj Princeton Univ. Press, 1930)* p. 230. Hereafter
cited Pomfret, Sj^Ufjils X$>r I^ial*
26 Curtis, Coercion, p, 350.
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pressure and an optimism generated by rising farm prices
and a languishing of the Plan of Gampai-n, Balfour laid
before Parliament a series of proposals designed to augment
economic development. The Cowper Commission and the First
Report of the Royal Commission on Irish Public Works had
stressed the need for a network of drainage schem.es to con-
trol the flooding of Ireland's many rivers. Productive
farming was impossible in many areas without proper flood
control, most especially in those agricultural coiTununities
bordering upon the Shannon River and the Corrib, Absence
of drainage schemes Balfour cited as an importajit barrier
to purchase by many tenants. So he introduced drainage
bills for the Barrow, Eann, Sharjion and Suck Rivers on
31 I/iay 1888, He intended to finance the schemes through a
combination of free grants and loans totaling jb380,000.
In the course of the debate p although aclmowledging v^he
Radical complaint that English localities had to finance
their public works, the Chief-Secretary defended the e^^pendi-
ture of imperial funds as an historic deblr owed to Ireland
for the destruction of budding Irish industries prior to
the Union. However, lest the Irish members expect massive
imperial financing, Balfour emphasized his conviction that
goverriment aid alone could not create economic progress, A
great industrial enterprise, he said, was the product of
native skill, capital, and organizing ability. Maintaining
that Ireland possessed tJie first two, he saw no evidence of
the last. This lack of confidence in the Irish was
reflected in the small degree of popular control over the
drainage schemes given to the occupiers charged with the
repayment of loans. Although the Irish members were not
overly enthusiastic about the bills, the Radical opposition
led by A. C. V. Conybeare. Sir George Campbell and S. Storey
destroyed them.^? Radical criticism of any expenditures
on Ireland had been consistent, and Balfour complained
bitterly to the Bishop of Selfordof his additional obstacle.
You will observe the attitude that has been
taken up by the Radical tarty on the subject
of my Bills for the material improvement of
Ireland - they are determined to do their best
to wreck them, the Irish members fi;ivin£;^ the
Government cold and reluctant support. 28
On the other hand, the Light Railway Bill providing a
grant of L60 0,000 to facilitate the construction of linos
into the Congested Districts of the West was warmly received
by the Irish members. Th^ Sq.qs,ji^ Rej^orJ; q£. ihQ Roval Cpia-
m.S5l<?ja m IxisJl iiljMixi vmrilS as well as the annual reports
of the Irish Fishery Inspectors had emphasized the urgency
of rail facilities for the struggling infant fishing indus-
29
i.ry. The Chief-Secretary argued forcefully for the rails
as a much more important means of boosting prosperity than
3 HjJQOaLrd, cccxxxvi, l604-8, I725-27.
28Balfour to the Bishop of Selford, 26 June 1839, B. Ju. Add.
US 49,828, f. 96.
29
Zu<l Es.mx:l pj. ihs. Bpyal Ccii}ini£.§lfiD on Iris h lubiic iiorlca,
p./; (0. 5204) H. c. 1838. xiviii; hs^juQnt oi insmoli^n £l
Jjusii EjJiiis.r±s.s fjor pp. 11~12 (c. 5035) h. c. 1887,
xxij also Fishery report for 1888, pp. 16-1? (c. 3777)
C. 1889, xxii.
drainage schemes. ^0 in addition to citing the potential
increase in the sale of Irish fish and agricultural produce,
Balfour stressed the railways' utility in exposing the Con-
gested Districts to the 'outside world'. Undoubtedly he
believed that anglicization and modernization would be
stimulated. He saw an additional blessing in the rails'
potential for encouraging emigration. -^^ The importance
Balfour attached to the rail scheme was roflected in the
liberal credit arrangements for the proposed lines. The
bill authorized the Treasury to make a direct guarantee to
the rail companies rather than await a primary guarantee
from the barony through which the line was to pass. Tm nyw
credit regulations enabled the required capital to be raised
at 3^ per annum rather than 5>'i. If rr2cesf:ary» the Treasury
could loan all or part of the fc600,000 to rail compcxnies
unable to raise funds from private sources. The Congested
Districts were not liable for any of the construction costs,
although a rate of 6d in the pound was authorized by the bill
if costs exceeded receipts. With the exception of three
Irish members, the Irish benches found scheme very
attractive. Mr. Joseph CTillis Biggar (Cavan, .'0 e.nd
Mr. Patrick Arthur Chance (Kilkenny) attacked the bill as
a bribe, while Arthur O'Connor (Donegal, i^.) abstained
3 HanaaiL<^.» cccxxviii, 9^.
'^1
^ Balfour to Ridgeway, 15 May IO89, B. W, Add. MS 49,82?,
f. 26 J Curtis, Cgigr.c i.Qn, p. 357.
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from voting on the grounds that high overhead would increase
taxes in his locality. However, Rev. Michael Martin of
Killybegs rebuked O'Connor, and emphasized to Balfour the
importance or the railways to Donegal.
I told him he assumed a most unwarrantable
responsibility to make a false statement atthe very time that all the divisions of the
country were crying out for railv/ays, I
said that he and his party were opposing
every good measure for Ireland, that no chief
secretary had ever done the one-twentieth
part of the good v/hich you do for the count-^y
.and that after you had passed your land pur-
chase bill no fair man could deny it. 32
The passage of the Light Railways Act in I889 greatly
facilitated the government's task of providing employment
in the congested districts during the potato failure of the
following year, /^hen reports of a probable blight reached
the government during early June I89O, Balfour moved to
incorporate rail construction into his general relief plans.
Construction in the areas dependent upon the potato began
in late November^ four months earlier than planned so as to
coincide v/ith the exhaustion of the good potatoes in mid-
December. Balfour threatened the Midland Railway Company
with cancellation of the government contract when they balked
at the financial arrangements offered by the government. •^•^
Anxious to keep relief works to a minimum and to avoid the
-'"Rev, K. Martin to Balfour, 9 March I89I, B. M. Add. MS
^9,848, ff, 95-6. Many newspapers within the Congested
Districts recorded resolutions of local boards of^guardians
favoring the construction of railways,
^-^Gurtis, Coerciori. p. 366.
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Meinoralization' of outdoor relief, Ealfour wanted to
employ as many men as possible on the rails. Sir West
Ridgeway, the Under-Secretary, estimated that the wages
paid to from 7,000 to 8,000 men and boys saved approximately
35 to ifO thousand people from virtual starvation during one
of the worst blights since the 18^0 's.^^ Ridgeway arrived
at the latter figures by including the relatives of rail
workers who were sustained by rail wages. Official figures
indicate that the 228 miles of rail constructed during the
distress raised the economic potential of many congested
areas. The Donegal-Killybegs line may partially explain
the increased fishing activity in the area between 1892 and
1903
e
The number of vessels engaged in fishing rose from
158 to 198 J while the fishermen employed increased in numbers
from 3k6 to 10^5.^^
The government's relief schemes provided 7392 people
with work on road and bridge construction and repair. The
seacoast population benefited from the construction of 18
piers, boatslips and landing areas. The projects were
carefully planned to insure that only useful construction
was done. Balfour demanded close supervision on the relief
oi.r West Ridgeway 's Draft Report on Relief of Distress,
I89O-I, B. M. Add. MS 49,823, f. 182.
^%ii^Tnla mxsiLto:, 1894, p, 697; tUqhIs Dirge tgrY, 1895,
p. 799.
Ridgeway 's Report on Distress, I890-I, B, ivi. Add. KS
49,^23, f. 182.
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works to insure that 'a day's work for a day's pay' pre-
vailed.-^"^ Besides alleviating the serious distress and
permajiently improving the economic resources of the west,
Balfour hoped the relief works would lift the inhabitants
out of '...the demoralizing slough of insolvency..,' through
hard work, discipline and punctuality learned on the job.
The Chief-Secretary was convinced that his self-help lesson
would prove an asset as important as roads and rails in
averting a complete collapse in any future potato failures.
Education into Anglo-Saxon values was a fundamental aim of
moot of Balfour's ameliorative measures c*^^
The road works and rail construction were not appro-
priate forms of relief for the sick, the old and the children
of the famine-stricken areas. The government relied upon a
37
-'^ Balfour to Commissioner Tuke, 26 August I890, B. M. Add.
MS 49,817, f. 248.
30
3 Himsard* cccxlix, 560 ; TJtLa Times, 18 November 1890.
Indeed, the Chief-^Socretary would have reforraed Irish
eating habits, if possible. After conducting experiments
growing potatoes at his whitting hame estate on the
1890 failure, Balfour lamented in September I890 to Sir
James Caird, 'I v/ish to heaven we could induce the Irish
to grow some food of a more trustv/crthy character than
the potato, ., .The readiness to accept nev/ ideas and to
engage on new enterprises is precisely the characteristic
most wanting in the population. ... If it were not so they
would have refused to squat generation after generation
on the bogs and mountains of the inclement rtest, ' Cited
in Curtis
» p. 378. A few weeks later Lord Zetland, the
Viceroy, expressed similar sentiments v/hen reporting on
his recent tour in the v/est, 'I grieve to say that my
experience of the Celts leads me to believe that .trovidonco
has not endowed him with sufficient energy to do much more
than eat l-'otatoes that are put into his mouth.' Zetland
to Balfour, 2? October I89O, B. M. Add. iViS 49,602, f, 127
.
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strictly administered outdoor relief program, seed distribu«
tion. and the efforts of private charity to take care of
this segment of the distressed population. The private
charity efforts of Lord and Lady Zetland, the Viceroy and
his wife, helped to mitigate some of the hostility which the
restrictions on outdoor relief caused.
Although the government's response to the crisis of
I89O-I may appear niggardly and inadequate by today's
standards, when measured by the climate of contemporary
opinion, Balfour's actions evidence a novel determination
to find a permanent remedy for the terrible poverty in Con-
naught and Western Donegal. Many of the people and the
priests later acknowledged his efforts, while others com-
mented upon the improved efficiency and effectiveness of
the relief operations as a v/hole.^^
An explanation of this increased effort is not hard
to find. In addition to his experience with the Crofter
problems in Scotland, Balfour's two week tour of Cormemara
and Donegal in October I890 impressed upon the Chief-
Secretary the serious consequences of the impending crop
failure, and also strengthened his conviction that even in
^^-^Golonol Turner to Balfour, 2? November I89O, B, M, Add.
MS 49,609, ff. 106-81 Rev. Michael Martin to Balfour,
9 March I89I, B, M. Add. MS 49,848, ff, 93-96j vvilliam
Doherty to Balfour, 4 June I89I, B, M. Add. WS 49,848,
f. 205? resolutions of Swineford Board of Guardians on
8 March 1892 reported in Hi)tas X):ijm Ir^lnnd, V, no. 4
(19 toch 1892) J Dublin ilerald, 13 August 1892.
^^R» Rutledge Fair to Browning, 12 February I89I, B. M. Add.
MS 49,848, f. 63i ^'•yndham to Balfour, 26 November 1900,
B, M. Add. MS 49,80:3, f. 48 j same to same 2 February I9OO,
f. 205, fjame to same, 20 September I90I, ff. 211-12.
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ordinary circumstances a heavy does of state intervention
was necessary to render any improvement in the Consested
Districts. As he told the National Conference of Consorva-
tive and Constitutional Associations in Liverpool subsequent
to his tour, relief works alone would not teach '...the
habits of continuous, painful, industry...' so essential to
any significant or permanent progress Balfour thought
a variety of means necessary to transform the Irish into
law-abiding, industrious, thrifty and independent citizens.
The crime statistics suggested that three years of resolute
government were effectively developing the first character-
istic. Hov/ever, since it would be many years before the
allegedly elevating effects of single ownership could be
fully realized, Balfour supported and encouraged any pro-
grarns or persons which premised to increase the self-reliance,
initiative, skills and general education of the people » The
establishment of the Congested Districts Board under his
Land Act of I89I perhaps best illustrates this approach*
From his earliest days in the Irish Office Ealfour
appreciated the special difficulties of terrain, isolation
and uneraplojTTient which plagued this land west of the Shannon
_
. Li.2
River. The conclusions of virtually every government
^^•\TJia Iim££, 18 November I89O.
'^^Balfour to Buller, 12 March 188?, cited in Dugdalo,
B^JXeiir, I, pp. 128-9; i^alfour to .-Salisbury 3I October
I889, B, M. Add. MS ^9,689, f. 77? William l, Micks, A
lii^iory Ih^ Qs}lXgesJL^ DinicifiiS. iistil^ (Dublin: i:.ason,
1925) contains the best description of the problems of
the '.'/est. Hereafter cited iviicks, Con-Bested Districts
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commif^sion and report between 188? and I890 concerned with
Iri^h economic conditions emphasized these exceptional
difficulties, and called for some paternalistic ,-overnment
action. This official opinion was reinforced by consistent
Liberal Unionist plaas for special attention to the West.
Thie combination of personal conviction, official recom-
mendations, and Liberal Unionist pressure, stimulated Balfour
to advocate a considerable amount of paternalism in his I891
Land Act. Contrary to still widely held principles of
laissez-faire
p his act conferred upon the Congested Districts
Board powers of compulsory purchase to facilitate the amal-
gamation of small holdings into economically viable units.
It further authorized aid and the development of forestry,
edmg, as well as weaving and spin-
ning in the v/est. The encouragement of the fishing industry
throui^h the construction and improvement of piers and har-
bours as well as instruction in modern agricultural skills
and native crafts were important board responsibilities.
The board's jurisdiction spread over 3,608,569 acres in the
poorest sections of Donegal, Loitrim, i^ligo, Mayo, Rcscominon,
Galway, Kerry and Cork. The annual interest on the Irish
Church Surplus Fund provided an income of ib^l,250 over which
the board had absolute discretion. By staffing the board
with sympathetic men cognizant of conditions in t)ie West,
and by giving it financial independence, Balfour protected
it from the usual stigma of being 'just another Castle
board'. ^ The board's reconstructive efforts displ^.yed
themselves in the expansion of their jurisdiction to include
one-half the area of Ireland and one-third the population,
as well as in the growth of its income to 4-250,000 by I909,
A desire on the part of Gerald Balfour and George Wyndhan,
as well as of the Nationalists to facilitate the board's
amalgamation and migration operations, rather than increased
poverty, was the chief reason for the jurisdictional expan-
sion, vvhen the board was dissolved in I923, approximately
1,000 estates comprising 2,000,000 acres had been purchased,
while 60,000 holdings were created or- improved. A total of
£-2,250,000 had been spent on improving land, dwellings, farm
buildings, drainage, fences and roads.
Comments from many political quarters attest to the
accomplishments and esteem achieved by the Congested Dis-
tricts Boc-rd* Referring to Balfour's scheme as ' enlightened
state socialism', the old land Leaguer Michael Davitt wrote
«
Though opinions differ as to the amount of
good done by tiiis body, there can be no
•doubt that much benefit has been conferred
by its labours upon the several districts
comprised v/ithin its area,^^
^3r/licks, • Con
-eru;£.a pp. I6-I8, The original
board included the Bishop of Raphoe, Lr. O'Donnell, the
Rev, Charles Davis of Baltimore', Co. Cork v/ho aided fishery
development in V/est Cork, William Green of the Fishery
Board J and Father Finlay and Horace Munkett of Irish
Agricultural Organization Society fame,
'^%ick3, ConzQslM Districl^s Baar^f p* 123.
^^Pomfret, 'Ms. strugrjXQ Xsx MM, p. 310.
Michael Davitt, Tfce FsXi J2£ FfiUdaliiiia Jji .Ireland ( London
s
1904), p. 663,
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Indeed Davitt was one of those who urged the expansion of
the Board's jurisdiction to encompass the eastern Connaught
grazing ranches during the height of the United Irish
League's agitation of I901-3. John Dillon, recently sen-
tenced under Balfour's Crimes Act, was friendly to the Board,
its author notwithstanding.^"^ Only two years after the
Board's establishment. Sir Herbert Jekyll. Lord Houghton's
secretai-y. following a trip through the west, wrote:
The Congested Districts Board are doin.T excel-
lent work, especially in fostering: and" extending
the fish?ries. Here a^ain the difficulty is
mainly with the people themselves, who in come
districts do not take readily to seafaring life.
Much has been done to overcome these prejudices,
and much more may be done with patience and
better education. At many of the fish-curing
stations men are constantly employed at good
wages, while the fishermen find a steady market
for the fish which were formerly unsaleable....
The extension of the railways has greatly bene-
fitted the fisheries, as it enable? the fish to
be taken to profitable markets ... ,^8
Official figures later confirmed the optimistic pre-
diction of better days for the people of the West, Between
IC9I and 1903 the value of fish caught on the West Coast
increased from £62,631 to ^12/^300 while the quantity
increased from 138,000 cv/ts to 289,3^2 cwts. Between
Castletown Berehaven and Rathraullen, the number of fisher-
men increased from 12,022 in I89I to 13,168 in 1903.^^
hn
^Mviicks,
.CoTiSi^riieii Distxifils Bt^aca, p. 1?7.
-oxr Algernon west, Ths. imimte Pir.rie.s Sir Ain^mon
}VQSt» ed, H. G. Hutchinson (London: J, Murray, 1922),
p. 180.
^^^-TiiOTiiVs Director::;, 189'^ p. 686; -rhpm's Direg trry, 1905,
p. 798.
5^
These figures ^niggest the financial and social benefits
which the coastal population derived from the combined
efforts of the Congested Districts Board and the Fishery
Board, Balfour's enthusiasm for the Board's work led him
to want to continue as a board member after he left the
chief secretaryship in the fall of 1891.-5<^
Balfour's preference for improvement through individual
initiative rather than through state-supported schemes led
him to encourage and support Sir Jlorace Plunkett's efforts
to modernize Irish farming and business practices through
dairy cooperatives and educational schemes, When he first
heard of Plunkett's plans and his hopes to promote cordial
relations between the Ascendency and the people through the
cooperative principle, Balfour v/as enthusiastic. In early
I89I Plunkett requested a small government grant of -LkOO
to ^500 to launch his schemes, but so far no record of
whether that was cipproved by Balfour has emerged. Never-
theless, once Plunkett's Irish Agricultural Organization
Society demonstrated its potential in for-warding ' self-help'
values and in accruing profits for its members, Balfour
advised numerous officials and landlords to consult Plunkett.
In fact, Balfour showed his esteem for Plunkett and his
Balfour to Ridgev/ay, 22 October I89I, B. M. Add. MS ^1-9,830,
ff. 315-16.
^"'"Plunkett to Balfour, 18 September I889, B, M. Add.
MS 49.792, f . 23; also same to same, 5 February I89I,
f, 2? J Plunkett Diaries, I5 April I89I, Plunkett House,
London,
wor.s in 1900 when the former Chief-Secretary intervened
in the South Dublin election to rescue Plun.ett from attacks
by ultra-Unionist landlords highly suspicious of the sin-
cerity of Plunketfs unionism. 52
One Irish grievance which Balfour hoped to solve was
the Roman Catholic University question. Since Trinity
College was an Ascendency dominated institution, and the
Royal University was principally an examining and degree
"
granting body, there was little opportunity for an Irish
Homan Catholic to obtain a liberal university education.
The Chief-Secretary was anxious to provide Irish Catholics
with higher education to develop in them enough independence
of thought and action to counteract the extreme deference
Which the Irish allegedly had for thoir political and eccle-
siastical leaders. Besides encouraging political stability,
numbers of university-trained Catholics would become valu-
able assets to the economy as engineers, businessmen, and
as members of other professions. Sympathy for university
reform had existed among some Unionists since I885. Lord
Carnarvon and Sir Michael Hicks Beach both had attempted to
produce a satisfactory scheme, but Salisbury and the Cabinet
were reluctant to touch the issue for fear of alienating
English Unionists and Presbyterians. At the height of his
struggles with the Plan of Campaign in late 188? , Balf -ur was
urged by the Catholic Duke of Norfolk and Bishops Healy and
This episode will be discussed in the next chapter.
0'I>.,er to begin direct negotiations with Ro«e for a state
subsidized Romn Catholic University. However, the new
Chief-Secretary stated adai»anxly that concessions or state
aid would be possible only when '...the Irish priesthood
Shall have learnt the ten ccnnandments.
.
. '53 and joined the
government in arresting the land war. As Balfour explained
at the time J
...it is i-npossible to ask Parliament or thp
Ca'th^TL Pbf""^^
any sacrifice in favour of *ihexathoiic Church m Ireland while all the
resources of that Church are beins exhaustedin the cause of socialism and Revolution. But
T '"^^^ unhappy state of things isDrough-L to an end, the matter will be^ takenseriously m hand. 5^
It was mid-1889 before Ireland was sufficiently paci-
fied to impel Balfour to reopen the Catholic educational
question as part of his general program of constructive
unionism. He hoped to affiliate a Ronian Catholic college
with the Royal University of Ireland, and to endow it with
•fc33,000 a year. Fifteen prominent Roman Catholic laymen
would compose the governing body. Balfour's suspicions
about the quality and content of clerical education led Mm
to insist that a committee of arts and science facultier.;,
rather than the governors or clergy, set the curriculuTiu
Admittedly Salfour's enthusiasm for Catholic higher educa-
tion was not completely altruistic. Part of his motivation
-^'Curtis, Cs3j:iQlmt p. 276.
IkLd.j p. 388.
at this Juncture was to win moderate bishops and the Vatican
over as active allies in the administration's war a.ainst
rural disorder. The Catholic university he kept danglin. as
a possibility in the hopes that a .ore rigid enforcement of
the Papal Rescript would result. ^5 However. Balfour's plan
for a Ronoan Catholic University floundered like earlier
proposals upon a combination of cabinet reluctance and rank
and file anti-Catholic prej^.dice within the Unionist coali-
tion. In any case, the Irish bishops were not ready to
sacrifice their independence by accepting Balfour's plan,
iiqually difficult were the slighted feelings which prospects
Of a government supported Catholic university raised among
the Presbyterians of the North. Consequently, the uni-
versity question went into raothballs for another decade.
Balfour's plans for improving elementary education met
with more success. In I892. W. L. Jackson, who replaced
Balfour as Chief
-Secretary in late I89I, carrica the National
Sducation (Ireland) Bill which provided for a total of
•L290.000 to abolish fees in most schools, and which increased
teacher pension and salary funds. -^^
In addition to formulating the land purchase proposals
end administering the relief operations. Balfour spent con-
siderable time during his last year as Chief-Secretary
wrestling with the problem of Irir;h local government reform.
-^^Curtia. £i?j:u:£Li2n , p. jS8-9.
^^^iliiii., p» 391.
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The need for the democratization of local government insti-
tutions throughout the United Kingdom, and especially in
Ireland, had been generally conceded by the Liberals, the
Irish, and moderate Tories as far back as the early 'eightie.
.
Chamberlain's controversial proposals for an 'Irish central
board', and later for national councils in Ireland and
England was in part a recognition of the archaic, ineffi-
cient and oligarchic character of county administration
within Great Britain. Tory espousal of democratic local
government reform originated in late I885 amidst the con-
fusion of the break-up of Gladstone's government. When
rumours of Whig opposition to Chamberlain's local govern-
ment scheme and of Gladstone's Home Rule proclivities
spread throughout the parliamentary ranks in August J.885,
the Tories decided to steal the Liberal's thunder on local
government reform. In addition, they hild a small hope
that the Irish people might accept democratic county govern-
ment as a viable alternative to Home Rule^-^^ Speaking at
Newport on 7 October I885, Salisbury pledged his party to
abolish the grand jury system throughout the kingdom. His
intentions were reaffirmed by Sir Michael Hicks Beach in
the Queen's Speech in the following January, However, the
Prime Minister and Hicks Beach both insisted that an Irish
reform would be deferred until the political and social
67
-^'Catherine 3, Shannon, "The Ulster Liberal Unionists and
Local Government Reform, 1885"98," Irisil Historical
Slii^iii:iii 18, No. 73 (iviarch 1973 )f pp. ^>^07-9.
condition Of Ireland ceased to threaten imperial security
and the lives and property of the
-loyal minority. Con-
sidering that Salis^urys aristocratic prejudices caused
hxm to delay the English and Scottish measures until 1888.
it is hardly surprising that he wanted to jettison the IrLh
pledge. The dictates of practical ,,oH + f^c ^iJidctic i politics made that impos-
sible.
The realignment of parties with the defeat of Home "
Rule and the Spring election of 1886 meant that the Tories
could not permanently disregard the legislative priorities
Of the former Liberals who had deserted the Gladstonian
ranks for the preservation of the Union. A belief in demo-
cratic local government was. of course, one of the strongest
articles in the political creed of the Liberal Unionist
leader, Joseph Chamberlain. After the failure of the Round
Table conference Chamberlain consistently pressured the
Tory ministers to prove their good faith by introducing the
local government measures, and the introduction of the
English and ScottisJi biJls in 1888 was largely the result
Of that pressure. The Ulster 3.iberal Unionists toolr steps
to make sure that Ireland did not lag far behind.- After
finding a sympathetic ally in Chamberlain at the December
1886 Conference of Liberal Unionists, the Ulstermen sent a
deputation to Hicks Beach outlining their legislative pri-
orities as democratic local government, land purchase, and
railway and drainage schemes for economic development. JIow-
ever, the Chief
-Secretary 's failing health and the Prime
60
Minister's insistence upon 'law and order' militated
against the introduction of any portion of the Ulster
Liberal Unionists' suggestions .^^ A second Ulster Liberal
Unionist campaign to get an Irish measure simultaneously
with the English and Scottish bills was mounted in early
1888, but the young Chief
-Secretary was as adamant as his
uncle had been earlier thatt
...different circumstances and differentbehaviour are essential before loca! seL-government can be proposed with hoDe of
Ire'aSinst'^f.r^^f ^''^ ^^^^^^^^
tical?59
cannot be described as poli-
Balfour's refusal to contemplate an Irish measure before
he had developed his land purchase proposals and while he
was fighting the Plan of Campaign, had the backing of
Chamberlain. Hartington and the majority of the hnglish
Liberal Unionists. From the government
--s perspective,
it v/as essential that the power of the National League be
broken first. Otherwise, the governraent feared thcit
Leaguers, inspired by confiscatory property views, would'
dominate the councils and use them as weapons in the land
agitation. Balfour did not want to jeopardize further the
landlord class, many of whom had already incurred severe
58
J^h^. Uls^^z i.d]-.erai i^nionisj^ Asso£jUn^on, p. 22.
^^3
.Haasiii:^, cccxxv, 503.
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^p'r^o ^^t'^^^'h '^/.o^^^o'^'; ^''^^"tf^omery, 29 January 1888,
financial losses fro. the Plan an. the general rural agita-
tion.
„hile Balfour was not opposed to Liberal Unionist
suggestions for remedial legislation, his opposition to
local government reform lasted till mid-1889. In early I890.
the Chief-Secretary told the parliamentary draftsmen to
prepare an Irish local government measure. Three considera-
tions prompted Balfour's switch. The decline in the rural
agitation and the government's success in extending the •
Ashbourne Act tended to lessen his anxieties about League
domination and manipulation of the prospective county coun-
cils. Secondly, as he told A. V.
-Dicey, some action was
inevitable owing to the originaJ pledge and the promises
made to the liberal Unionists back in 1886 and I887. Kepudi-
ation might, in Balfour's opinion, risk the break up of the
Unionist party.62 ^^^^.^^ conservative strength in recent
elections emphasized the importance of strong Liberal Union-
ist support in the next general election. Thii-dly, the
comprehensive land purchase scherce upon which Balfour
insisted local government reform was conditional, was ready
for introduction to the Commons. By early 1691 the success-
ful passage of the Land Act as well, as the disruptions
threatening trie Irish party had strengthened Balfour's
resolve. A local governcent bill offered an irresistible
^"^i^f68o"'"r--*to-?n^°"''* "
J^""^ry I889, B. K. Add. Mi
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opportunity for capitalizing on the divisions an<i disillu-
sion,„e„ts Which tho exposure of the Parnell-0..hea affair
engendered within the Irish party and Ireland. I„ fact.
Sir west Ridgeway, the Undersecretary, expressed see hlpe
that many priests would gratefully accept local government
in place of Home Rule.^^
Following Balfour's 10 August I89I announcement that
an Irish local government bill would be introduced in the
next session, the Irish Office was inundated with letters
from irate Irish Unionists and landlords who predicted that
•the National League would make havoc and mayhem of the coun-
cils. The Unionist press voiced loud demands for protective
devices su.ch as minority representation or special franchise
qualifications, f.xtremely bitter over this eruption of
unionist opposition, Balfour wrote one disenchanted Union-
ists
I consider that I have a real grievance against
tiie party, for the pledge has been ^iven over
and oyer again. It has been introduced in onequeen s speech after another, and so far as IUnow not a smglo serious expression of dis-
approval has been received durini^ all theseyoars by any responsible member of the govern-
ment, I do not imow whether the party take the
view that promises are made to be broken, if so,
I cannot agree with them. ok *
r/'^yf ^"'^^ uiugeway to Balfour, 19 October 1891.B. M, Add. MS ^9,812, f. 199, *
Balfour to Ridgeway, I'y October I891, B, M. Add. MS
:;J9,8^0, f . 282, R d I
6^
Add^°v/^ 49 Po 2 ^September I89I, B. M.
Two „.el.s later, citing the support of t«o Ulster l-.ie.bors.
Saunderson and. Macartney, the Chief-Secretary told the
Duke Of Aberoorn.one of the .ost influential Irish Unionists,
that retreat was i^possible.^S
,^^1, ^^^^.^^^^
pathetic to landlord anxieties, Balfour saw great difficulty
in securing minority representation acceptable to Liberal
Unionists and Nationalists .^6 i„ an effort to counteract
ultra-Unionist demands for stringent safeguards, the Chief-
Secretary requested the Marquis of Waterford. one of his
few enthusiastic supporters, to impress upon his fellow
landlords the futility of franchise qualifications as safe-
guards j
They irritate one party without Drotectin^ theother. They destroy all appearance of eqSalUybetvreen the treatment of England and Ireland'
^
and they would certainly be swept away in theixrst s-corm. I am very anxious for minority
representation if that can be obtained an thiswill ensure some good men upon every county
council, which is absolutely on democratic^lines,
Despite these pleas, the campaign to secure stringent
safeguards was successful. As a result the Irish local
government bill introduced by Balfour on 18 February 1892
was so halting and inadequate that many Irish members as
Lo^iSn^ J5 Abercorn. 9 iJeptember I89I, B. M. Add, hiS
'^ytOjOt ff. 229-30.
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l^^i^Q^ f^
^aterford, 22 October I89I, B. M, Add. MS
6if
well as English liberals demurred fro. taking it seriously.
The long-awaited bill provided for county and district coun-
cils, elected on a parliamentary franchise. Grand jury
responsibilities relating to road maintenance, sanitation
and the administration of local revenues would go to the
proposed councils. The four main safeguards, incorporated
in deference to landlord anxieties, practically obscured the
democratic aspects of the bill. A cumulative vote for thoce
paying the highest county cess was written in. The grand
jury's right of traverse was retained enabling any taxpayer
to challenge a council presentment before a judge and jury.
The third and most controversial safeguard provided for the
dismissal of county and district councils for dis^cbedience
to the. law. corruption, or consistent malversation and
opprescuon. The fourth safeguard, which had no Jinglish or
Scottish precedent, provided for a joint committee of coun-
cil members and grand jurors to have a supervisory vote on
all capital expenditures as well as on the appointment of
all new loc:al government officers.
The Irish benches condemned root and branch Balfour's
attempt to redeeui the Newport pledge, for it preserved,
even if in limited form, the oligarchic grand juries and
their controversial powers of granting compensation for
malicious injuries. The Irish members called the bill an
insult to the Irish people .xnd a coercion bill in disguise.
^'^^ir Mns^^, i, ? 26-95.
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Whxlo Balfour's local government measure mi^ht oon-
ceivably have been satisfactorily amended, nationalist
support was impossible owing to the increasing possibility
Of a general election, Wherpa<5v,uxun «nereas this circuinstance obligated
the Tories to introduce the bill, the strong livelihood of
a Liberal victory obligated the Irish to expedite the Union-
ist fall by opposing any local government bill, irrespective
Of its merits. At this juncture, the Irish had their signts
on Home Rule, and they had to expend all their political
energy in convincing the English Liberals of the justice of
the HoBie Rule demand. Not surprisingly, then, after attacks
from both Unionists and the Irish, the government dropped
Balfour's bill without regret or ceremony.
In explaining the origins of Balfour's progressive
uidonism betiveen 188? ajid 1892, it is perhaps teinpting to
attribute his conciliation chiefly to a Iv!achiavellian desire
to preserve and perpetuate the Liberal Unionist Tory alliance,
Certainly, the introduction of the Local Governrent Eill in
1892 was largely a tacit recognition of the need to keep
Liberal Unionist support in a potentially close election.
Balfour's correspondence bears witness to this important
consideration. VJhile it would be naive to eliminate these
pragraatic considerations, one must go beyond pure politics
for a full understanding and appreciation of the raticnyJe
governing Balfour's Irish policy. The Chief
-Secretary '
3
interpretation of Irish History as wjll as his general
philosophic outlook stimulated i-mportantiy his policy of
66
conciliation. Hie explanation of Cro..ell.s failure indi-
cated an early appreciation of the need to balance
'^-iocs'
With 'icindness. well before Liberal Unionist support beca.e
crucial. That most of Balfour's r.nedial legislation was
not introduced until 1888 owes perhaps more to the parlia-
mentary difficulties generated by the land agitation than
to a desire to capitalize on the failure of the Round Table
Conference by responding to Liberal unionist legislative '
suggestions. Certainly Balfour's parliamentary speeches
fron 1883 as well as his own correspondence
.indicated a
consistent determination to promote peasant proprietorship,
which was, after ail, one of the primary goals of the
National League. Balfour's persistence in the face of land-
lord, Radical Bjid ev.n some Cabinet objections, ultimately
succeeded in making government subsidir'.ed land purchase a
major rjlank in the Unionist Irish policy
»
Land purchase took priority in Balfour's program for
pragmatic as well as general philoccphical reasons. As has
been shown, he was convinced that, in the chort run, a solu-
tion to the land question would effectively eradicate the
political and parliamentary turmoil which the Home Hule
movement precipitated o It might also check the spread of
dangerous socialistic doctrines in Jingland. Irj addition,
however, to these pragmatic considerations, Balfour at this
tine genuineJ.y believed that peasant proprietorship along
with his other remedial schema! s would lead to a consistent
and permanent improvement in the economic and social condition
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of Ireland. In his Rector's Addrec^e, +^ „ .to uaress to Glasgow University
in 1891, entitled On }^^s. Balfour attributed the
progress and prosperity of Victorian society to the free
interaction of the forces of education, individualism and
manufacture. Education and property-holding he defined as
the most effective stimuli for promoting individualism,
initiative and resourcefulness. Indeed^ Balfour claimed
that all the great changes and discoveries of civilisation
'
were the product of individual genius as opposed to state
action. He limited the role of the state to providing the
opportunity and security in which that genius might develop
and flourish. Questioning the hereditary interpretation of
progress and human ability, Balfour asked:
Are v/e not often attr.U..uting to heredity whatIS properly due to education, and crediting
nature with what is really the work of man?
Balfour posited that the economic and social ills of any
society could be cured by a combination of education^ indus-
trial development and individual initiative. Governments
and individuals had a responsibility to create an environ-
ment in which this combination would be valued and extended.
From the perspective of this address, one may feasibly argue
that Balfour's commitment to Roman Catholic university educa-
tion, railways and technical education, and land purchase
derived from his general philosophical views on progress.
In short, Balfour believed the Irish would possess the key
to progress once they emulated the values, ideas and insti-
tutions of the contemporary British estat)lishment
. As he
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frankly admitted in state papers and in his parliamentary
addresses, he designed each component of his program to
encourage the individualism, initiative and industrial
organization which he alleged the British and Ulsterman
already possessed. While one may justly criticize Balfour
for his failure to appreciate some genuine nationalist
aspiration in Home Rule, and for his contempt and conde-
scension toward the native Irish, his analysis of Ireland's
economic and social needs was not far off the raarkc
It has recently become fashionable to denigrate Bal-
four's remedial programs as 'too little, too late
'
/'-^
However, just as the New Left critics of Franklin D. Koose-
velt might benefit from reading Studs Terkel's MxA liris^,,
conteLiporary Irish historians ought to i-ealize that
Ivlr. Balfour's embryonic projects of social engineerings
despite their limits and the racism with \.'hich they were
administered, saved mar.y people from starvation during
1890-1, The establishment of the CongeBted Districts Board
and tha encouragement given to Plunkett's cooperatives and
Father Denis O'liara's Parish Goimittees helped to lay the
foundations for some significant changes in living standards
in the .Vest, It cannot be pure coincidence that bet^.voen
1391 and 1901 housing accommodations in the province of
Connaught registered a decline in third and fourth class
69Joseph Lee, ilie Mp^ii:riisji.tlQn 2l Ixlnh Society, XSM-
ISflo (Lubiini Gill and Llacmillan, 1973;, pp. 122-25.
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dwellings, and a rise in first and second class dwellings. 7°
The steady fall in relief expenditures after I891 testi-
fies to improving conditions. While the government spent
^565. Olif on relief works during the t^velve years before
I89I. they laid out only £100,00^ during the thirty-two
years of the Congested Districts Board's existence ."^^
Another indication of significant improvement in the West
after I89I is the nine-fold increase in post office savings
deposits in the years between 1831 and 1912.*^^ While per-
haps some of the long-term planning of the Board \ms defi-
73cient in relation to the types of industry set up, the
statistics given indicate a faster and more significant
rate of improvement in the West than existed previously,
and indeed in some decades since. The Congested Districts
Board was an early experiment in state intervention. To
suggest that it should have been able to solve completely
the economic difficulties of Western Ireland expects too
much. .Ml the expertise available to the Irish government
in the 1960's and 1970 's has not produced a complete solution
70Third and fourth class dwellings fell from 71,986 to
38(837, and A"', 503 to 1,978 resTsectively. First and
second class dv/ellinrs rose from 4,70^P to 4,95&, and from
52 V 816 to 60,^53 respectively. Gtaiila Directpry f 190 5,
Po 729*
71 .Micks, Coni^fisisii DisirixLta Board, pp. 72-3
»
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Gladstone's determination to re.^ain faithful to the
Home Rule principle insured that, despite the split in
the Irish Party following the deposition and death of
Parnell, the Irish Question would loom large in the I692
electoral fray,
.-rom the spring campaign of I892 until
the Lords killed the Second Home Rule Bill in September
1893, Balfour was one of the most vocal and active Union-
ist critics of the Gladstonian solution. As the minister
responsible for moulding and executing Irish policy for
four and one-half years, Balfour was the most informed and
'.veil prepared of Unionists to defend the Act of Union both
in and out of Parliament. His notable success as Irish
Chief-Secretary as well as his close family and poIit.ico.l
relationship with Lord Salisbury insured that Balfour would
assume a prominent role in the debates en the Irish Ques-
tion during tlie elections and thereafter, his speeches
during this time are significant not only as Balfour's
first public explanation of his interpretation of the
nature of the Irish Question, but also because, as a man
whose parliamentary reputation derived chiefly from his
Irish administration, the opinions expressed therein were
boimd to have considerable effect upon his fellow Unionist
parliamentarians as v/ell as upon the average voter. His
speeches reflect and refract many of the ideas and anxi-
eties which promoted Unionists from various classes and
to these prob3.ems.
A final evaluation of Balfour's role and influence
the shaping of early VA'entieth-century Ireland must await
an examination of the Irish administrations of his two
Unionists successors, Gerald Balfour and George Wyndham.
CHAPTER III
BALFOUR AND THE HOM RULfi DEBATE OF I893
geographical a.eas to defend the Union despite oontinuinl'
Irish support for Home Rule.
.Shortly after the dissolution of the Unionist Parlia-
ment, Balfour launched his attac. upon Gladstone's inter-
pretation Of the Irish Question. Claiming that his own
policy of vigorous law enforcement and Treasury subsidized
land purchase had produced lower crime rates and significant
economic im.provement
,
Balfour predicted that Home Rule
would prove Just as elusive in finally settling the Irish
Question as had the previous Gladstonian measures of Irish
Church Disestablishment and the Land Acts of I870 and I881/
The 1886 opposition of the English majority whose interests
he considered to be vital, indeed paramount, was stressed
by the former Chief-Secretary along with criticisms specific
to Ireland's economic and social situation. ^ However, the
Irish Question notwithstanding, continuing economic diffi-
culties and more militant socialistic propaganda made the
recently enfranchised voters restive under Tory rule, and
a Liberal victory was almost a certainty. The full vigour
of Balfour's rhetoric was wisely reserved until, subsequent
to the Liberal victory, Gladstone introduced his Second
Home Rule Bil]. on IH- February 1893. Following the intro-
duction, Balfour embarked upon a series of speeches
•""TiLP. Times, 30 June I892.
Leiters. jQl QxiQeja Vlai&xla» 3rd series, ed. George E. Buckle(London: J, /.mrray, I920), II, 136. Hereafter cited
i^. il. V,
attacUn, both the general principles and the details of
the Liberal proposal, m early April when the second
reading debate was in full swing he journeyed to Belfast
and Dublin to deliver the Key-note addresses at two massive
I'nionist demonstrations. An appearance at Li.ehouse in
London's
.^ast Knd on 18 April I893 followed. These speeches
in particular display considerable oratorical and political
Skill in moulding his arguments to the prejudices, anxie-
ties and vested interests of his audiences. Addressing
^^000 people in Belfast's Ulster Hall where seven years
earlier Lord Randolph Churchill encouraged Ulstermen to
unconstitutional resistance, the former Chief
-Secretary
forecast that Home Rule would bring economic disaster to
Ulster in the form of higher taxes, lower wages and shrink-
ing imperial credit for land purchase and public works. He
flattered the enthusiastic Belfast audience by comparing
their 'orderly' and 'prosperous' condition with the South
and //est whose population was 'inferior' in political know-
ledge and experience. Continued prosperity depended upon
the maintenance of the Union. The central Gladstonian
concept of a single and historic Irish nationality was
challenged by the assertion that
...at this moment, the religious differences
v/hich divide different sections of Irish
society are deeper and more impossible and
difficult to heal than such differences in
any other country that I know of in the world.
Under these circumstances, is it not folly,
is it not madness to suppose that in Ireland
you find a single nation with one single set
of aspirations, with one single set of
"^i^^^"'^ - which"S^Ls:\s1ira-
In developing the therne of unbridgeable historical and
religious sentiments. Balfour came close to playing the
'Orange card'. The famous Miiiite warnings against the
•tyranny of the majority was employed to clinch his pro-
test against any attempt to impose Home Rule upon Ulster.
^
Following his tumultous Belfast reception, Balfour
travelled to the Duke of Leinster's estate near Dublin for
rest prior to his speech to the Irish Unionist Alliance.
The Dublin Unionists organized an evening parade illumin-
ated by torch-bearing Trinity undergraduates as a prelude
to Balfour's Leinster House address. Once again Balfour
raised the spectre of economic collapse as the necessary
corollary of Home Rule. The small farmer and landlord
would equally suffer from the suspension of Treasury loans
since it was doubtful that an Irish IDxchequer could secure
rates as low as the British Exchequer. The possibility of
diminishing British demand for agricultural products from
the South and the West was raised. Civil servants and
Royal Irish Constabulary men were warned that their careers
and their pensions might be sacrificed by the Home Rule
policy. For those possessing imperialistic sentiment,
Balfour claimed that despite Gladstone's intentions, Home
3
Tb£. TjjDQB, 5 April I893.
Rule would ultimately lead to separation.^ A fortnight
later at Limehouse.5 Balfour predicted that Home Rule would
bring lowered Irish productivity and shrinking credit, and
as a consequence Irish immigrants would flood the :.nglish
labour market. This line of argument undoubtedly would
have exacerbated the traditional anxieties that English
workers felt in the face of Irish competition. Ealfour then
suggested that Home Rule would bring additional burdens to
'
all British taxpayers since land purchase loans would be
difficult to retrieve with a Home Rule Government. Balfour
claimed that Irish debts were hard to recover in ordinary
circumstances despite the fact that official reports on
land purchase receipts proved the Irish farmers were punc-
tual in their purchase payments.^ -
Balfour's visit to Belfast is significant in two
respects. On the one hand, it gave him concrete experience
of the intensity of Northern opposition to Home Rule, and
of the seriousness of the much employed shibboleth 'Ulster
will Fight
'. The memory of the four hour parade of 80,000
citizens and of throjigs of people clinging to his carriage
'...with tears in their eyes..c' begging to know if the
Lords would destroy the Bill,'' explain the addition of the
SliMLS, 9 April 1893.
^Tlia limes, 19 April 1893.
u» Balfour's iviemorandura on Irish land purchase, 10 i.iarch
I896, CAB 37A1/16.
n
Countess of Antrim to Harriet thipps, 5 April I893, cited
in L. v., 3rd series, II, 2i|-5--6.
Ulster isoue to the catalogue of objections to Ho.e Rule
contained i„ Balfour's second reading speeches. ^ This i=
especially notable because Balfour, although always i.oressed
by the Northeasfs industrial capacity, previously had shown
distaste for the Orange.en.9
,vhen the Ulster issue emerged
again in I9I2-U. the ne.ories of this visit
.ay partially
explain Balfour's acquiescence to the tactics of Ulster
.militants in the formation of the illegal Ulster Volunteer
'
Force. Secondly, Balfour's visit gave to the Northern
Unionists ample
'...evidence that Ulster was not deserted '.1°
Following her nephew's visit. Lady and ^ord Salisbury also
travelled to Belfast. After the trij .ady Salisbury told
Queen Victoria that the Northerners were much soothed by the
feeling that they had powerful ^.nglish friends who would aid
them. "In fact', she wrote, 'it is hardly too much to say
that the two visits of Arthur Balfour and Salisbury have
probably saved Ireland from a dangerous riot.'^^ iVenty
years later, the Ulsterraen's obstinacy and resistance to
the Parliamentary will probably owed much to their own recol-
lections of Balfour's consistent advocacy of their case
against Home Rule. However, at that juncture, the stakes
fens,^, viii, l/+08j xi, 987-8.
o
"Curtis, Cosx^doxit p. ^03.
^^Countess of Antrim to Harriet i-hipps, 5 April I893, citedin L, 1. , 3rd series, 11, 2^5-6.
I )
.
i-ady cialisbury to Queen Victoria, 3 June 1893, cited in
J^il»f p. 256
e
were higher, and it was civil war. not a riot, that was
^
narrowly averted.
In the Colons debates Balfour vigorously attacked
the general principles and specific details of the Home
Rule Bill. Challenging the Government's contention that
Irish crime and rural unrest were caused by frustrated
nationalism. Balfour reiterated his firm conviction that
the system of dual ownership in Ireland was the real cata-
lyst of Irish alienation and agitation. The Home Rule
Bill would do nothing to eradicate the land problem which,
he maintained, was the effective driving force behind the
country's support for the Nationalists. land purchase, not
Home Rule, he presented as the most effective remedy for
disaffection and rural cri.,e.l^ Balfour labelled as foolish
any hopes, often held in Liberal and Radical circles, that
Home Rule v.ould alleviate the time and energy rarliament
expended on Irish debates. 13 i„,perial responsibilities for
defense and foreign policy in addition to a vague definition
of the Viceroy's position and powers would insure plenty of
parliamentary attention to Ireland. He opposed the reten-
tion of 80 Irish members as giving the Irish double repre-
sentation in comparison to the ivelsh. Scotch and inclish,
and because it held out the prospect of continual Irish
disruption of British party politics during periods of slim
^"^ Hansaril., viii, 1399; xi, 939.
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majorities. It was intolerable that English parties shoi,ld
be held hostage by the Irish.^^ Balfour criticized the
government's characterization of the bill as the initial
step in the eventual federation of the British Isles
'...since the English nation so enormously exceeds all
other elements of this proposed system, both in population,
and in wealth and power...'. Coordinating them as equals
was termed '...an absolute impossibility whenever it is
tried.' In words oozing imperial self-confidence and
pride, Balfour asserted that to divide up the United Kingdom
was to defy history's evolutionary tendency toward large
units and empires. In both debates, Balfour made full use
of his ministerial expertise in Irish agrarian crime, and
its suppression, aiad questioned whether promises by pro-
fessed boycotters to henceforth respect property could be
taken seriously. He reminded the Commons that
...the Irish politicians have been occupiedm a steady and consistent propa/?anda of
doctrines with regard to property, and doc-
trines with regard to government which are
absolutely inconsistent .with any government
at al.l
.
They have preached spoliation 1
admit undefined. 16
Given recent liistory and Irish doctrines on Icmd, rent,
tenure, eviction and resistance to law officers and court
writs, Balfour predicted that within a year of the
H^aasuia, viii, U15--16.
^^^ UB-n^rAt XX, 970.
^ £!3nSi\r^t viii, 1^21,
establishment of a Home Rule parliament, would follow
'...a confiscation more absolutely monstrous and unjusti-
fiable than any of the monstrous and unjustifiable con-
fiscations Which stain the history of Ireland.^^7
the 1893-4 debates on Home Rule, Balfour continually harped
upon the theme of agrarian violence and Irish unorthodoxy
on property rights. In .larch, he introduced a motion cen-
suring the Government's law enforcement policy in Ireland.
"
The Liberals he accused of trying to pacify Ireland by
dangling Home Rule and amnesty for convicted agrarian
offenders in front of the Nationalists. Balfour charged
that the proposed repeal of the change of venue clause
meant that intimidation would triumph so completely that
...in every agrarian case whatever you abandon
all hope, even the remotest, of obtaining a
conviction, no matter v/hat the evidence may be.
He predicted rising rural violence and rent boycotts if
Hone Rule did not pass. These were controlled, he alleged,
by the dictates of the Irish party rather than by effective
Castle administration and law enforcement.-'-^ The chronic
nature of rural violence was cited as procf of the unfit-
ness of Ireland for Home Rule., In these comments cn the
caust-E and nature of rural crime, }3alfour n-ver cnoc dis-
played the contempt v/hich he had shown occasionally in
private for landlords like Clanricarde, whosre insistence
iiaii^j::^, xi, 989.
18,
4 Himsaxol, X, 12C7-29.
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upon property rights amidst economic distress aroused ev.n
the ire of Balfour, let alone that of the poverty-stricK-on
peasants. ^
^^^^^^ ^^^^ effective
defense of property rights demanded that Balfour keep
private his impatience and contempt for the ultra-landlords.
His claim that rent defaults owed more to the political need
to pressurize the Liberal government than to inability to
pay, likewise demonstrated a convenient absentmindedness in
'
the m.an who established the Congested Districts Board after
personally viewing the hopeless and dire poverty in Aestern
Connaught during autumn 1890.^°
During the second reading debate Balfour developed at
great length his views on the nature and consequences of
the Act of Union. He flatly denied the Nationalist con-
tention contained in John Redmond's and Michael Davitfs
speeches that the Union was an economic failure. On the
contrary, Balfour asserted that Ireland had seen more eco-
nomic progress between H^j^ and I890 than had Jingland. The
different economic bases from v/hich they started in 17-50,
however, he ignored. In answering Davitfs charge that the
Union had increased the rate of lunacy, Balfour cleverly
turned the argument around. He attributed the increase to
better British registration and to the fact that '.dn the
'Curtis, Go^r-Oion, pp« 256-8; Dugdale, BaXJ-gur, I, 129;
Shannon, ^m.^m^ .in IixiliaM, pp. 48-9.
20.
^ '^\y%x\^^i:^, X, 1213; Curtis, Co^jciilgrj, pp. 369-?Oj Siiannon,
licca-i c_q!<:i^:iiiii2iii ir^^lanii, pp. 63- A'-,
century to which the Hon. Me.ber looks back as the
.olden
ape Of Ireland, lunatics were tied to posts or were allowed
to stray unattended through fields, and nobody counted the.
because nobody cared for them. -2^ while admitting that
Kngland bore some responsibility for Irish economic and
social problems, he castigated those who from ignorance or
hypocrisy charged her with all or mere than half the blame
2 2for Irish ills. In phrases ringing with Anglo-^iaxon
patriotism and condescension, Balfour attributed whatever
Irish progress had been won to the very fact of the English
connexion, and labelled as absurd the notion that Home Rule
would restore any worthy ancient Celtic institutions.
Thej^act is, that before i^n^lish power went
to Ireland. Ireland was a collection of t-ibes
waging? constant and internecine warfare,
without law, without civilization. Althoucrhthe law :;.s imperfectly obeyed, and although
civilization may oe ir/iperfect ly axjprehended
,
all the law, and ail the civilization in
Ireland is the work of .ingland, Ihe unity,
•the imperfect unity which Ireland enjoys that
also IS the work of iingland, and the Parlia-
ment which Ireland desires to have restored
to her, what was thax but the work of England ?23
Balfour next held out the loyalty of the Anglo-Irish
to the Union as an argument against Home Rule. That the
class constituting Grattan's iarliament now ardently sup-
ported the Union indicated its success. This suj^port was
Hanssxd. xi, 971-2.
^''^^
Harisg-xa, xi, 9?1.
23^^
1- Hsiis^d, xi, 972-3,
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explained by their higher wisdom and 'noblesse oblige
•
rather than by any recognition of the vested economic.
'
social or political interests of the Ascendency and their
anxiety to preserve their privileged status. Balfour
invoked the reputations of the greats of Irish literature
and administration such as Swift. Goldsmith. Berkeley.
Burke and Wellington, to add lustre and authority to the
Ascendency's repudiation of Home Rule.^^ This line of
argument evidences the former Chief-Secretary's almost
total contempt for the Celtic elements in Irish society,
and that he measured everything by an Anglo-oaxon yardstick.
His very infrequent and short stays in Ireland, as well as
the obscurity of the only recently established Celtic liter-
ary and language laovement, may partially explain his
indifference to, or ignorance of, the recent discoveries
by linguists, archaeologists and historians of the achieve-
ments of the pre-Norman Irish in language and art. not to
speak of the Irish monastic contributions to the survival
of learning in the ninth and tenth centuries in iiingland and
on the Continent. In 1913"14. despite the evidence of
24,
^ HaDsar^. xi. 990-1:
25The trr.e measure of Balfour's contempt for Celtic elementsin Irish society came two decades later when the fullimpact of the Irish Literary movement and the Celtic
revival put the Irish peasant in a new and better per-
spective even for many educated i:-n£clishmen. including
Balfour's former private secretary and successor as Chief
-
secretary. George Wyndham. *vhile aamittedly Wyndhamdescribed the Irish people as 'mongrels', his letters toBalfour and others indicate that he appreciated some Cel-
tic aspects of Irish life. Curtis. Coercion
, p. 40?.
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the achievements of the Celtic past and the economic and
social progress attained in the countryside, Balfour still
disdained any CelUc manifestations that did not recognize
an innate superiority of Anglo-.axon ideas and institutions
I^aturally. therefore, Balfour gave full play to the
Ulster opposition during the second reading debate. While
he did not specifically state this theory, the similarity
Of the Northeast's economic, industrial and religious life
and values to contemporary England and ocotland undoubtedly
reinforced his conviction of the seriousness and validity
of the Ulster position. Balfour denied the Nationalist
Charges that he played the 'orange card' by making inflama-
tory speeches on his Belfast visit. He reiterated his
contencion t>)at because Ireland was '...divided, fissured,
rent into two sections...', parliamentary government was
only possible if Ireland was merged into the ^highor unity
of the United Kingdom'. Ulster's opposition to Hom(^ Ruie
rested upon the conviction that '...all that is most educate
all that is most intelligent, and all that is most enter-
prising in Ire;uind b-long to a minority, that would be
oppjressed,..', and upon the knowledge that '...the
-ceachlng
of Irish politicians, patriotism has been confounded for
years with plunder', principles v.hich would make '...any
civilized government absolutely impossible'. By contrast,
he again characterized the citizens of Belfast as 'loyal
subjects of tne Queen, who v/are anxious to obey the Imperial
Parliament, and who could see no reason why they should be
con-
handed over to those who they knew would have absolute
trol over their destinies.. 26 Concluding his speech with
predictions of national disaster, Balfour claimed that
under Home Rule even the Celtic Irish would suffer by the
compulsion
...forever to drink from th.e bitter, narrowand polluted streams of purely fr'sh hllttrv -that unhappy history - and yo^ will forbid
bro^d^stisa^'^ r ^^^^-^^^-^y to touch'that
^^"^e^^'^' Partake^SriroSry^u will
The adjectives employed in this peroration suggest that
Balfour equated all past and future Irish progress with the
preservation of tne Union, and with the obliteration of any
Celtic elements that had thus far escaped Anglicization.
Reassured that the house of Lords would probably kill
the Home Rule Bill despite the Commons pas^'age, Balfour
participated in the Committee debates in only a limited
fashion. He did. however, reveal his continuing conviction
that the Roman Catholic clergy exercised an undue and cor-
rosive influence over the Romaji Catholic electorate. He
protested against the disenfranchisement of Trinity College
on the grounds that literate voters v.'ere essential to check
unhealthy clerical influence in the polling booths. The
sweeping defeat of all but nine larnellite supporters in
^ Mji^Qxa, xi, 987-8.
27
^ Himaarfi, xi, 991.
the 1892 elections, as .ell as Darnell's defeat in the I891
by-elections following the Irish bishops' denunciation of
his continued leadership, had confirmed many Unionists'
belief in priestly domination over the Roman Catholic
voters. 23 Balfour, Salisbury. ^9 and other Unionists fre-
quently cited these defeats as convenient debating points
in their efforts to denigrate Irish capacity for self-
government. Clerical domination as well as racial and
religious divisions. Balfour concluded, made minority repre-
mentation in the form of the university vote essential.
...if you mean to give Home Rule, you must
safeguard it with provisions and arrangements
which would be probably unnecessary and pos-
sioly_ even noxious in i^ngland and .ScotlandOux YJiiich are absolutely most necessary in
u^V'tT y^^J<^'^n to give anything ax^Droach-mg representation to what are, after all, the
most orderly, the most enterDrising and the
most deserving classes in the whole I>-ish
coniTnunity , j'-)
Balfour thus portrayed the southern Irish as politically
unreliable, and inferior to the Anglo-Iri^h and Ulster
minority. The last two groups alone he rated as equal in
stature xo the izinglish and Scots.
Bali our 's opposition to Home Rule in I892-3 derived
from a number of sources 0 First, and most obvious, was
26Curtis
» GogrcjLfin, pp. 323-2?; iJhanjnon, I^cj^J, Goj^^riuneirt;
in ItsilsMt p. 95.
29See Saiisbvry at the Guildhall, 9 November I891, The
Himejii 10 Ncvember I89I; Curtis, Coerciori, pp. 323-7.
30.
^ H5.,cs;^rc(, XV » 1523.
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his ovm recent experience fighting the land agitation
directed by the Land League climaxing in the lian of
Campaign
.
That the chosen political leaders of the Irish
people, despite jail sentences, in their speeches and
actions repeatedly called into question- 'sacred property
rights' raised the spectre of dangerous socialistic doc-
trines to rich men like Balfour. After two years as Irish
Secretary Balfour wrote: "l have long been impressed by the'
fact that at least half the force behind Home Rule is :.ocial-
istic and the more this is unde>-stood the better for us.-^l
Two years later he wrote to Professor Henry Calderwood,
The Home Rule agitation, properly understood,IS a very hollow affair consisting chiefly.,,
of two elements in conjunction, neither of
which separately have anyxhing to do with HomeRule whatever - the old i-enian element, namely,
which desires separation, and the old agrarian
element which desires or did desire spoliation. 32
His defense cf Irish landlords and of their attachn-.ent to
the Union did not rest upon any recognition of their innate
worthiness or merit, but rather upon the implications which
a Home Rule and Nationalist victory would mean across the
Irish Sea. By the late 'eighties and early 'nineties the
infant English socialist organizations such as the Social
Democratic Federation and the Socialist League were begin-
ning to question the property rights of the v/ealthy in
31Balfour to vV, H. Hurlbert, 1 April I889, cited in Curtis,
£peJ^3lori, p. k07,
32
-"Balfour to rrof. Henry Calderwood, 22 October 18QJ , cited
in Aluil. , p. 400.
8?
^n.land. Knowledge of the writings of .arx and .ore moder-
ate socialists li.e Henry George was spreading a.onr the
I^nglish poor. To allow the Irish, with their socialistic
doctrines, victory either in Westminster or in the country-
side might set a dangerous precedent and encourage English
radicals and socialists to imitate Irish tactics and methods.
This fear, more than an affection or respect for Irish
landlords, explains Balfour's militant stance on their
property rights. Balfour displayed his contempt for Irish
support Of the Man of Campaign when he exclaimed to Queen
Victoria that if he were an Irish landlord, he would rather
beg his bread than give in to it. While the former Chief-
Secretary had criticized in ministerial circles uncooperative
and vindictive Irish landlords, his devotion to private
property rights was so firm that he could never acknowledge
publicly such criticismo Law, decency and civilization
depended upon the defeat of the separatist and socialist
elements in the Home Rule agitation.
Balfour shared some of the anxieties" of many British
politicians and aristocrats thr-t the triui.-iph of Home Rule
would cause the whole British £;mpirG to lose power and pres-
tige. To allow Ireland, the oldert and closest imperial
possession, to fall to the disintegrating forces of national-
ism miFht imperil the vast network of colonies, dominions
33Balfour to J, Robert, 6 February 1888, cited jn Cu'^tis
QQ£LCillcj}, p. -'iOB; L. Qt, V., 3rd series, 11^ 12. "
'
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and protectorates that reinforced British economic, naval
and strategic power. While Balfour, at this juncture, did
not invoke the strategic arguments, twenty years later when
Germany manifestly challenged British economic and military
strength, he directed considerable attention to this argu-
ment. Undoubtedly his anxiety over the menacing inter-
national situation prompted Balfour's comment to Horace
Plunkett in early 19lk that he loathed nationality as a
sentiment which could lead to the destruction of empires. 3^
Balfour's perception of the history and character of
Catholicism and Protestantism is a third important factor
in explaining his opposition to Home Rule. The combined
effects of the secret ballot and the IdQk franchise reform
ensured that any Dublin parliament would be predominantly
I^oman Catholic in its composition and sympathy. Balfour
was raised among men and institutions that had traditionally
equated Catholicism with intellectual backv/ardness
» obscur-
antism and authoritarianism. He and his generation were
part of a national and intellectual tradition that traced
the progress of modern f^ociety to the religious upheavals
against the Papacy and Catholic orthodoxy during the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries. Mot only did they view
the Protestant revolts as the well-spring of intellectual
and religious liberation, but they also heralded these
rtorace Plunkett Diaries, 20 warch 191^, i-lunkett House,
London, iwicrofilm couy, .'/estfield c--tate College.
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revolts as the effective moulders of a parliamentary tradi-
tion Which defied and finally destroyed Stuart absolutism
in 1688-9. All progress and enlightenment in modern
history, whether political, economic, intellectual or
social, they associated with the triumph of Protestantism
and its values. Indeed, in I90I Balfour reassured a corre-
spondent Of the continuing strength of Protestantism owing
•to its possession of the 'weapons' of 'enlightenment',
•toleration', and 'education'. In fact, he equated the
cause of Protestantism with Enlightenment and humanity.
The tendency ever since the Reformation of England's
Catholic continental rivals, France and Spain, to view
Ireland as a bridgehead for attacking the iinglish Protest-
ant state added strategic justification to anti-Catholic
and anti-Irish prejudice. To Balfour, therefore, so long
as the Irish remained unquestioning and devoted believers
in Catholicism, they did not possess enough independence of
thought or action to insure British security or to partici-
pate in the most elementary of political functions. Balfour
and his peers interpreted Parnell's defeat as a capitula-
tion to priestly domination rather than an indication that
the majority of the Irish Parliamentary Party and Irish
people were politically mature enough to put the higher
Home Rule principle above personal loyalty to Parnell.-^^^
^^Balfour to Colonel Sandys, I6 April 190I, B. M. Add.
MS '49.85^1-, ff, 72-76.
Lyons, l)2&lm4 since £&l(}2ns.t 201.
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Perhaps Balfour's concern to minimize clerical influence
and to establish minority representation for Protestants
in any Home Rule Bill assumes understandable, if mistaken
proportions, when one remembers the reaction to the I870
pronouncement of Papal Infallibility even among Irish
sympathizers like Gladstone. Balfour's fears of Catholic
domination may have been exacerbated by the contemporary
Irish willingness to support generously the construction of
massive new churches and cathedrals, and to supply numerous
recruits to the growing ranks of Irish priests, nuns and
brothers. Balfour and his contemporaries apparently
failed to appreciate the penitential or identity-crisis
part of the Irish devotional revolution. They tended to
view the increase in the Catholic Church's woal-^h and per-
sonnel simply as another manifestation of Catholic attempts
to reverse the verdict of the Reformation. The very fact
that Balfour spent only six months in Ireland during his
four and one-half year term would have made it difficult
for him to gather enough experience and evidence to ques-
tion this anti -Catholic tradition or the anti-Catholic
opinions ne heard from his colleagues, family and friends.
His most trusted Irish advisor, Sir ivlathew .vest Ridgeway
on
^mmet Larkin, "The Devotional Revolution in Ireland,
1875/' ^jnorJsL^^-n hisJ:^rj^l RqxJj^w. 77 (June 1972), 625-52.
In this essay, Larkin points to the probable impact of
widespread church construction and succossiul clerical
recruitment in the late nineteenth century upon those who
later invoked the Orange cry 'Home Rule means Rome Rule'.
told his chief:
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I came to this country absolutely devoid of
th^ fi''''?
prejudices, but I have been forced toe conclusion that it is not ^'r^^^^
Irish Ro.an Catholicin" posiUoS whe^e'he' will
^ton.''''^^'^'^^'
^^^^^^ perform? His connec-
U ^equiredTve^v'.'? "^'^^^'^ at'hil^'and
^c^^^^^^^^^ Z wit^siI!5^?Hinfluence brought to bea?:3i '^^ ^s.and the
Lord Salisbury^^ held similar views about the power and
influence of the Irish clergy over their flocks, as did
Balfour's aunt Lady Salisbury.'^O Balfour demonstrated
analogous views when he advocated a limited form of minor-
ity representation through a cumulative vote in the abortive
local government bill of I892, and when he told Salisbury
in 1892!
I have never quite ma.de up my mind whether Idisliice the Orangemen, the Extreme RituaUsts.the political disputers, or the R. C. 's the
most. On the whole, the last, but they are
all odious, ^1
In his anxieties over Catholic power in Ireland, Bal-
four failed to appreciate the many Irish political leaders
such as John Dillon, John Redmond and Iviichael Davitt who
wanted to keep the clergy out of Irish politics. At this
38Ridg^eway to Balfour, 5 Ivlay 1888, cited in Curtis, Coercion,
39IMd., pp. 325-26.
Frances Balfour, Ne PbllYiSiL?ir.ls (.London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1930), II, 54.
^1Balfour to Salisbury, 2^ December I892, cited in Curtis,
Ci>.Q.rclaQ> p. ^i-Q'u
Juncture. Balfour's recognition of the anti-clericalis.
^
Within the Fenian tradition was offset by his abhorrence of
separatist republican elements in Fenian ideology. Balfour's
attitude toward the political involvement of the Irish
clergy, indeed, evidenced a degree of 'double think'. Back
in 1887 in his war against the Land League's Plan of Cam-
paign, he was not reluctant to make overtures to the Vatican
to obtain a papal order that Irish priests ought to direct
'
their energies to the restoration of law and order in the
countryside. The Papal Rescript of I887 was the product of
these negotiations with Rome as well as of Mon. Persico's
observations on Ireland. Obviously. Balfour permitted, even
welcomed, involvement by the Roman Catholic clergy if it
facilitated the government, but he condemned such involve-
ment if it furthered the Nationalists' goals of rent reduc-
tions or Home Rule.
Balfour, on the other hand, did not see the Catholi-
cism of the Irish as a permanent disqualification for full
political participation on a democratic basis. He had groat
faith that 'sound education' free of 'the bonds of Catholic
orthodoxy' might develop ultimately those habits of inde-
pendent thought which he equated with the English educations
and university system. Much of his support for educational
reform in Ireland, and in particular for expanded university
opportunities for Roman Catholics, was predicated upon the
belief that a gradual enlightenment and appreciation of
Anglo-Saxon values and institutions would thereby develop
among Irish Catholics to .ake the. content with the Union.
In speaking of his continuing support for improving higher
education in Ireland in I901. Balfour said. "it is in^pos-
sible but that the illegitimate power of the priesthood
Should be diminished by the spread of culture . "'^^ ^imi-
larly. Irish exposure to the rationalist scientific tradi-
tion. Balfour believed, would correct the allegedly mythical,
sentimental and green-coloured view of the past which
prompted the majority of the Nationalists and their sup-
porters to seek Home Rule or separation.
The fourth and most significant factor in Balfour's
attack upon the principles of Gladstone's Home Rule policy
in 1893 was his perception of the exact nature of the Irish
question. In surveying the history of Irish nationalist
agitation. Balfour concluded that the bread and butter
issues of land tenure and poverty rather than frustrated
nationalism caused the disaffection of the majority of the
Irish with the Union. He observed that the nationalist
movements ever ;^ince O'Connell's day equated the solution
of the land question with the achievement of their political
objective. He believed Parnell's popularity and success
derived precisely from the linking of the consxitut j.onp.l
movement, with its goa]. of legislative independence, to the
solution of the land question. In 1893, just as in Fintan
Balfour to Colonel Sandys, 16 April lyOl, B. 1.;. Add.
MS 49»85^, f. 76
9^
I^lor's day, the heat and steam of the land agitation
fired the Home Rule engine. Balfour believed that once
the Irish peasants were blessed with the benefits of
peasant proprietorship the whole nationalist agitation,
with its threatening socialistic and separatist doctrines,
would evaporate. The Irish farmer would then espouse
those values of orderliness, self-help, and initiative
that many prosperous Victorians associated with property
holding. Land ownership and education would guide the
now gullible Irish to a sense of responsibility and a
respect for the law. Balfour's sister, Edith Balfour
Lyttelton, who accompanied him on his Gonnaught trip, appar-
ently entertained analagous views when she observed that
the Irish peasants v.'ere
...little children still listening' to oldfairy stories while their bread has to be
earned, they are like cnildren who are afraid
to walk alone, who play with fire, who arehelpless; like children who will not grew
up...,.vhat would I not give... to help^thoinv
But the task is very difficult, and if you
give children complete freedom thev will
certainly stray. ^3
The tremendous energy with which Balfour threw him-
sej.f into dravving up land purchase legislation during liis
own tenure as Chief-Secretary and later rested upon these
convictions. He was revolutionary in the tactics he
^3l. p. Curtis, Jr., ^aol^^Jizsim S-M Ggji-i, A otucly Au
Anii-Irijih i^iimdicja In }Lli:j:mLmn J^n,^;land (Br-idgeport«
Conference on British Studies, I968;, p. 53. Hereafter
cited Curtis, ADGilfirSaxms aasl C^^ils.
employed to teach the Irish conservative values in order^
to save society fro. the threat of socialism and disrup-
tion. His use of wide state credit to finance peasant
purchase, and the establishment of the Congested Districts
Board, are striking examples of Balfour's willingness to
suspend still highly valued laissez-faire principles. Like
the aristocratic American progressive, Teddy Roosevelt.
Balfour would tolerate extensive state intervention if \he
values of individualism and property rights could thereby
be protected. He told a Mnchester audience in I895 that
"...if those Who wield the collective force of the com-
munity show themselves desirous.
. .to ameliorate every
legitimate grievance and to put society upon a proper and
more solid bo.sis," the threat of socialism would evaporate.
He further told the Duke of Devonshire in I903,
The movement of thought and the pressure of
events have compelled us (in mv opinion
rightly coiT^oelled us) to abandon these (laissez-laire; principles in the extreme form, butthis does not mean that either you or I are
socialists. It does mean that we now feelbound to consider many proposals on their
merits which the Manchester School of 60 years
since would summarily have dismissed on what
they called principle .^^^
Balfour believed that the acquisition of a solid basis for
Irish society depended upon the adoption of practices of
state subsidization, which flouted rigid laissez-faire
Sydney Zebel, Balioui:, A miiicrU Bip^caphy (Cambridge!
Gamoridge University Press, 1973J. p. 1^^2, lialfour to'
Devonshire, 2? August I903, D, M. Add. MS
-^19,770,
ff. 115-16. ^fff *
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doctrine. In pursuit of this end. Balfour was not reluc-
tant to chastize the Irish landlords for their unwilling-
ness to ,„ake some sacrifices, shortly after taking office
m 1887. he defended his land purchase proposals against
landlord objections
. A few years later, while still
struggling to expand the state supported purchase program.
Balfour complained somewhat bitterly to Sir Stafford North-
cote,
bu? ^S^Hn^^"^' ""^'^l-^ '"^^ 'English garrison't while dual ownership exists, th^y no moreadd strength to England than the garrisons olbuikata and Tokar add strength to Egypt. Onthe contrary, the whole of our Home Rule con-troversy has been hampered and embarrassed byhaving to defend not only the Union but thelanaloras. Abolish dual ownershio and theinfluence of the landlords will./.be greatJv
augmented. There will be no cause of frictionDet^veen them and their neignbcurs; they cannotbe made the theme for Platform oratory; andthey wixl then for the first time really become
an ciicient support of the English connexion. ^f-^
When the Second Home Rule Bill was introduced in
1893 I Balfour maintained that the land purchase program
had not been given adequate opportunity to cure Ireland of
its chronic 3,and and social problems. He strongly criti-
dized the Liberal preoccupation with political solutions
rather than with diagnosis and treatment of the land prob-
lem. More time was necessary, he argued, to complete land
-^Balfour's Cabinet Memorandum on Land Policy, 8 April
188?, B. M. Add. iviS ^9,822, ff. ^1-9-50.
46 „Balfour to Morthcote, 1 Fiay I890, cited in Curtis,
£asX£lPl]» p. 3^4.
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purchase and other aineliorative n^easures in order to get
"
the Irish people to repudiate Home Rule and become loyal
supporters of the British connexion. A firm believer in
'
the Burkean tradition of slow and gradual reform. Balfour
proclaimed in August, I89O1
It does not rest with one individual, with
^?etP?^^^^"^••^^^^ generation com-pletely to solve so ancient a controversv
OnP^itr historic difficulty as... the Irish
?o h^ir^o ^^^^ Unionists) can claimt ci^e Qone..,!.;
-2 jn the process ofsolving It, and that claim, we may put for-ward with something like moderation andjustice
As Balfour's letter to Professor Calderwood suggests,
he did recognize some Fenian separatist elements within
the Home Rule agitation, and certainly the intelligence
reports on the activities of the Irish Republican Brother-
hood that circulated in the Irish Office and in .Dublin
Castle must have emphasized the irreconcilable nature of
Fenian opposition to the Union. While acknowledging that
this Fenian element could never be completely annihilated,^^
Balfour believed that the majority of the Irish people
would repudiate Fenian tactics and goals once the bene-
ficial effects of the Union were made manifest to them
through a vigorous policy of law enforcement tempered with
conciliation. The former Chief-Secretary maintained that
Curtis, Coercion, p. ^03; Balfour at Belfast, i'h.o Times
,
5 April 1893*
^ Hsa£axii, viii, 1^19.
ion. period of constructive unioni.™ woul. Ceci.ate tho
ranks of the Penian sympathisers, leaving only a few
fanatics oiin.ing to separatist republicanism. Only a
few v.-ee.s before leaving the Irish Office in I89I, Balfour
outlined this theory sucrin-fi.r v,' • ^^^y i=uccin..tly to Prancis Baxter.
With re,-ard to the native 'hatred of
^^^^^ tSnffi^ ? - .
tain f'lpc'c-.r. j^u ' -o s^'Paral..LoiTi xn cer-c.-^'.-sea 01 the communitv ris--nr out ofancient historical causes and which ran onL
|ee^r;::>^^i?.i^,^^^^^?^^-t%what I ,noan is the
Prot.stants against Popery " a f^el?L fg'in
^^^^Jr^'''^' -rely'r^Kus'"01.1 loncos but having its roots ir the r^-li-gious and political controversies of ^ \ythe;n lon^ forgotten past.
.^enti..ents and5 ^^i? kind can only be erase? by
it% ^'^^"S impatient about
During the deoarts of Unionist rule from 1895 to I905,
Balfour encouraged Gerald Balfour, George Wyndham and Sir
Horace Plunkett in forwarding policies of economic and
social amelioration. This support bore witness to his per-
ception of the lri^}> Question, which he presented to the
public aiid the House of Commons during the I893 Home Rule
debates. Until such time as the majority of the Irish
clearly demonstrated that they favored separation on its
ovm merits, Balfour had faith in the ultimate triumph of
the Unionist cause,
Balfour to Francis Baxter. 23 January I89I. B. M. Add.
R'io 49 » 829, ff. 631-32.
CHAPTER IV
BALFOUR AND CONSTRUCTIVE UNIONISM,
ZENITH AND DECLINE, 1895-1905
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The decade beginning in I895 brought perhaps more
Significant and fundamental economic, social and political
Changes to Ireland than had the dramatic and exciting
years of the land war and the Gladstonian conversion. Any
definition of the nature and extent of these changes is
determined inevitably by the perspective of the historian
documenting them, as well as by the particular institutions
and values that are being described and analyzed. While
the historians of modern Irish nationalism find in the
Gaelic Loague, the Gaelic Athletic Association and the
Irish Literary movement some of the seeds of republican
separatism that culminated in the rising of I916, the his-
torians of Unionism can look with some justification upon
this era as the zenith of Unionism and its values. The
ambiguity of the period is challenging, and one is hard
put to employ a term or set of terms that accurately
describe the character of the decade. 'Modernization' is
the term that perhaps best encompasses the contradictions
and dichotomies of Irish life in the late 'nineties, and
the early t-.v'entieth century. Jf , in addition to the rise
of democratic nationalism, modernization means the growth
of economic, social and political opportunity based on
merit rather than upon birthp and a consequent decline in
the deference paid to the establishment, then the decade
Of Unionist rule from I895 to I905 was truly vibrant.
While the Gaelic oriented n^ovements contributed signifi-
cantly to this vibrancy, the consistent and often success-
ful application of 'progressive unionism' produced much
Of the dynamism of the period. This chapter will be
concerned mainly with describing the implementation of
this progressive imionism and how it contributed to this
process of modernization.-^
A number of factors account for the recrudescence of
•conciliation' during the third Salisbury administration.
Firstly, Arthur Balfour remained convinced that the Irish
support for Home Hule would diminish in direct proportion
to the degree of social and economic improvement achieved.
Speaking at Alynwick in July 1895,^ Balfour acknowledged
the cruelty and stupidity of the land confiscations, the
penal laws and the suppression of Irish industries prior
to the Union. At the same time, he called upon his fellow
Unionists to support the government's efforts to upgrade
the material condition of Ireland during the Salisbury
administration. Undoubtedly, t]ie appointment of Gerald
Balfour in 1895» and of Geoi-ge Wyndham in I900, were
motivated by a desire to continue the conciliatory poli-
cies evolved by Arthur Balfour in the late 1880 's. The
•^The definition of modernization comes from Joseph Lee,
iJis. Mcn3,.erni:iaiij2a £i irisJi oociety.
2IM liiaos, '^5 July I695.
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legislative priorities and accomplishments of these chief-
secretaries were defined and facilitated by the inspiration,
encouragement, and often direct advice which Arthur Balfour
rendered from his position as Tory leader of the House of
Commons and subsequently as Prime Minister.
Secondly, a growth in the number of Irish unionists
who favored progressive policies materially assisted the
Irish administration in its program of social and economic
"
amelioration. Lords Monteagle, Castletown, and Waterford
along with Hugh de F. Montgomery, the O'Conor Don and
Horace Plunkett, though not typical of Irish landlords,
rendered valuable advice and support to both Gerald Balfour
and George
.Vyndham during their tenures in the Irish Office.
A sense of 'noblesse oblige' along with astute political
pragmatism seems to have stimulated these individuals to
abandon negative unionism for a more positive approach.-
Thirdly
p Chamberlain's presence in the Cabinet as
Colonial Secretary provided the Liberal Unionists with a-
useiul channel and leverage to press for a progressive
L, P. Curtis, Jr., "The Anglo-Irish Predicament," 20thS^^linry pildiiL^, November, 1970. This essay is a itimu-laoing discussion of the Anr,-lo-Irish prior to world .var IHorace Plunkett once reminded Arthur Balfour that a moreproductive and prosperous Ireland would facilitate "...anincreased consumption of manufactured articles im-oortedfrom Ji.ngland, and therefore apart from all political con-
siderations, domestic and imperial, it is a clear advantageto Great Britain to develop quickly its nearest market."
Plunkett to Balfour, 9 February 1900. B, JVi. Add hlS 49.792,f. 51. See also Monteagle, "A Unionist Policy for Ire-land," NaiimaJ. Royj^i:.:, 28 (1895). pp. 306-28.
policy. Indeed, the pressure of fighting the second Home
Rule Bill had given the Liberal Unionists, and especially
'
Chamberlain, greater clout than they had exercised in the
previous Salisbury ministry. The Ulster Liberal Unionists
continued to forward resolutions outlining their priorities
Of land purchase, economic development and local government
reform. Balfour acknowledged the necessity of catering
to the Liberal Unionists as early as I892 when he wrote.
...it must be recollected that the party whichhas with such unswerving loyalty supportedthe Government through five stormy sessions
*
Conservative Party but a UnionistjFdrty; A Unionist Party in which no doubt theConservative element greatly predominates,
out one nevertheless of which the Liberal
element forms an essential and most important
parti • y
The political apathy hovering over Ireland subsequent
to the Parnell divorce scandal and the continuation of
the split in the Ir-ish party up to 1900 greatly facilitated
the implementation of a conciliatory policy. The defeat
of the Liberals dashed for at least rive yoa-s any hopes
of Home Rule, and the .Tri.<=jh people began to focus th.5 3.;?
attention upon practical economic and social issues rather
than politics. The spectacular grovrth in the Irish
Joseph Chamberlair. to Balfour, 25 May I896, B, M. Add,
lis 49,773? f. 63j Salisbury to Balfour, 26 July 1892,
B. M. Add. LIS 49,690, ff, 66-7.
Balfour to Colonel Milvmish, February or March I892, cited
in S. Zebel, BalfpilTs p. 79. In fact, Balfour got a local
Conservative to withdraw from the I892 East Worcestershire
election so that Austen Chamberlain could run as the
Liberal Unionist candidate.
IS
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Agricultural Organization Society and the requests for
programs of technical education are suggestive of thi.
inclination to put economic and social improvement ab.
the din of contemporary politics. The shaky financial
condition of the Irish Parliamentary Party is yet another
indication of this political apathy. Good political and
parliamentary tactics compelled the Irish members to direct
their parliamentary energies to securing some concrete
economic and social benefits. Freedom from active coercion
from 1895 to I900 enabled the Irish members to render some
limited cooperation in passing remedial legislation. They
were not constrained, as in former days, to use every Irish
debate to condemn the law enforcement policies of Dublin
Castle and the Royal Irish Constabulary. While tlie Nation-
alists in the ivIcCarthite camp were somewhat sensative to
the dangers which a policy of conciliation might bode for
Home Rule enthusiasm, the large Unionist majority enabled
the government to pass beneficial measures without relying
heavily upon Irish cooperation. In fact, both Gerald
Balfour and George Wyndham had their most trying battles
with the ul-craconservative and reactionary landlords like
Aberconi, Ardiluan, Clonbrock and westmeath, who viev/ed
any concession to the Irish as traitorous to the 'loyal
minority*
.
Owing to the intirr.ato relationship betwee 1 . ^.hur
Balfour and the next two Unionist Irish secretaries, a
great deal of Balfour's recommendations for, and
encouragement of. conciliation see.s to have teen accom-
plished through casual meetings rather than by the usual
procedures of Cabinet memorandums and meetings. This
reticence i„ Balfour's correspondence on Irish affairs is
duplicated by a similar parliamentary reticence. However,
the priorities and legislative programs pursued by the
Irish government from 1895 to I903 v,ere almost identical
to the broad plans Arthur Balfour had developed when he
was Chief-Secretary.
,Vhile thin chapter focuses on the
Irish careers of Gerald Balfour and George Wyndham. the
Shadow of Arthur Balfour clearly hovers over the whole
period.
The most obvious indication of Balfour's influence
on Irish policy after 1895 is the immediate steps which
the Salisbury adminintration took to revive land purchase
from stagnation. Considering the importance which the
establishment of peasant proprietorship commanded in the
previous Tory ministry, the incoming government was
naturally aiixious over the fall in land purchase applica-
tions from 4526 in 18Q1 to a mere 1300 in I895. The
declining value of government stocks, by which the land-
lords were paid under the I89I legislation, had made many
landlords unwilling to sell. The tenants wore equally
reluctant to initiate purchase, hoping that a further
reduction in judicial rents might be forthcoming at the end
of the second term. Moreover, the yearly fluctuations in
the peasants
'
security fund payments discouraged many from
availing themselves of the purchase facilities of the I891
act. Although Arthur Balfour thought that the difricultios
Of purchase were often exaggerated by landlords who did not
want to sell and by tenants who did not want to buy, he
considered the decadal reductions as essential to long term
purchase and to the avoidance of 'more or less legal war-
fare in Ireland '.^ Only a few days after the Alynwick
speech. Balfour advised his brother to rescue the purchase
program by remedying the defects in the I89I legislation.^
By early I896 Gerald Balfour submitted his recom-
mendations to the Cabinet and the Treasury. Besides
increasing land purchase funds by ^36. 000, 000 the Chief-
Secretary advised amending the stringent security arrange-
ments of the 1891 act by extending the repayment period
from if9 to 70 years. In addition he contemplated a 2i-fo
interest rate and decadal reductions in annuity payments
based on the balance rather than on the principal. Those
peasants who had already initiated purchase under the I885
and I89I legislation v/ere to be allowed renegotiation of
their loans under the more liberal regulations which Bal-
four formulated. This relaxation in security and credit
arrangements apparently did not sit well with Treasury
officials, for on 27 January I896. E. .V. Hamilton submitted
^Balfour to Chamberlain, 15 March 1895, B. M. Add M3 ^1-9. 77
3
ff. 72-3? ^l- Hansard, xxxvii, 25^^-56. ^fff^^
7
^I'^^Jj^^gBalfour^to Gerald Balfour, 27 July I895, B. Add.
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a Cabinet memorandum expressing considerable anxiety over
the wiEdom Of the Irish government's proposals. The
lengthened repayment period ho criticized as possibly ore-
ating a precedent '...fraught with danger as well as
inconvenience'. The Treasury did not have 70 years to pay
its debts. Although acknowledging a 'remarkable regular-
ity' of present annuity payments and the absence of default
by the Irish purchasers, Hamilton attacked Balfour's scheme
as a violation of the general economic maxim that high risk
loans necessitated short terms and high interest rates.
The interest he attacked as being lower than that con-
templated for English landlords or any public body.
Hamilton also objected to the provision allowing for
renegotiation of past purchase agreements because
i
...if there is one thing more than another
which ought to be brought horr.zi to Irish\r-np
xt is that contracts are sacred and cannotbe set aside for the mere asking.
Q
The priority v/hich jand purchase held in the new
Chief-Secretary's policy was evidenced by the comments he
appended to the Hamilton memorandum. The extended payment
period and the lower interest rates he upheld as crucial,
owing to the special economic conditions of Ireland.
Default was more likely if the buyers were burdened with
higher rates for a short time. Gerald Balfour thought it
rather 'late in the day' to teach t)ie Irish the 'sacredness
g W, Hamilton memorandum cn Irish land purchase proposals,
2? January I896, CAB37AiA.
;es
LS
107
Of contracts', but insisted that the bill was designed to
avoid the necessity of reopening the. in the future. These
Changes, and most especially the decadal reductions and
the renegotiation clause, he deemed absolutely essential
to prevent agitation by previous buyers and to encourage
prospective buyers from postponing purchase until the next
rent revisions. In early Ivlarch. Gerald Balfour submitted
a detailed memorandum vigorously defending his recommenda-
tioHB against Treasury objections, and he reassured his
colleagues that there was little chance of serious loss,
to the Exchequer, in as much as the relaxed terms would
help the state recoup its money. To further buttress hii
position, he reminded his colleagues that time after time
the Conservatives had defined land purchase as the keystone
of the party's Irish policy and an object of the highest
public importance.^
The Land Purchase Bill which Gerald Ealf ou intro-
duced into the Commons on I3 April 1896 followed the
general pattern of the Jajiuary cabinet memorandum. In
addition to the provisions describ.id above. Balfour's bill
hoped to expand the po'A'ers of the Congested Districts Board
by enabling ic to borrov/
-:^500,000 from the Treasury for
its reconstructive efforts in the V/est of Ireland v After
outlining to the Commons the proposed financial adjustments.
9G. Balfour memorandum on Irish land purchase proposals.
10 fuarch I896, CAB37AI/I6.
lOS
the Chief-Secretary asserted that land purchase had
already produced some of the beneficial social effects
which Arthur Balfour had envisaged earlier.
holdLJ^r""!?*
f=^™?rs have purchased their
ha^tfifL^"? t-sjiraony is invariably that it
ciUzoS- It^^ ^i^^-i^i^ a^d better
^enantstio''^" ^''^^ '"''^^ "i^^" ^^^y «ere ^.ere
Despite some strenuous objections by landlord advocates
such as Colonel Saunderson and Mr. Smith-Barry in the
Commons, and by Lords Londonderry. Templetown. Belmore and
Clonbrock in the Upper House. Gerald Balfour safely
piloted his land purchase bill through its parliamentary
journey.
The combination of decreasing annuities and the
extended term were sufficiently attractive to stimulate
tenant purchas^e applications from ?.500,0C0 in I895 to
in 1897 and to -^2, 000, 000 in lOoS.-^^ Perhaps
another measure of the success of the I896 act is the odium
in which the reactionary landlord clique in the Kildare
Street Club held Gerald Balfour. Its leader, Lord Ardiluan.
refused to meet the Chief
-Secretary on the grounds that he
would not receive a thief, and in J900 Ardiluan refused the
Lord-Lieutenancy of County Dublin as a protest against the
10
^ ilsmsardt xy.xix, 781.
^^The cojrrpulsory sale of bankrupt estates and some minor
changes m tenure clauses were the principal sources oflandlord opposition.
^^pomfret, Sho, ^trvgglQ £si£ L^Dd In Irsland, p. 274.
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damages which had been done to the 'loyal minority' since
1895.^^ On 23 August I896, Horace Plunkett reported to
the Chief-Secretary's wife that the Kildare Street Club
was full of sultry and grumbling landlords and their
Ik
agents
,
While Balfour's bill did not constitute a final solu-
tion to the Irish land question, it did relieve the buyers
of the pressing disadvantages
.of the I89I act, and it
helped to relieve the country from agrarian agitation
until 1900, when the falling prices of government stock
consequent to the Boer War and tenant opposition to the
grazier interests, pushed the land question back into pre-
dominance. This peaceful interim stimulated government
officials and individuals within Ireland to investi^rate
other facets of the Irish Question, For instance, in late
I898, Gerald Balfour requested additional funding to expand
further the already successful work of the Congested Dis-
tricts Board, He wanted i.30,000 per arxnum of its capital
endovmient for purchases conducive to amalgamation. He
requested an additional ^.^0,000 to increase the regular
Board functions in the field of technical education and
,
If
agricultural instruction,
•^^21i'?;abeth, Countess of Fingal, Scvea^y Years Xs^-^mr-dondoni Collins, 1937), p. 232. Ardiluan's bitter
letter attacking the Salisbury administration's Irish
policy was published in T]tg Tiines on 2? July I896,
l^Plunkst to Lady Betty Balfour, 23 August I896, Plunkett
Papers, Plunkett House, London.
^•5g, Balfour ir.emorandum on Congested Districts, 8 December
1898, CAB37A'.8/92,
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Me,anwhile, in Ireland the hiatus in political and
agrarian agitation inspired some novel cooperation between
unionist interests and nationalists regarding the financial
relations between Ireland and Great Britain. The general
lack Of facilities for agricultural improvement and occupa-
tional training were another area of mutual concern and
cooperation. The report of the Royal Commission on the
Financial Relations between Great Britain and Ireland was
published in 1896 shortly after the land bill's passage.
iViinority reports notwithstanding, the majority report
seemed to substantiate the widely held nationalist conten-
tion that Ireland had been seriously overtaxed since the
Union. Landlord and Unionist pique over the recent land
legislation as well as over the abolition of four judge-
ships on the Irish Supreme Court for i7,500 per annum
savings was sufficient to drive a number of leading Union-
ists, including Colonel Saunderson, A, W. Samuels, W. E. H.
Lecky, V. F. Knox :-.nd Horace Plunkett, to join the Nation-
alists in establishing the All-Ireland Committee in February
189?. While this bipartisan committee v/as unable to agree
on the best means of redress, the Unionists reirjained very
sore over Whitehall's general fiscal policy for Ireland
right through 1898."^^ The Treasury responded to the alle-
gations of overtaxation and to the subsequent Irish protest
^•^A. W, Samuels to W. E. H. Lecky, 4 July 1897. Lecky MSS.
159^^ Trinity College, Dublin.
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by questioning the objectivity of a comnussion that
included eight Irishnien of varying political allegiances,
but only one English Unionist. Although admitting the
greater burden which indirect taxes placed upon Ireland,
and that equity might demand that Ireland's contribution
to each L210 of duty be reduced from il6 3s to iio and a
consequent increase in the English chare from t.
; 3 17s to
i200p the Treasury believed Ireland's lower cont. bution
to the national debt, defense and Irish expenses more than
offset the discrepancies described above, -^"^ while the
Chancellor of the Exchequer. Sir Michael Hicks Beach,
appreciated the sense of grievance felt in Ireland, he
attributed the difficulty to the inevitable effects which
agricultural districts suffered from half a century of free
trade,-^^
Arthur Balfour's response to the whole controversy
illustrates how stereotyped views of the Irish often mili-
tated against equality and equity of treatment even in the
leading spokesman of progressive unionism. Although Balfour
admitted that the different history, geography and economic
structure of Ireland and Scotland might justify some excep-
tional treatment in taxation policy, practical politics
17Treasury memorandum on Financial Relations between Great
Britain and Ireland (L, W. Hamilton), 30 September I896,
CAB37A2/37.
18
Hicks Beach to Arthur Balfour, 28 December I896, B. M.
Add, MS 49,695* f. 60.
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demanded that the three kingdoms be treated as a financial
entity. Balfour apparently shared Hicks Beach's contention
that Hamilton's recommendations for a separate Irish
exchequer smacked of financial Home Rule, and he vetoed
any such method of redressing the alleged grievance.
Having insisted upon financial unity, Balfour charged that
the alleged overpayment of ^,2, 500,000 per annum by Ireland
was net the fault of the Imperial Government, but of the
Irish themselves. The Commission's case was based mainly
on indirect taxes on luxury goods rather than on life neces-
sities. Balfour suggested that since it was notorious
that these indirect taxes derived mainly from spirit duties,
the government was perhaps performing a 'philanthropic'
service in levelling high duties on liquor. He admitted
that the simplest and most logical method of redressing
the alleged injustice was to lower these duties, but asked
s
Does any Irish patriot think it would be to
the advantage of the country materially to
lov'cr the spirit duty? If not he can only
ask for an exemption and enactment under some
other head of revenue on the grounds that
England ought to pay to keep Ireland sober.
Balfour argued further that Ireland was treated no differ-
ently than England since there too 'the man who consumes
pays', and 'the man who does not consume gets off '4
The province which contains many of the first
class and few of the f^ocond will be at a
financial disadvantage compared vd.th one which
19Balfour was similarly critical of the plan for a separate
Irish financial authority contained in the 190^-f Devolu-
tion proposals.
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He agreed with the Treasury that British expenditure in
Ireland «ore than made up for the difference between what
Ireland paid and her taxable capacity. Balfour concluded
that Ireland's financial grievance was r„ainly self-induced,
and that on balance, it was not essentially different from
one which agricultural Scotland or even Lancashire might
2.0put forward. Balfour's facile dismissal of the Coinrais-
sion's findings on the grounds of Irish drinking habits
probably reinforced Hamilton's and Hicks Beach's positions,
and thus partially explains the ministry's attempt to bury
the whole controversy by appointing a nev; commission. The
ministry virtually ignored the question until Irish Union-
ist discontent reached such a pitch that all the Irish
Unionist members joined with the Nationalists in support
of V. F. Knox's 6 May 1897 budget motion demanding a full
agricultural equivalent grant of B700,000 for the relief
of Irish rates.
On the other hand, bipartisan support for the
20
A. J„ Balfour memorandum on Financial Relations betv/e^'n
-"^^ Scotland, 1896. E. M. Add. L^.S 49,'823,
11, 2J7"-51. H. 0. Arnold Foster, the Belfast Liberal
unionist, termed the commission report "rubbish", andlike Balfour thought that Ireland's preference for whiskey
over beer was the root of the alleged overtaxation. H. 0.Arnold Foster to Joseph Chamberlain, 10 Decembe-^ 1896.
B. M. Add. Ll^ ^9,773, ff. m-15.
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establishment of a. Department of Agriculture and for a
system of technical education was received more sympa-
thetically by the Irish government and by the Ministry than
the joint protests over the financial relations issue.
Since the early 'nineties Horace Plunkett and his growing
Irish Agricultural Organization Society had been attempting
to publicize their conviction that no permanent or meaning-
ful improvement in Irish agricultural production and
marketing could be accomplished without the coordination
and education which a properly funded Department of Agri-
culture could provide. Shortly after the return of the
Unionist ministry in 1895. Plunkett i^^sued an invitation
to those concerned with the material prosperity of Ireland
to join in a nonpartisan study of Ireland's agricultural
needs. He hoped that this study would elicit a government
commitment to establish the necessary agricultural depart-
ment. Although the McCarthite faction of the Irish Party
and some of the ultra- Unionists did not participate, the
respect which Plunkett and his cooperative movement com-
manded among the Farnellites, the Northern Liberal Union-
ists, and in the agricultural midlands resulted in the
convening of the Recess Committee in early 1396. That
Plunkett and his followers v;ere champions of the doctrines
of self-help and personal initiative ma.de Gerald Balfour
very responsive to the Recess Committee's recommendations
for state supported technical education and for some popu-
lar elements to be introduced into the operations of the
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future Board of Agriculture, m fact, the Chief
-Secretary
apparently altered the draft bill he was preparing to
embody the suggestions of the Recess Committee, so that
the Agricultural Bill laid before the Commons on 12 April
1897 was substantially the product of Plunketfs Recess
Committee, Although the principle of the measure commanded
wide support within the house, Nationalists and Unionists
criticized the financial provisions of the bill which
established an annual income of only i.150,000.^^ The
recent Financial Relations report and the discontent it
provoked in Ireland was bound to make the Irish very sensi-
tive to the financial allocations of the proposed depart-
ment. Moreover, the government's intention to take this
income cut of the ^-.700, 000 reserved for an Irish agricul-
tural rating equivalent grant, rather than from the Imperial
Exchequer as with the English Agricultural Board, added
insult to injurj%
When V, F. Knox's ^notion commanding widespread Union-
ist support, including that of Gerald Balfour and George
Wyndham, was only narrowly defeated by 28 votes, it was
clear that the government was in serious disrepute with the
21Plunkett DiariePp 13 August I696, 12 September I896,
Plunkett House, London,
22
Frsfjiiaala Jimrinl, 15 April I897; i.rish Indj^pi^niifiM*
17 ^iay 1897; Ullblia l^lly ^Jg^uss^, 21 May 1897; Th^ Irish
HfiDS^eM. 17 April 1897; see also A. W. Samuels to
Lecky, 7 l^iay 1897, Lecky KIS 153^; same to same, ^ July
1897 » Lecky IvlS 159^, Trinity College, Dublin.
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•loyal minority. Writing to w. E. H. Lecky. the Liberal
Unionist member for Trinity College, A. W. Samuels, a judge
in the Irish High Court of Justice painted the following
picture of unionist disillusion:
h^i^r.^^ an intense feeling of indignation
R!r>,^''°S^
l^nionists with regard to HicksBeach s fiiiancial policy to Ireland. He willneither treat the tariff in England or in
i^o^'oflv^'''^ ^ way to destroythe faith we have had in English honesty.
^
E'^T^i^ ^ ''^''^ unhealthy feeling growing upthat the country is being cheated Ind thiGoyernraent is blundering very badly in itsIrish policy. Hicks Be^ich was a desiDerate
1 allure as Irish secretary with his 'pressurewithm tne law' policy but he is going it one
worse for the country as Chancellor of the£<xchequer,
I have never seen such universal discontent
among loyalists - landlords believe they are
robbed, and commercial men that they arebeing cheated by the go'/^rnmcnt that they
did anything in their power to put into
office,--'
A few weeks later Samuels reported that the Nationalists
were openly taunting the Irish Unionists with 'stewing in
Unionist grease', and that not a single one of the loyal-
ists had a good word for the government.
General government fiscal policy toward Ireland and
the small income contemplated for the Agricultural Depart-
ment did not exhaust the list of complaints against the
Unionist government. Immediately after the passage of the
23^
^arauels to Lecky, 7 May 1897, Lecky MS 153^, Trinity
College, Dublin.
2/kSamuels to Lecky, k July I897, Lecky m 159^4-, Trinity
College, Dublin.
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1896 Land Act, the Ulster Liberal Unionists renewed their
campaign to secure democratic local government reform.
Which had been one of the main conditions of their alliance
with the Tories ever since 1886. At their annual meeting
in 1897 they passed a resolution suggesting that, although
there might be some just apprehensions of mismanagement
and abuse in the beginning in some sections of the country,
the reform would ultimately engage the best energies of
the people in public affairs, and would provide wholesome
education and experience of public duties and responsi-
bilities. The resolution suggested further that this con-
cession would remove all reasonable complaints of Irishmen
about lack of political power,
The presence of Chamberlain and Devonshire in the
Cabinet facilitated the publication of these views among
the Ministers., In addition to the purely political motiva-
tions for instituting local government reform, there was
an urgent adininistrative need to overhaul the Irish work-
house system. In the absence of any other democratically
constituted bodies, the local Boards of Guardians took on
many duties in the areas of health and sanitation which
had little to do with poor relief. Moreover, there was a
pressing need to amalgamate and improve conditions in
existing workhouses. Once the political and theoretical
need to abolish the grand jury system was accepted by the
Cabinet and the party rank and file, it was logical and
more efficient to rationalize the Poor Law Guardian
^^uist?r Liberal Unionist A^.s9ciatigD» p. 85.
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functions within the general local government measure.
Therefore, the limited poor law bill which the Irish Office
was preparing in 1896-7 was dropped by the government.
Thus by Rlp^y 1897 the Unionist government had a variety
Of disgruntled constituents and groups to appease. Many
landlords were incensed over the land act. the moderate
Unionists over the agricultural bill, the Irish liberal
unionists over the delays in local government reform, while
virtually all Irishmen were embittered by the government's
general fiscal policy. Only five days after the Knox
motion, Arthur Balfour submitted a proposal to his col-
leagues which would liberate the Ministry from its Irish
dilemmas by simultaneous treatment of the local government
question, the financial grievances of the landlords, and
the need for imperial aid to agricultural rates. In fact.
Balfour m.aintained that by combining local government
reform with a large finc'.ncial grant in aid of agricultural
rates, the governmsnt had a unique opportunity simultaneously
to give the Ir.lGh landlords some 'pecuniary solatium', quash
Irish financial discontent, and satisfy the legitimate
demand to reform the antiquated and politically indefens-
ible system of Irish local administration. In order to
accomplish all these objects, the government would drop the
agricultural bill and the proposed poor law reform. Ireland
would receive ^700,000 in aid of agricultural rates rather
than the i500,000 which, in 'strict equity* v/as the maximum
She could claim based on the
-,,,^3, Agricultural Ratin.
Act. The extra ^200,000 was included because
.generally
speaking the circumstances of Ireland justify generous
financial treatment', and because the settlement of all
these issues would be well worth some financial sacri-
fice.
The ministry's policy was clever and unique in offer-
ing benefits to every segment of the Irish political
spectrum. The Nationalists were offered an opportunity of
more power to weaken the political base of the aristocracy.
The Liberal Unionists would have their old local government
grievance redressed, while the landlords would receive a
great financial boon from the rating relief and from the
conversion of the incidence of taxation from the owner to
the occupier. The landlords were also scheduled for relief
from their former share of the poor rate. These financial
provisions were crucial to prevent the landlord class from
opposing their inevitable exclusion from local affairs.
The major Ascendency objection to Balfour's I892 bill had
been that, as the rate-payers for both their occupied and
tenanted land, they would have been taxed out of existence
by nationalist dominated councils „ In effect, the agri-
cultural equivalent grant enabled the ministry to allow
democratic local government reform by buying off landlord
?6
'A'
^* Balfour's Heads of statement policy on Ireland,
11 Ilay I89?, C;aJ337AV20, '
opposi-tion.^7
practically ad.itter
this v/hen he said:
After the class war of which v/e hpvp -.nthe vir + TTYic! +ui„ ^ na e all beenxn ctims this Bill - without the finanoiTiclauses... would have been the most uiiu^^measure iinaginable. It would have been^weapon ready made in the hands oFthe maiorltv
fr^^L^^ extinction of whatever property n
^
With rTJ.T'i ^''^ Irish^IandJo^ci^
^he landed M.^r^^S'^'^^^"'" ^^^^^ conferred on
rents wn? ' I ^^^"^ revision of
L'nantstie '^'^^^^ of the
Horace Plunkett attributed the loss of his agricultural bill
to '750,000 golden reasons '.^^
Balfour informed the House of Commons of the new
Irish policy on 21 May 1897. The Irish Nationalists were
naturally pleased by the prospect of increasing their
political power, while the Unionist leader, Edward Carson,
echoed landlord opinion when he said that as long as the
minority were protected, it would be narrow for his party
to be antagonistic. Six months elapsed before the pariia-
jnentary draftsmen completed their work.
The local government bill which Gerald Balfour intro-
duced on 21 February 1898 eventually established county
and district councils, elected triennually on a parliamentary
i^ir V;est Ridgeway to Balfour, 19 November I891, 13. M.Add. I^'b i|9,8l2, ff. 206-7. Absentee landlords who lettheir entire estates received double benefits berause
their non-occupying status cancelled all poor relief andlocal rates. There probably were not too many in this
category, hov/ever.
28
^ Himjifird, ixii, 577.
29Plunkett to I^ady Betty Balfour, 29 October I897, X'lunkett
Papers, Plunkett House, London.
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franchise. Those women and peers, who but for their sex
and title would have qualified for the parliamentary
register, were also given the local government franchise.
The application of the one-man one-vote principle to every
occupier abolished the plural voting privileges formerly
enjoyed by the Ascendency class. Because the only qualifi-
cation for eligibility for office was possession of a
parliamentary franchise, local politics were open to all
Irishmen, irrespective of wealth, religion, or politics.
The franchise and eligibility clauses were perhaps the most
revolutionary aspects of the bill, for as the first elec-
tions indicated, they enabled the native Irish to sweep
the Ascendency completely out of local affairs.
The parliamentary reception accoru^d to Balfour's
bill did not give the government any grounds for complaint.
The very minute objections brought forth by the Nationalists
aiid Unionist members were solely for appearance's sake.
Unionists did not want to jeopardize the prospective finan-
cial aid. while the Nationalists looked forward to having
new machinery to further the Home Rule agitation. John
Dillon spoke of the absolute necessity of a limited
movement to secur- popular control of the county councils...'
when William O'Brien was planning; the September Convention
of the United Irish League.
30Dillon to O'Brien, 8 July I898, O'Brien Papers. National
Library of Ireland, MS 885/I3.
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There were many Irish Unionists who felt the major
safeguards against financial abuse, i.e.. the incidence of
taxation on the occupier, were inadequate, and shortly
after the introduction they mounted demands for minority
representation or for a system of cumulative voting. The
Chief-Secretary apparently shared his elder brother's view
that such mechanisms were useless, and were opposed to
democratic principle:
Lri!^'
no longer to keep up. so far as localgovernment is concerned, anything that
emphasizes the distinction between landlords
ana tenants, bet^/;een large and small cess-payers. Iviy own belief is that if you succeedby a system of minority representation ingetting a larger proportion of landed gentry
on uhese councils you would do so with the
accompanying disadvantages that those whoDy this means secure seats on the council^,
I? i Si'^ '^'^ influence on the councilsthat they would otherwise poscess.31
Colonel Saunderson lod these ri-ht wing Unionist
forces in the Commons while the Belfast Newslcttor was
their mouthpiece in Ireland. W. E, H. Lecky received
petitions for minority representation from the Derry Union-
ist Association, the Irish Unionist Alliance, and a Com-
mittee of Kerry Landowners, as well as from the Mid-Arm.agh
Constitutional Association,^^ Despite Lecky 's advice that
the best course was to accept the inevitable ajid to involve
^ Hxmaarii, iv. ^59, 516-7.
32Lecky MS I687, I692, 1700a. Trinity College, Dublin.
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themselves in the new system, 33
.any of these Unionists
remained embittered by the government's refusal to counten-
ance any form of minority representation. 3^ An indication
Of the bitterness which the government's conciliation
caused among the ultra-Unionists is reflected in the fol-
lowing editorial from the ^qlf^ NewslAtt^r'
The Bill is a notable instance in which theGovernment have deserted their supportersgoing out of their way to pleaseT?ac?ioAthat never will be pleased with anvthing
t^^.f political independence, and for that
f ^V^Bf?i^^r^'-'^?
into a revolutionary measure,
h:t ^'^h.^^i f altogether experimental asjuccess of local government in England
an.J^ Scotland cannot be taken as a criterion
lini"''''"/^
asure of this nature will work inirelj^nd, the social and political conditionsOx Inis country being so different fromthose prevailing in Great Britain. 35
It would be incorreot to assume that Gerald and
Arthur Balfocir.' had complete confidence that the local
government machinery would be run in a totally nonpartisan
and efficient manner, Vor instance, the clergy were dis-
qualified from off j.ce ovdng to what Gerald described as
'the tame submission' of the Roman Catholic population to
priestly v- tPx-e^ rcnco and do/nination. (Moreover, the county
councilG v^ere not given the powers of compulsory land
33le-cky to Lud-Armagn Constitutional Assooicticn, 5 April
lo'-j-', Lecky I704, Trinity College, Dublin,
Botlon J. v.'aller to Lecky, 26 knrch 1893, Inckv MS £601-
same to same, 16 April I893, Lecky ivii 26n2, 'iv-^nity
College, Dublin. — y
35
•^-^Ih^ Bfiiila^ Newsli^tjir, 16 Way I898,
12^
seizure which the gx-and juries had possessed. The Local
Government Board exercised stronger powers of supervision
over capital expenditure than existed under the English
and Scottish systems. 36 Nor were police powers extended
to the Irish as had been the case under the English and
Scottish Acts. There were differences in the application
Of the agricultural rating which suggested a desire to
confer more benefits on the landlords than on the ordinary
ratepayers. For instance, unlike in England, agricultural
holdings within towns were exempt from relief, while wood-
lands, parks and pleasure grounds outside of towns were
accorded relief. Landlords, the only possessors of such
recreational property, were the obvious beneficiaries of
the latter provision.
Nevertheless, the Irish Local Government Act was
second only to the land purchase acts in providing Irish-
men with the opportunity to control their own immediate
affairs. An Irishman's Catholicity or his class origins no
longer prevented his participation in local affairs or
denied him the opportunity for public employment. The
first elections in I699 virtually ousted the Ascendency
classes from their former control of county affairs.
Nationalists secured 551 places on the new county councils,
while the Unionists could claim only 125, 86 of them in
3^G. Balfour memorandum on Irish Local Government Bill.
29 Novem.ber 1897, CAB37A5/5i.
Ulster. Inevitably, the first elections «ere fought
upon political lines. To have expected the Irish in the
f^rst flush Of their newly won electoral powers to ignore
the predominant political issues of the d.y, whether Ho.e
Rule versus the Union or landlordism versus tenant demands,
was asking too ™uch. On the other hand, the extension of
democratic local government helped to develop an awareness
that Home Rule could not solve all Ireland's problems.
Most Of the county councils proved themselves cognisant
Of the basic economic requirements of the country, as they
demonstrated in their cooperation with the Department of
Agriculture in their initiation of technical and agricul-
tural courses. The democratization of the franchise helped
to focus attention on the horrendous grievances of the
town and agricultural labourers. The preoccupation with,
the land question from the 1670 's i,ad obscured the claims
of this large class of impoverished Irishmen. The election
of labourers and their representatives facilitated the
expansion of publicly supported labourers' cottages all
over the country in the decade after 1898, The Irish
agricultural labourer, who suffered the nost fror,, depres-
sion and unemployment, was equally influential in pressing
the local organs for technical instruction schemes.
37c
• Shannon, I-2£aI
.GoveraumJl jji ICEland, Chap, Four.
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^!!2""""' if^ai Ssym:mpnt jjy teiand. Chap, Five, pp. 296-30^. 319-3^7! also 1-/9905/12825/1902, i^iji, ladijjiji^aalO, 30 August 1902. -^,_>j tf-.-u^
Indeed, by I905 the majority of M^h ratepayers showed
the most concern for these pragmatic considerations and
efficient administration, and considered Home Rule senti-
ments and declarations increasingly irrelevant to the
proper administration of local affairs.
The passage of the Local Government Act did not
terminate the reconstructive efforts of Gerald and Arthur
Balfour. In 1899 the government established the long-
awaited Department of Agriculture and Technical Instructi
along the lines recommended earlier by the. Recess Committ
The appointment of Horace Plunkett as Vice-President of
the department and the subsequent acquiescence of the
Chief-Secretary in the appointment of T. P. Gill, a Roman
Catholic nationalist and an ex-participant in the Plan of
Campaign, indicated a greater responsiveness to Irish
wishes and ideas than had existed previously. Undoubtedly,
while ties of friendship partially explain these appoint-
ments, Gerald. and Arthur Balfour saw in Plunkett the very
model of the Irishman that 'progressive unionism' v/as
expected to develop. Despite growing ultra-Unionist suspi
cions of the genuineness of Plunkett' s unionisi a
subsequent outcry over the Gill appointment by .e Ardilua
clique, Arthur Balfour and his brother remained steadfast
in their support of this dynamic Anglo- Irishman and his
39
Plunkett 's nonpartisanship led the Irish
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- 3.ady Betty Balfour to Arthur Balfour, 28 August 1900.
B. M. Add. :ViJ ^9,831, fe
. . 12?
unionists to try to ow^ii- hir^^ TO ust him from his South Dublin seat,
Arthur Balfour encouraged Pi„ni-«+-4- ,d a iiunkett to run so that his
constituents would bear full responsibility for the loss
Of his talents to the Co.n.ons. Writing to the Du.e of
Devonshire, Balfour severely critici-od
-t-ho v^y ^ xici..e the diehards who
remained blind to Plunketf«? onr>+>,.'>-LunKett s contributions to the cause of
the Union:
Mr, Plunkett's position io ^„
iiciano. He has devoted himself, for n^nv
land's srefest'^SLt'ryia°'ioS^^
puipose, with an absence of any
-seJ f-sp^ki v^/rmotive and with an unwearied zeaJ which o^^htto earn the gratitude of Irislmen of allclasses, and not least I think o? ?hose Union-ists who hold that poverty is one of ?he
L'rP%'"of'li'Lnf '""^^ '^"^^'^^ the ancienthrn?L5 M O? ^I"^ prevented them from
J'^""'
Plimkett has now got a positionin which he can still furth6:r develop theIdeas Which as a private individual/ he hasdone so much to foater; and it is sireV
a
melancholy reflection that a man of whom allthis may be said cannot find a seat in thecountry of his birth, and whoso best interest
"evS^I^;^!^r^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^-^^ and\^^elf.
Balfour greatly regretted that the Gill appointment and
Plunkett's one vote in support of the release of Irish
agitators was allowed to outweigh his services to the coun-
try. If Sir Horace was forced to retreat to a safe English
or Scottish seat, Balfour suggested that this event would
emphasize the accusations that party divisions ran so deep
that Irish administrators could only be effective when
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holding English and Scottish seats.^^ Despite Balfour's
admonitions to the Irish Unionists, the reacxionary
Ardiluan clique put up their own candidate against Plunkett
with the result that the spJit in Unionist votes gave the
South Dublin seat to the Nationalist contender. Mooncy.
Balfour's admiration for Plunkett and his conviction that
Sir Horace's work was strengthening the Union led to
Plunkett 's retention of the Vice-Presidency of the Depart-
inent of Agriculture.
Indications of Unionist backlash notwithstanding,
Arthur Balfour remained convinced that '...Ireland should
receive exceptional treatment of a generous character to
mitigate or remove the social and economic difficulties
under v;hich she had so long laboured'. Although there
were no English parallels, Balfour defended the land pur-
chase program, the Congested Districts Board, the Light
Railways and the Agricultural and Industries Act as justi-
fied by an anxiety to give exceptional aid to a sister
kingdom. Indeed, Balfour maintained that such policies
strengthened rather than weakened the Union.
In the autuiTin of 1893 Balfour hoped to follow local
government reform with legislation to provide university
education for Irish Roman Catholics. As has been shown,
Balfour to the Duke of Devonshire, ? June I900, B. M.
Add. I/iS 49 » 769, ff. 179-183.
41
Balfour to V/. p. Jackson, 20 March I900, B. Add.
IvlS 1^9,853, f. 199.
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on principle Balfour had been sympathetic to this Irish
grievance back in the late 1880 's. In February I897 he
told an Irish bishop that the government would welcome
receiving confidentially the views of the Irish hierarchy
on the university question/^^ 3.^^^ ^^.^ question had
generated so much religious passion and bigotry in the
past, Balfour took no immediate steps to frame legislation
for publicly endowing a Roman Catholic university. As he
explained to a correspondent in July 1898j
It would break the party to endeavor toforce them against their will or against the
will of their constituents, to vote for a
measure to which many of them have anineradicable objection. ^3
A further obstacle was undoubtedly the absence of any con-
sensus among the Irish bishops, Presbyterians and laity as
to the ideal solution.
However, by late I898 the Irish bishops as well as
John Dillon had expressed renewed interest in rapidly set-
tling the higher education issue on non-denominational
lines if financial support comparable to that of Trinity
College could be secured. Ec;lfour drafted into service
R» B. Haldanes, ^^ho had written the London University Charte]
only a few years previously. In October I898, Haldane
secretly journeyed to Ireland and interviewed Archbishops
42
Balfour to Bishop O'Dwyer (?}, 19 February 1897„ B. U,
Add, MS 49,852. f« 42.
-Balfour to Mr. Samson, 8 July I898, B. hU Add. M'S 49,852,
f. 303.
Aalsh and Logue as we.Xl as Christopher Reddington. T. ,i
Healy and John Dillon of the Irish Parliamentary Party.
He also tall:ed to various business and educational offi-
cials in Dublin and Belfast in his efforts to build up an
Irish consensus.^^ He envisaged setting up two constitu-
ent universities in Dublin and Belfast. One supreme
governing body would be established which could grant
internal and external degrees. Haldane believed this
measure would satisfy the northern Presbyterians as well
as the southern bishops, whom he described as more inter-
ested in having 'a non-atheist
' atmosphere than a specifi-
cally Catholic curriculum. In view of his pre^ car
sentiments, Balfour must have been relieved
.v.ane's
report that the hierarchy did not particularly v,ant to
dominate the governing bodies and would be satisfied if
they were consulted in the nomination process of the uni-
versity governors, Haldane encouraged Balfour to press
the Cabinet to deal quickly with the matter to substantiate
the government's good will.^*^^
Three weelcs later, despite the inevitable diehard
objections, Balfour submitted Haldane 's report, sketch
bill and sketch charter to the Cabinet, He told his
The political delicacy of the mission is illustrated byHaldane s request that the Foreign Office print only 20
copies of his report, 6 for Balfour, 6 for himself
, andthe others to be locked up,
Haldane memorandum on Irish Mission, prepared for A j
Balfour, 20 October I898, CAB37/W?'?.
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colleagues that in the interests of Ireland, of the Union.
and Of higher education in general, he felt obligated
earnestly to press the recommendations,
From the point of view of Tt'pT'-.v,/! •• -• •
^U^^^l^T ^s'i^ prop?
re?usaft^'^' "i"" the Union/' the
"
iusal CO pass such a measure would be aplain admission that on some subiects 4least, a Unionist Parliament coSld not Wis-
as^a master
S^n^^ally, it is manifest,
'
Ion? a? ^hf politics, that, sol g s the Irish grievance remains unre-dressed. It will be imT30ssible to r-ntr^brteanything from public sources towards IV^Tver"sity requirements in Great Britain, Ax^least.
in Lrf"^-^"^
Irish member, I should take careoo make ix impossible ^•''6
Over the next four months, Balfour and lialdane met fre-
quently in an effort to get an Irish University Bill laid
before Parliament . ^'^ Hicks Beach enthusiastically sup-
ported the cause and promised ^50,000 from the Church
Surplus funds. ^'^ However, despite his desire '...to get
the Roman Catholic population of Ireland educated...,''''^
^"A i' ^^^^-'-^our memorandum on Irish Unive>-s-:tv Question12 November I898, CAB37A8/82. Balfours^rLsed alsS'that the support of the Ulster Liberal Unioni^:t3 and
some bcotch and Welsh dissenters gave a unique opDor-tunity to proceed with the reform.
if?
'R, B. Haldans,
^in Ajiln]^^api}y (Garden City; Doubledav
and Doran, I929), pp. 138-144.
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^^'thur^Balfou^^^ to^Gerald Balfour, n. d., B. yi. Add.
49.
Balfour to Professor Park, I5 February I898, B. M. Add.
Mi) 49,853, f, i\o.
Balfour's efforts in I898-9 proved as abortive as those
Of 1889. While the Irish bishops' den^ands for an endow-
ment equal xo Trinity's and for more control over the
governing body caused some difficulties for the leader of
the House, the death blow to Haldane's proposals came from
opposition within the Cabinet, and especially from the
Duke Of Devonshire. 50 The appointment of a new commission
to investigate higher education in Ireland buried the ques-
tion until 1903. It is perhaps more convenient to turn
to that year to conclude this discussion on Balfour and
the Irish university question,
Encouraged by the conciliatory atmosphere generated
by the Land Conference of I902 and the passage of the Land
/ct in 1903, George Wyndham urged Arthur Balfcur, now the
Prime Minister, that the time was propitious for reopening
the university question. Wyndham maintained that the
multiplication of public universities in England at Liver-
pool, Leeds, Manchester, Birmingham and Sheffield rightly
exacerbated the Irish sense of grievance. Since the report
of the second royal commission indicated that Catholic,
Anglican and Presbyterian interests all agreed on t]ie obso-
lescence of the present examining university, Wyndham
advocated converting the Royal University into a teaching
university. The Queen's Colleges at Cork, Galway and
50Balfour to General V/anchope, 8 June I899, B. M. Add.
MS ^^9,853, ff, 95-7; also W. Long to Balfour, 2? November
1898, B. M. Add. MS 49.?76, f. 10.
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Belfast he thought shoula oe converted into technological
institutes. According to Wyndhan., £50,000 to fc6o.OCO
per annum drawn from the Irish Development Grant of
^185,000 per annum would finance the bill adequately, and
would thereby eliminate possible parliamentary difficult
ties that might arise if funds were drawn directly from
imperial revenues. Wyndham believed there was enough
support among all the religious factions as well as from
moderate Unionists such as Dunraven and Monteagle to
guarantee success. His anxiety for proceeding at this
juncture was not entirely altruistic. The I903 I^nd Act
had operated only a short time when it became apparent
that landlords had received very generous prices. Wyndham
hoped that university ix^form would help to divert Irish
attention from the great boon conferred upon the Ascen-
dency e-^
Wyndham 's proposals were publicly floated in Lord
Dunraven 's letter to the press on 4 January 190^K However,
the Chief-Secretary's optimism was quickly dampened when
three weeks later Lord Londonderry told Belfast Orangemen
that the Cabinet had no intention of establishing a Roman
Catholic University in Ireland. Besides the opposition
^"^Kn^ 3*" September I903. B. M. Add. MS
^^,604, f. lol; same to same, 4 November I903. B. M„
p^^r^ ^^''^ 18 January J 9(V4,B„ M. Add. iijS L^o^sok, ff. 207-8. '
'^IhaMin Daily E^garfiss, 23 January 190^1,
Of this influential peer other factors also explain
Balfour's failure to support vigorously the Chief
.Secre-
tary's proposed university scheme. Firstly, the Prime
Minister could not risk rekindling, by an Irish bill, the
religious dissensions which had accompanied the passage
Of the English Education Act of 1902.53 F,,,,ermore, there
was widespread feeling in Whitehall that Ireland had
received extremely generous treatment in recent years with
'
the monies expended on the agricultural grant, the Devel-
o-m Grant, the Department of Agriculture and the more
recent land act. Austen Chamberlain and Edward Hamilton
reported that the required borrowing to finance the latter
measure was causing considerable anxiety in The City, and
that resistance to Irish expenditures was growing. j.
Sandars, Balfour's secretary, warned his chief that the
majority of his colleagues believed that '...George and
his clients had a very fine exhibition last session, and
that the Party want no more Irish measures for the
present. '^^
53
u:.Ur:J:'^ l""^' ilJliaand, l8Z0rm.4 (Oxford: Oxford
the ^o!t^T.;f 'J^^^^' ^55-8. These pages dLcuss
Ministry!
T'Tohler^s the
.
Education Act causid for the
'
ti^'''v^^i^^7?^^^^^''
^alfour, 13 November IQ03. B. M.
f]?* Vr^'lM' i' ^' to same, 6 January 1904, B. ivj,
t 1^ "t/t^"'-^^; ^' ^^^'^^ -''"^^^ 24 August 1904B« M, Add, IVxS 49,735, f. 49.
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Once again the claims of Irish Roman Catholics were^
set aside in deference to English financial and religious
'
sensibilities. This grievance was finally settled in I908
When the .ain elements of Haldane's recommendations for a
nondenominational university were introduced into Augustine
Birreirs University Act. Although Balfour was opposed to
the academic recognition which Birrell's bill accorded
Maynooth Seminary, and to the role of the Irish county
councils in choosing the governing body, he welcomed the
measure as a sincere effort to establish sound academic
institutions and traditions
'...unpolluted and unperverted
by religious prejudices or bigotry on either side.... '56
In as much as the present university system of Ireland is
based upon Haldane's plan, Balfour nust be given some
credit for providing higher educational opportunity for
Irish Catholics,
As has been shown. Arthur Balfour's support of land
purchase and local government reform began to open novel
economic, social and political opportunities for the major-
ity of Irish people. However, conciliation proved expensive
in terms of Irish unionist support because the Ascendency
classes attributed the erosion of their social and politi-
cal influence directly to these measures. Irish unionist
discontent began smouldering at least eight years before
the Devolution Crisis burst upon the parliamentary scene in
56
^ H£m^:j:d» clxxxviii, 35^-56? cxcii, 631-ifO.
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190;^-5. Much Of the furor over the Gill appointment and
Horace Plunicett's nonpartisanship was B,.apto.atic of the
anxiety which conciliation generated in the great Irish
houses. By 1900 many unionists found further cause for
complaint in Gerald Balfour's failure to initiate coercion
against William O'Brien's United Irish League. The Chief-
Secretary's position was further complicated by the reuni-
fication of the Irish party in February I900 following
almost a decade of internecine squabbling. Gerald Balfour's
oft used parliamentary tactics of divide and conquer were
losing their utility in the face of a united Irish party
at Westminster. As the man responsible for Irish affairs.
Gerald Balfour had to bear the brunt of both Irish union-
ist discontent and the renewed vigor of the Irish Ilational-
ist benches. Caught between the cross fires of Nationalist
hostility and Unionist anger, the Chief-Secretary suffered
a loss in healtii and political influence by mid-1900, and
his resignation from the Irish Office in November 01 that
year was virtuaJly a foregone conclusion. -^^
The chcl(;e of George Wyndham as Gerald Balfour's
successor in the Irish Office indicated that Salisbury and
Arthur Balfour wore not disposed to capitulate to the first
signs of Unionist backlash. The Ardiluanite clique had
hoped to terminate conciliation by getting v»alter Long
57-J^lunkext to Lady Betty I^alfour^ 19 June I9OO, Plunkett
Papers, Plunkett House, London; W. Long to Arthur Balfour,
2 November 1906, B. Add. I-ii 49,776, f. I85-6,
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was
appointed as Chief
-Secretary. 58 Wyndharn's appointment
undoubtedly prompted by motives similar to those which
led to Gerald Balfour's appointment as Chief
-Secretary
five years earlier, wyndham had served an Irish apprentice
Ship When he was Arthur Balfour's private secretary from
1887 to 1891. Moreover, ties of mutual intellectual out-
look and friendship insured that there would be constant
communication and empathy between the leader of the House
and the Chief-Secretary. Wyndham was in office only a
short time when their substantial agreement on the causes
and solution of the Irish Question became apparent. As the
new Chief-Secretary explained to Lord Cadogen, the Viceroy,
Ireland would suffer from chronic agitation so long as the
system of dual ownership and periodic rent revisions
existed s
Under the existing system the value of Irishland must be continually depreciated; thelandlord cannot be expected to improve tne
lai\d; the tenant may be expected to deterior-
ate It, and even in the best estates, certain
occupancies will be perpetuated which are
centers of lawlessness an.d rallying groundsfor fresh attacks on the capital value of
Ireland \s chief asset, I therefore wholly
concur m thinking that purchase must be
accGleratcd and cheauened and released fi-om
impediments to all parties concerned. 59
Easier said th.-.m donel A number of factors were
bringing purchases under the existing legislation to a
5St.
LrQemnllz ilouriiS.l, 2 iNove:nber 1900,
"^Vndham to Cadop:en, n. d., B. M, Add. Mo ^49,830, f. I6I.
standstill. Firstly, Wyndharn discovered that all the
landlords who could afford to sell as a result of other
income, had already done so. The legal costs, often as
high as 33f^, were preventing the rest from putting their
land up. Landlords were reluctant to accept the declining
government land stock as payment. On the other hand,
.any
tenants were slow to buy what were basically uneconomic
holdings. In addition, expectations of a third rent revi-
sion and Of the United Irish League's agitation forcing
sale prices down were postponing many peasant purchase
applications.^^
The urgent need to revive the flagging purchase pro-
gram was pressed upon Wyndharn and the Irish administration
by the rapid growth of Wiiiiain O'Brien's United Irish
League, originally conceived as a weapon for poor tenants
in their fight against the grazier interests in Connaught.
0.\ W. Russell, the Ulster champion of tenant right, per-
suaded O'Brien to use the League to forward compulsory •
purchase. The popularity of the League's platform was
measured by the rise in the number of branches from 386 in
1699 to 865 by late I900, while membership rose from i^if,225
to 86, 119 c^-^ In fact, many Irish landlords, anxious over
6o„.
.^ynaham to Cadogen, n, d., B, M. Add. m 49,830, ff. 166-190 s
61
Wyndharn memo?.-£indum on the origins of the United IrishLeague, 23 July I901, i3. M. Add. IViS /^9,802, f. 172.'
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declining land values and falling land stocks, were begin-
ning to agitate for increased government s^.bsidization^
for land purchase as protection against bankruptcy .^^
Wyndham proved to be as sensitive as Balfour to the
especially serious conditions in the far west, and wrote
that the present funding and powers conferred on the Con-
gested Districts Board were inadequate to the task of
bringing permanent improvement through amalgamation and
resale. ^3 i,,ereased financial support and '...two or three
years of paternal administration...' between the landlords'
sale and tenant purchase was the Chief-Secretary 's pre-
scription for the economic ills of the west«^^
The complexity of the legal and financial problems
of land purchase as well as the political and parliar.entary
difficulties generated by the United Irish League's agita-
tion prevented Wyndham from producing a land purchase bill
until the spring of 1902. Nevertheless, the general lines
of a land policy and the best means to defeat the renewed
agitation began to emerge in a series of memorandums which
Wyndham sent to Balfour and to the Cabinet starting in
November 1900. Although he was as firmly committed to
peasant proprietorship as Balfour, wyndham opposed
bee in particular Montgcmery Papers, P. R, O.N. I., Mont-gomery to G, de L, Willis, Secretary to Trustees of
Irish Land Trust, 26 April I889, Dod/627A28/98
:
4 iio-marii, ci, 751.
-^Wyndham to Balfour, 26 November I9OO, B. M. Add. ¥^
49,803, ff. 139-43.
^^IMii., ff. 143-7.
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compelling landlords to sell on the
.rounds that compulsion
would^stereotype the existence of small uneconomic hold-
ings. Until a comprehensive land purchase bill could
be formulated, he preferred to expand the powers of the
Congested Districts Board to supervise amalgamation, and
to instruct the Land Commission to approve only those sales
Where the size and quality of the holding gave promise of
successful farming, Balfour agreed with the Chief^Secretary
that steps ought to be taken as quickly as possible to
remove the barriers hindering purchase. He was also opposed
to compulsion because of the enormous expense such a scheme
would necessitate,^"^
By early January I90I Wyndham had concluded that
substantial amounts of imperial monies would have to be
expended to secure a fair price for the landlords and annu-
ities attractive to the prospective buyers. He strongly
recommended the 'in globo' purchase of whole estates by the
Land Commission when 3A of the tenants agreed, lie hoped
thereby to facilitate the eradication of rundale and the
prevention of subdivision,^''^ Wyndham was not able to trans-
late these general ideas into legislative form until the
fall of 1901, and the actual introduction was delayed
65 .
rtyncham to Balfour, 26 November I900, B. M. Add. MS
49fo03, f. 143.
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Balfour to ^Vyndham, 18 January I90I, B. :/]. Add. Iv]S 49,803,
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'^'Vyndham to Cadogen, n. 0.,, B. M. Add. WS 49,803, ff. l6l-4.
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until March. I902. One of the principal obstacles was
Cadogen's opposition to the 'in globo' principle/^
Cadogen feared that making the state a landlord would pre-
cipitate perpetual difficulties. Secondly, the continued
growth of the United Irish League, which was up to 989
branches of 98,/fOO members by the summer of 190I, and the
support which John Dillon, John Redmond and the Irish Par-
laimentary Party gave to the agitation, increased Wyndham's
difficulties in persuading the Cabinet and the Treasury to
embark upon any fresh ventures in land purchase. More-
over, Hicks Beach warned Salisbury in September that since
normal expenses had risen W'o in the previous six years,
and heavier direct taxes would not bo tolerated in times
of peace, the estimates for 1902 would have to be pared to
7 0the bone/ Wyndham was sorely tried by all these diffi-
culties, but Balfour counselled patience and encouraged
him to keep plugging away.''-^ The Chief-Secretary did plug
away, but chiefly by sending more and more pleading memos
^^vvyndham to Balfour, I3 January I90I, B. M. Add. MS
'>9fB03, f, 15I; same to same, 20 January I90I, B, M.
Add, MS if-9,803>,
.f. 19-!+.
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V/yndham to his brother, 19 November 1901, cited in J. V/,
Mackail and G. vVyndham, Lif^ ^6. Letters o£ George
Viyililh-^ja (London? Hutchinson, I925), II. ^31. Hereafter
cited kackail and Wyndham, Gae^^'^^ wyndham.
70 .Hicks Beach to Salisbury, I3 September I90I, B. M, Add.
MS ^-9,695, fr. 127-8.
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' Wyndham to Balfour, 29 September I90I, B» M. Add. MiS
'V9,803. f. 220.
that introduction of a land purchase bill was the only
effective means to check the rising agitation:
bnater.^^hnr^-^^'" landlords except a
lllnlt^tK.^ ^^^1 facilities forpurchase at some expense to the stateb; dependent upon that reducing the state
cation'o/p ^'^f^ rents/by simplin-on of appeals o If I only can e:et the
Of renl!?2'^'' " no^hird^revision
A few weeks later Balfour received another plea:
I cannot say too earnestly how necessary Ifeel It to be that the Cabinet should decideon a comprehensive land policy and place mem a position to speak early in the session
or sooner, iiiveryday that I give to studyin-the question convinces me that we must accept
tT^ ^^.^i^^^ principle and announce it soon.It would be a great calamity not to come out
with our policy until the agitation has gonelurther. I am keeping the lawless parts
wedged off from the rest of Ireland, but the
strain is increasing. V
3
He emphasized to Balfour again his conviction that the
combination of ordinary law plus a constructive policy was
the most effective weapon against the rural agitators;
c . .nine-tenths of the people are holding back
from the agitation. The graziers have had a
very bad year and prices for stock are very
low. If we can get in with a reasonable
constructive policy beforf: the agitation
develops further, and v/hilst the 'grass' inter-
est is still suffering from past inflation
and Present low prices, I believe we sliall
win. f^-^
^ Wyndham to Balfour, 18 October 1901, B. M, Add. IViS
^i-9,803, ff. 228-29»
73
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^9,803, f. 233.
''^lidii., ff. 235-36.
1^3
w'yndharn's plans for ordinary law plus purchase were
thwarted by growing Irish Unionist frenzy over the United
Irish League and Cadogen's conversion to the necessity of
coercion.75 Although Balfour put pressure on Hicks 13each
to accept a L5 iOs rather than annuity in Wyndham's
proposed bill, the Leader of the House was not able, and
perhaps not willing, to prevent the Cabinet from making the
introduction of the land bill conditional to the renewal
'
of the Crimes Act.^^ A vigorous Tory press campaign in
conjunction with the pressure that the Irish Unionist
Alliance applied by deputations to Lord Salisbury and by
resolutions in April led to the proclamation under the
Crimes Act of Cavan. Cork, Leitrim, Roscommon and Sligo on
16 April 1902. The revival of coercion along with unsatis-
factory financial pr-ovisions virtually precluded any
possibility of Vvyndham's I902 Land Bill being passed, and
Parliament dropped it on 10 June I902. Almost immediately
Cadogen Memorandum on Ireland, 8 March I902, CAci37/6l/'58
•
vVyndhara to Balfour, 2 Karch 1902, B. M. Add. /f9,804.
'
f. bj J. J, Sandars to Balfour, n. d., B, M. Add IviS
49 J 761, f. 9-12, Balfour acknowledged in his repoi-t to
the King the growing pressure for coercion from Cadoron
and the Irich unionists, but he apparently appreciated
vvyndham's reluctance to prosecute or to introduce the
Crimes Act until he had sufficient evidence to almost
guarantee conviction. From his experience as Irish i^ecre-
tary Balfour appreciated the difficulties which innocent
verdicts caused to Dublin Castle and Royal Irish Con-
s tabul^r^r^morale
. Balfour to the King, 11 March 1902,
76
V/ilfred S, Blunt, J^iy Diaries (New York: Knopf, 1921),
p. ^^5, Hereafter cited Blunt, Liy
vVillia. O.Brlen and John Red.ond
.ade plans to revive
.ho
rural agitation so as to bring Dublin Castle and tne L.nd-
lords to heel.7^ By the end of su..er the government had
Placed two-thirds of the country under the Cri.es Act, and
had gaoled a total of n .embers of Parliament as well as
two former members. The government faced the real possi-
bility of an agitation of the proportions of the Flan of
Campaign. However, wyndham, as Chief
-Secretary and Balfour,
now the Prime Minister following Salisbury's July retire-
ment, were sav^d from that by Captain Shaw Taylor's
suggestion Of 3 September I902 that representatives of
Irish tenants and owners search for a solution at a round
table conference. Wyndham heartily endorsed this Anglo-
Irishman's proposal in a public letter two days later, as
did William O'Brien and John Kedmond. Although the ^nd-
owners Convention refused to participate, the J^nd Confer-
ence convened on 20 December I902. By early January its
Nationalist and moderate Unionist representatives had
worked out general terms attractive to landlords and
tenants alike. The Land Conference Report called for the
direct payment of state cash to the landlord and extended
payment periods for tenants. The details of price and
financing were left up xo the Chief
-Secretary and the
Ministry to work out. Because ./yndham believed that
77Redmond to O'Brien, July or Au^^ust 1902, O'Brien MSS
National x^ibrary of Ireland. 10^^96; Tho. Fr^^oniiuil^ 'IsmumL.June 1902; ..'illiam O'Brien, An OlivQ Bxoncil In
Irsl3,nsi &nsl lis. hlslj^i:^ (London: iv'ac:viillian, 1910).
pp. 136-37.
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purchase woul.
.ene.it the
.o.e.n.ent
.e.ucin.
.udiciai
Charges and law enforcement expenses, he urged Balfour to
get the Cabinet and the Treasury to accept the Report as
the basis Of his next purchase biU.78
^^^^^^^^
Wyndham eventually laid before the Cabinet called for
^12 million in direct cash payments to the Irish landlords.
Prices were determined at m to 2,^ years rental value on
first term rents, and 21-^ to 27* on second term rental
values, with an annual interest rate of 3t percent. Some
government members opposed this extensive use of state
funds to rescue the Irish landlords. For instance. Hicks
Beach wrote the Prime Minister from Palermo. Italy, that
although he realized the government had little choice but
to accept the unanimous convention report, he was loathe
to expend ^12 million without the introduction of compul-
sory purchase. Ha held that many Irish landlords would be
foolish and obstinate enough to wreck the scheme by holding
out for better terms later, and he suggested that plenty
Of precedents for compulsion could be found on the basis
Of public interest, or oven on the basis of the past adjudi--
cation of Irish rents. "^^ Chamberlain also seemed to oppose
the bill vigorously. According to his cousin, wilfred ,S,
Blunt. vVyndham liad such a desperate fight to secure Cabinet
78
wynrtham to Balfour, 11 January I903, B. i^i. Add. MS k9,8oh,
79
•Hicks Beach to Balfour. 22 At^ril 1903; B. Ivi. Add. MS
*+9*695» ff. 1^7-8.
approval that the fate of the bill was uncertain just
forty-eight hours before introduction, wyndham later told
his cousin that Arthur Balfour's support was crucial in
securing ultimately Cabinet assent. In reporting the
Cabinet proceedings to the Kir.g, Balfour acknowledged the
objections cut supportod the bill enthusiastically
^
This is a very far reaching measure; and the
-urish government are sauf?;uine that it w^il
m t-'^'''':'^^'^ ^^''^ ^^^^^ 1^^^ difficulty!The objections to it - and there are objec-tions^ to all things - arise from the fact thatIt maKes a heavy call on British c^-^e^it
already handicapped by the past war loaAs andthe Iransvaai borrowings? and that it will be
represented as a great gift to the Irish
tenants and landlords at the cost of the
Brit;;.sh taxpayer. The Cabinet did not under-
rate the force either of the fijiancial or
the political argueraent, but they were clearly
of the opinion that in the interests of a
greax policy ruinor difficulties must be ig-
nored. The bill will be introduced as soon
as the financial work of the House of Commons
will allow. ol
While opposition to Wyndham's bill in the Comraons
was limii.'.--d to a few Engliah Unionists and some Radicals,
Balfour rof-e xo defend the purchase idea^ He maintained
that anxieties a.bout security were groundless as install-
ments under the 1691 and I896 legislation had been paid
vdth absolute regularity. Additional security derived
from charging defaults to tiie local rates, as well as from
the fact t)iat public sentiment in Ireland did not favor
8 0
Blunt, My Diari££, p. -'+59.
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Balfour to the King, 10 ivlarch I903, CAB41/28/5.
repudiating debts. The Pri.e Minister asserted that owner-
ship was already stimulating Irish farmers into a greater
amount of work and energy than was ever prompted by the
1881 legislation. While denying any intention to convert
Home Rulers into Unionists by the bill, he forecast that
the bill would take away the sores which
'...aggravate
every political movement which might otherwise be innocu-
ous
•
.
The Prime Minister's commitment to Wyndham's
measure was so firm that during the critical committee
stage, he told the Duke of Devonshire that a ministerial
crisis over Chamberlain's colonial preference must be
avoided at all costs.
..at would destroy the chances of the I^nd
^ill. Chamberlain, I am aware, does not likethac measure, and I am not s-ore that it movpsyour enthusiasm. Yet it seems to me to rive
us a unique chance - I do not put it hi^^her -
of really settling the Irish land controversy,
and I should regard it as the greatest of
national misfortunes if that chance was thrownaway over differences which do not as yet
relate to any question of practical Dolitics.C3
After congratulating wyndham on his success in tlie
third reading debate, Balfour proclaimed his support of
the measure, not as a politician fighting Home Rule, but
82
Hsusxild, cx::i, 12^1
-56.
C o
Balfour to the Duke of Devonshire, k June I903, B. M.
Aad. MS il9,770, f. 9, At this juncture, Joseph Chamber-j.ain had begun his campaign for imperial preference.
There v/ere still many proponents of free trade prin-
ciples in the party, and Balfour was anxious that a
vigorous Chamberlain campaign vj-ould endanger party unity
and thereby endanger the successful passage of the land
Dill.
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as a social reformer. Although admitting that the great
Irish controversy would remain, he asserted that, at least,
the social wrongs of the Irish land system would not
intrude on the political debate between Home Rule and
British public opinion.
Despite his denials of political motivation, it would
be naive, in view of Balfour's earl.ior explanations of the
origins and nature of the Irish ^uefi-^:icn, to believe that
"
the Prime Minister did not hope this measure would deliver
a decisive blow to Home Rule. Balfour's belief in the
•elevating' effects of land ownership carried with it the
firm expectation that eventually most Irishmen would recog-
nize and admire British institutions and values and cherish
the British connection. Meanwhile he did not venture
...to prophesy when or how soon there wilT be
any wide spread revulsion of Irish nstionaU'-^t'^.in favour of this country. Emotions which
are the result of long generations of enmity
and bitter traditions are not easy to blot out.They die hard. They leave tones of bitternesslong after the causes which have first produced
them .aavG become only matters of histor-ical
and speculative interest. ^5
Obviously Balfour still believed that social and
economic grievances, rather than genuine politica]. griov-
ances, were the source of Home Kule enthusiasm. He was,
however, confident that the conciliation ho helped initiate
in the late 1880 's and encouraged from 1895 ^vas helping to
iianj>5J3i, cxxv, 1333-39.
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make Irish disaffection a matter of 'historical and specu-
lative interest'. Meanwhile, he could take satisfaction
from various reports that land purchase and local govern-
ment were developing in the Irish citizens a sense of
fiscal and proprietory responsibility which would buttress
the institutions of private property throughout the United
Kingdom. This sense of responsibility had been achieved
without subjecting the Imperial Exchequer to undue risk, and
without despoiling the Irish landlord. Indeed, six weeks-
after the Land Act received the royal assent, George /.ynd-
ham reported to the Prime Minister what "a good deal" pur-
chase was for the Duke of Leinster, whose selling arrange-
ments were netting him h98 on i-100 rentals. Balfour was
unwilling to admit any genuine political nationalism within
the Irish Fax-1 iamentary Party or among its supporters.
There is no indication that he v/as aware of, or gave recog-
nition to, the growing manifestations of cultural nation-
alism tiiat wex-e being nourished by the Gaelic League, the
Irish Literary Movement and the Gaelic Athletic Associa-
tion.
George Wyndham's enthusiasm for' conciliation was not
86
v.'yndham to Balfour, 9 Seotember I903, B. M. Add. MS
49,804, f. 18''-;, L. P. Curtis, Jr. suggests in his essay,
"The Anglo-Irish Predicament," 20th Oen'^^vry Studios,
November, 19?0» that the Land Act of 1903 actually but-
tressed the positions of the landlords by making them
more financially secure, enabling them to pay off debts
and generally to lower their expenses. He believes the
land acts v;ere more destructive of their sense of iden-
tity than of their financial pov/er.
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exhausted by the Land Act of 1903. In late Soptenbor he
submitted to Balfour a general sketch of future Irish
prooects.87 wyndham pressed for an expansion of labourers'
cottage schemes by pooling all the cottage funds allocated
under the I89I Labourers Act and the Local Government Act
of 1902, and from Board of .vorks sources. As he explained
to his chief:
Dilapidation in the small tov/ns, squalor inthe labourers cottage are a social evil inIreland, maintaining fevers (even typhus prac-
extirpated from England), depressingviUlity and lowering self-esteem. If theIrish nation is to be healthy, energetic,hopeful ana independent, one fourth, perhaps
one third of their population must be betterhoused.
The Chief-Secretary showed special concern to help urban
districts which could not easily assume the cost of con-
structing decent labourers' cottages. In the category of
trade and industry, Wyndham suggested an industrial exhibi-
tion near Phoenix ^ark in I906. The success of the Cork
Exhibition had impressed him the previous year, and he
apparently thought another like it would stimulate more
enterprise. Other projects he suggested included the
building of a naval base at Galway. the subsidization of
an ocean line from Galv/ay to Canada, and continued Treasury
support for drainage schemes. V/yndham strongly rGcommended
that Ireland be allowed to transfer any savings on her
87
'Wyndham to Balfour, 28 September I903, B. M. Add. MS
^9.80^-1, ff. 186-9^.
estimates to the Irish Development Grant Tor application
to the particular objects which commanded wide enthusiasm
among the Irish. He asserted that this measure would free
the Treasury from requests for doles, and at the same time
teach the Irish the benefits of social peace and economical
administration. As shown previously, the university
reform v/as also a major priority for Wyndham in 1903-^.
Unfortunately, the Chief-Secretary 's desire to pro-
ceed with conciliation was thwarted by a number of factors,
and most of his recommendations were Jettisoned. Firstly,
Nationalist criticism of the generous financial arrange-
ments accorded to the landlords, combined with Dillon's
and Redmond's insistence that Home Rule was still the
prime objective of the party, made many English Unionists
as well as the more conservative Irish Unionists unwilling
to concede additional imperial funds and more power in tlie
name of conciliation. Secondly, as the era of I895 to
1903 proved, conciliation required some cooperation from
the Nationalist ranJvis. After the Land Act, John Dillon was
especially worried that Irish attention to Home Rule would
be diverged if Wyndham kept appearing bearing gifts. There-
fore
»
ho refused to endorse any further experiments in
cooperation with the Unionists or the Chief-Secretary,
which crippled Wyndham 's hand when going to Whitehall.
Thirdly
»
as has already been suggested in reference to the
University Question, the Treasury was especially hardpressed
88
''^^
m 1903-4, owing to the Boer War expenses and overall
inflation. Money was difficult to raise in the City, and
Wyndham's suggestions for new Irish expenditures therefore
did not command ministerial enthusiasm. In fact, wyndham
and Austen Chamberlain in I904 disputed the amount of cash
to be made available for purchase. Wyndham insisted that
5 million pounds was the figure agreed upon by Charles T.
Ritchie, Chamberlain's predecessor as Chancellor of t},e
Exchequer. Chamberlain maintained it was 4 million
, 89pounds. writing to teeton Frewen in November, I903.
Wyndham acknowledged the financial obstacles hindering his
program:
The English are very jealous of the Land Act.ihey want credit on easy terms for many
purposes - for their own labourers, for art^-
san^ dwellings for equalizing rates, for
municipal schemes .There is no scope forheroic finances just now. 90
As Prime Minister, Balfour could hardly be indiffer-
ent to the strong sentiments of the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, and the. growing feelings among.rank and file
Unionists that Ireland had received more than her fair
share. The unity of the party had already been severely
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89Chamberlain to Wyndham, 21 December 1904, B. w. Add.
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strained by the education controversy, and was beginning to
be tested by Joseph Chamberlain's ventures into the field'
Of colonial preference. Pragmatic financial considerations
and the dictates of practical politics explain Wyndham's
inability to enlist the enthusiastic support of the Prime
Minister for his future Irish proposals. That does not
mean Balfour opposed the Chief-Secretary 's policy on prin-
ciple. He later told Wilfred Ward that George Wyndham.
...had a great and a most legitimate ambition
vv^-h^r^ • i''^''^ economic and social conditionsvith British money I and he was keenly aliveto all the misfortunes which the bitter divi-
sions between different sections of the popula-tion had brought upon the country. He may"have overrated (he probably did) the power ofthe individual to heal these ancient sores bypersonal influence and sympathetic treatment,
out for all this who shall blame him?91
The most decisive blow to the policy of economic and .
social amelioration was delivered by the Devolution Crisis
of 190^-5, and the Unionist backlash that it generated.
The association of Sir Antony MacDonnell, Wyndham's Roman
Catholic Undersecretary, with Lord Dunraven and the moderate
Unionists of the Irish Reform Association caused a furor
of suspicion and indignation amongst the Ulstermen, the
English Unionists, and the ultras in the South. When
McDonnell's participation in the preliminary discussions
leading to the associations' Devolution scheme was
91Balfour to Wilfred V/ard, 2 October 1913, B, hi. Add.
MS 49,863, ff. 12-13, V-ard was preparing an article on
Wyndham, who had passed away recently.
discovered, these Unionists were sure they had cau,ht a
Home Ruler in Dublin Castle. The Devolution scheme, which
called for a partially elected financial advisory council
to supervise the cooperative development of Irish resources
and to control purely Irish affairs, smelled of Home Rule
to these loyalists. The publication of the proposals on
26 September 1904 led to immediate denunciation of Dunraven
and his associates by Attorney-General Atkinson and other
prominent Unionists. ^2 Although wyndham repudiated the
devolution proposals on 2? .ieptember in O^lg Time_s
, and
McDonnell severed his connection with the Irish Reform
Association, the ultra-Unionists kept insisting upon McDon-
nell's dismissal. The Chief
-Secretary
' s refusal to accede
finally led to suspicions that he himself had been involved
in the form.ation of the proposals, and that McDonnell was
being made a scape goat for the Irish government's tam-
pering with the legislative union. As Sir Henry Lucy
explained
:
...Ulster is a sleuth-hound which, having once
got its nose on the trail, does not uplift
it except to spring on the fugitives. 93
And spring she did upon McDonnell, and especially wyndiian,
once the I903 parliamentary session opened. Lords *Vest-
meath and Rathmore led the attack in the Lords, while
i^&£hS& P.n U^ollxlXQUt Irish Unionist Alliance Pamphlet.
93Henry Lucy, Tlj.£. BalfjOiaiiiiii L2,]ZlJLDMLml, l£LQihil20i (London:
Hodder and Stoughton, I906), p. 36^. Hereafter cited
^ucy, S3l£s>Mrli^n Parlianignt.
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William Koore, T. A. Sloan. J. B. Lonsdale and T. .
Corbett reflected the intensity of Ulster suspicions and
anger. Typical of the attacks upon .vyndha™ and his policy
v;as William Moore's:
After twenty years of Unionist Government
unive^^;^'''"^'^ ^^i^ n.inu?e! such
Sf^cSon n^^^H"^^^ mistrust; such dis-
mmr?pi^^ P^""^ ^^i" million and aquarter of people who certain members of KisMajesty's Government thought, might be li^^tlv
Aul74 llll'^it''^ ''^^^""'''^ regret.f..Up to ^ '
toward the G^vP
°f ^riJ. Unionists
dfJ?!^!. K ? '^'''"^''^ ^as one of dislike anddistrust, but since the introduction of the
five time? '^^^^ '^^^^"^^
^''^^''^
l s as intense, and the real Questionwas, '.Vho was responsible for this s2heme7?9^
Attack followed attack until it was clear that Wynd-
ham's continuance in office was impossible. According to
Viscount Ssher, Londonderry and Carson v/ere prepared to
resign if Wyndham was retained, and only personal loyalty
to Arthur Balfour kept the whole Unionist party from going
against the government.
By early Llarch the political and physical strc.ins
-of
defending himself and Sir Anthony from the Ulster sleuth-
hounds convinced Wyndham that he must offer his resignation
oil,
Hans^LTd, lixci, 6-^1.
95Viscount Esher, Joiiriia:Lfl .and LetJ;£rs oX YlD!iQml >''-iierea. iv] V. Brett (London: Nicholson and Watson, 193'4j /
±}f 76; i,ucy, tt^Tfjiu^rLan It^tlls^mnl, p. 362. -Vyndham'sdiscovery of documents and letters sent to him by McDonnellUltimately proved both men innocent of the chargeslevelled against them during this crisis.
to the Prime iMinister -^^ Roi-p«. . x . Balfour sincerely believed
Wyndhan, innocent of any wrongdoing, but he acknowledged
the seriousness of the situation in his reply to the res
nation offer:
TVio lobby is full of the wildest and moc^t
o^^^^J'^i^f^ °r ^^.^^---is only a fraction
ir. ^'ul ^^^^^^"^'^^n circumstances, wiu come
.0 ^ight; tnat McDonnell and Dunraven have
"^J^^ '"l^T ^^^'^ ^ut if dr?;en to
^^i^ 'H-^""^ ^^^""^ materials for making
is exceedingly
du.-i?.icult to know how to neutralize thispoison, which eats into the larty, and r-ro-O.UCCS such depression and discontent
-'n :hehouse of CoKimons out of all proportion, X
tnirui-, to the effect which is being producedin tha country. But there it is and we haveto reckon with it. 97
The personal p?,in and anguish which the whole episode cai
the Prime Minister ho revealed in his closing words to t>
emba1 11e d Gh i ef 3 eore tary t
It is utterly repulsive to raa to ai:uyA' a
colieugue to go under- anything in the nature
Ox pressure from outside. We all have our
Ups and downs', we are the greatest of vion
one week: the most inconipetent of politiciars
the next; and if the Irinie r;;inister is to'
permit these gusts of feelin^^; to modify the
constitution of his Cabinet, it appears to me
that all Cabinet solidarity is in cJanprer ofdissolution^ I should feel just the same about
the iviember of the Government to whom I was
least attac/ied sis I feel toward you who y.re
amongst my closest and dearest friends. S-o^
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v.yndham to Balfourr. 2 Karch I905, B. M, Add. '^9,805,
ff. 22-23; same to same, 3 iV;arch 190 5, B. :/u Add. :ViS
^+9.805, ff, 25-26.
07
" Balfour to Wyndhain, 3 March 1905, 13. M. Add. JiS ^19,805,
ff. 33-3^.
T ^
. 35-6.
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Balfour's responsibility as party leader, one which
he toolc most seriously, eventually outweighed these strong
feelings of personal affection and trust, and he accepted
Wyndham's resignation. As early as 21 January, j. j.
Sandars had warned his chief that the Devolution Crisis
was creating pressure for an early dissolution and severely
straining party loyalty;
Carson, whom I met yesterday speaks in the
Zll ha?'^pjn J"^"' 'I -hoLsSe damagethat s bee done... to our Party's int-rpst^in Ulster and so does Atkinson. You may
Sifh^f ^^^1^ oppose us ontn s but we could suffer almost as much fromthe disinclination of our friends. 99
The appointment of Walter Long, the darling of the
militant Unionists, as Irish Secretary was the natural
consequence of the im.broglio, and of the urgent need to
quiet the suspicions of the Ulster Unionists. Balfour
acknowledged as early as January that Long's appointment
would "give great satisfaction to the Orangemen", and even
though he was somevvhat anxious about Walter's "fiery
disposition", and rigidity of mind.^-^° The Devolution
Crisis hung like a black cloud over the remaining months
of Balfour's administration, and even into 1907. AJ.beit
personally disgusted by the persistent and disloyal
90
''oandars to Balfour, 21 January 1905, B, ivi. Add. IvlS
a.m"'' L also same to same 23 January I905, B. M.AQd. ^9ti^3t f. 85.
^^[^Balfour to Sandars, k January I905, Be P., Add, I»iS
^9,763, f* 7^.
suspicions Of the Irish Unionists
, and while ho refused
Long's request to publish the correspondence relating to
McDonnell's appointment, Balfour was forced in the
interests of the party to acquiesce in Long's policy of
firm application of the law. When the Chief
-Secretary 's
repudiation of conciliation and of all Lord Dudley's advice
led the Viceroy to consider resignation. ^^^^^^^ refrained
from criticizing Long, and diplomatically suggested to
Dudley that since Long was Chief^Secretary his policy would
have to be accepted as official ."^^^
By 1905 Balfour had disassociated himself from active
conciliation. The combination of fiscal strains, the
political ramifications of the Devolution Crisis, and
Unionist backlash made it impossible for the Prime Minister
to do otherwise. The seriousness of the Unionist backlash
is reflected in Balfour's explanation to Joseph Chamberlain
in November I905 that the need to convince the Ulster
Unionists that they were not being 'gratuitously abandoned'
was one of tliO factors which prevented a mid-summer
•^^^Balfour to Austen Chamberlain, 8 October I905, B, hi.
Add. m A''9,?35, ff. 232-33; Balfour memorandum on Devolu-
tion, October I906, B, M, Add. IvIS ^f9,859, ff, 53-79.
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Dugdale, Balfo.ur^ II, ^^21-23.
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-'Dudley to Balfour, 7 March I905, B. ivi. Add. MS ^1-9,802.
f, 206.
"""^Salfour to Dudley, I5 August 190*5, B. M, Add. m ^9,802.
f. 223,
dissolution. Moreover. Balfour considered the land
purchase scheme as the keystone of constructive unionise.
Once the I903 act had been passed, he undoubtedly felt
that, with the exception of the University Question, there
was little else to be done in the na^e of constructive
unionism. Unionists would now have to rest their case
until the effects of past amelioration led the roajority of
Irishmen to realize the benefits of Union.
The Devolution Crisis had other casualties besides
Balfourian anieli oration. For instance, Lord Dunraven and
Horace Plunkett found their continued efforts for eoonomio
and social improveiiient continually discredited by ultra-
Unionists. ^ Very few southern Unionists cared to risk
the odium which further explorations in conciliation or
class cooperation would have precipitated. Retreat into
the ti-aditional patterns of resistance to Home Rule and
exclusively Anglo-Irish social circles was much easier
politically, socially and emotionally. ^-^"^ Even more .sig-
nificant was the impact of the Devolution' Crisis on Ulster
Unionism, The Ulster Liberal Unionists, previously
105
A?5'^^--^V^° Jp^^eph Chamberlain, November I905, B. M.Add, ivx-. 49 f f„ 95; i-ong rnemorajidum against dissolu-
tionj .iO oepteraber 190;5, CAB37/79/158
.
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Plunkett to Lady Betty Bal-rour, I5 Kecember 1905,
Plunkett Papers, Plunkett House, London.
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consistent advocates of conciliation, severed their con-
nections with the moderates of the South, and joined ranks
with the Tories of the North. The distinctions between
these Ulster Liberals and the hardliners were lost when
the Ulster Liberal Unionists affiliated with the Ulster
Unionist Council in July I905. Ulster Liberal Unionism
was submerged henceforth in pure Ulster resistance. The
way was thus prepared for the Home Rule Crisis of 1913-lif, '
and ultimately for the abandonment of the Southern Union-
ists for the salce of Ulster's survival in the Union. The
partition of Irish unionism precipitated by the McDonnell
affair in a sense foreshadowed the partition of the nation
15 years later. Pragmatic politics prevented Arthur Balfour
as Unionist leader from publicly critioizin.- or preventing
this ominous development in Irish Unionism. Perhaps that
partially explains why iie eventually advocated partition
as the best solution to the Irish question.
V/hile Balfour's participation in Irish affairs during
the crucial decade of 1895 to I905 had been peripheral,
this survey of the administrations of Gerald Balfour and
George Wyndhara evidences the former Chief-Secretary's per-
sistent inspiration and encouragement of economic and
soc5.al amelioration down to late I903. His support helped
to mould early twentieth-century Ireland into a more modern
society where political, economic and social opportunities
were based on merit rather than upon class or religious
identities, as in the past. Land purchase gave the people
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a positive interest in the improvement of their land, while
the extension of local governnent stimulated an awareness
and concern for the quality of the economic and social
environment. A desire to improve farming standards led
the first county councils to participate in the instruc-
tional programs which the Department of Agriculture spon-
sored after IS99
.
By 190/f the Department of Agriculture
had 121 itinerant instructors teaching 551 courses to
39,398 students. The only counties which by look did not
have some schemes of technical instruction in which local
authorities participated were Antrim, Armagh and Down.--^^
Moreover, the county and district councils provided a
forum for the Irish laborers to air their previously
ignored grievances, and the multiplication of laborers'
cottages after I9OO indicates an important expansion of
political and social opportunity for this neglected seg-
ment of the communitye-^^^ The democratization of the
local franchise helped to complete the Catholic Emancipa-
tion of 1829, while it also led to the ostracization of
the Anglo-Irish gentry and their ultimate withdrawal into
despondency or pure resistance. Moreover, v/hile the land
108.
" kSLiiona. Anmial .Ssjigri dI. 1\x2. P-j^arim^at nL Agjz^jinilliir^
anii ^'iuaoiii^ InaixuallQn, p. 22 (Cd. 1314) h. c. 1902
XX; Wo He i'isher rr.emorandum on grants in aid of Irish
technical education, TV9905/12825/1902,
3 OQShannon, laoiQ, IisaLsmmeni in Irelanii, pp. 330-39.
purchase acts saved the Ascendency fro^ financial ruin,
they also contributed to terminating the relationships
(admittedly bad ones in most cases) between the native
Irish and the gentry, thereby exacerbating the gentry
-s
identity-crisis and sense of besiegement. Th.se develop-
ments made it much easier for the Celtic and 'Irishing
Of Ireland- forces to influence the countryside prior to
World War I.
Finally, the extension of local government gave the
Irish the opportunity to prove to themselves, to England
and the world that thoy were indeed capable of effectively
administering democratic institutions. Reports of the
Local Government Board and contemporary authorities gave
ample testimony of the success of local government in the
years before the war. The experience gained in the county
councils ma.y have been a significant factor in the success
of the Sinn Fein government and later of the Irish Free
State
»
While Arthur Salfour took great pride in the expan-
sion of economic and social opportunity which progressive
unionism helped initiate, he was undoubtedly chagrined
that Irish interpretations of political opportunity neces-
sitated not only democratic local government but also a
national legislature. As the next chapter will show, his
chagrin v/as transformed into a more violent if not almost
treasonable position by 191k,
^lOilerbert Gladstone to Sir Henry Campbell Banncrman,
8 December l899» B. Add, r-iS ^1,215, f. 162.
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163
In his lively and entertaining ThSi Si^mga ^
I^i^ml England. George Dangerfield portrayed the atmos-
phere of crisis Which gradually developed in England during
the four years prior to the outbreak of the First World
V/ar.-^ The Home Rule issue was a prominent factor in
contributing to this environment of instability and anxi-
etyo Arthur Balfour's response to the deepening Irish
crisis substantiates DangerfieM's thesis that the leaders
of society lost their sense of proportion and reality in
attempting to come to terras with the complicated issues
of the day, v/hethsr they be parliar.i9ntary reform, suf-
fragette demand, or, indeed, the persistent Irish deLuind
for a Dublin parliai-ent« Balfour's attitude to and role
in the unfolding Irish crisis between IQIO and 191if, will
demonstrate that even ono of the most intelligent, erudite
and experienced of politicians ultimat^ily advocated poli-
cies that were diametrically opposed to the traditions of
parliamentary government that had been evolving since the
late seventeenth century. In his recent study, Sydney
2ebel argues that Balfour showed an uncanny ability to
adapt to the forces of the modern world. ^ However, his
^George Dangerfield, Th2. Strang tolh £(£ Llbnmi Jin^-UDii,
I21XI:dit <1935j rpt. New York: Capricorn, 1961),
^Zebel, vi-vii.
response to the approaching enactment of Home Rule illus-
trates a glaring exception to Zebel's contention. The
following description of Balfour's response to the Parlia-
ment Bill and the third Home Rule Bill will demonstrate
his inflexibility in the face of the democratic implica-
tions of parliamentary reform and of twentieth-century
Irish nationalism.
Despite the personal and political humiliation of
the massive Unionist defeat of I906, Balfour probably
derived some solace from the fact that the huge Liberal
majority^ freed the Campbell-Bannerman ministry from any
obligation to introduce Home Rule immediately. While
the LiboralG did not repudiate Home Rule altogether, the
majority of tlie party, anxious lest the defeats of 1886
and 189^ be repeated, favor-fd a gradualist approach toward
a Dublin legislature. The Liberal reluctance to face
squarely the Irish issue and its implied recognition of
Irish nationalism was reflected in the innocuous Irish
Council Bill v/hich AL^jstina Birrell, the^ Irish Chief-
Secretary, introduced to the Commons on 7 r-Iay 1907. The
proposal, which v/as a recasting of the controversial
Devolution Scheme of I90/+, called for a partially elective
and partiaJ.ly appointed council to coordinate and super-
vise the administration and finances of eight Irish
3
•'In the 1906 election the Liberals won 377 seats, the
Unionists I57, the Irish 83 end Labor 53, H, G. K. linsor,
England, ld7Qzl9Vl ( Oxford « Oxford University Press,
1936), p. 386. Hereafter cited linsor, England
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departments, including education, local government, and
the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction.
The Lord-Lieutenant would exercise wide veto powers, and
the ultiinate authority of the Cabinet and the Iraperiai
Parliament remained intact.^
As party chief Arthur Balfour led the attack on this
Liberal proposal. He warned the Liberals that the Bin
would do nothing to satisfy Irish nationalist aspirations.
>ie forecast, however, that the council would be used to
fonvard the political aspirations of the Nationalist party
rather than as an agency for efficeint and economical
administration. The former Prime Minister asserted xhat
the Liberals were deluded to anticipate that the Irish
Gourde 11 would r^^duce the time and ener-y which the Commons;
had to devote to Irish affairs. On the contrary, Balfour
argued, the proposed council would provide fresh oppor-
tunities for jurisdictional collisions hetvc^on itself and
its subordinate departiaents as well as between Dublin and
Westminster. The Unionist lea.d8r suggested that
•
.
.
^weariness of dealing with this perpetual and perennial
Irish problem.. rathar than a sincere commitment to
Irish mtionalism was the real impetus driving some British
politicitnrs an'i citi2.ens to advocate abandoning the Union.
Th.e rapidity with which the Nationalists and the ministry
Lyons, imiMisl Slnon lim Emim., p. 265.
It
-^5 Hans^'J, cixxiv, iii-xs.
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Oettisonod the Irish Council Bill suggests that Balfour
astutely assessed the attitudes of the Irish members and
the Liberal party toward the proposal and toward the whole
question of Irish nationalism.
By 1909. however, the Liberals developed a fresh
appreciation for the Irish members and their Home Rule
policy. Recent government losses in bye-elections, as
well as the recognition that Lloyd George's plans for
heavy taxation on land and liquor interests in the I909
budget would incur bitter Conservative resistance, prompted
this change of heart in the Liberal ranlcs. The miniotry's
program of social reform, along with their plans to
strengthen the British navy in the face of the German
challenge depended upon securing new parliamentary allies
to pass unprecedented taxes upon the wealthy land and
liquor interests. Since it was almost certain that the
House of Lords would veto a budget which they alleged to
be 'Gocialistic*, and which attacked their financial inter-
ests, a showdown over the Lord's veto powers was the
expected sequel to the introduction of Lloyd George's
1909 budget
e In those circumstances, the Liberals quickly
recognised the value of the Irish-Liberal alliance that
they had taken gratuitously in the previous three years.
Although the Irish liquor and publican interests
from v/hich the Irish Parliamentary Party dervicd much sup-
port v/ere bitterly opposed to the heavy spirit taxes, the
16?
Irish members recognised that, in the long run, their
Gupport for the budget provided the necessary leverage to
secure abolition of the Lords' veto and consequently, the
realization of Home Rule,^
The Unionist forces also recognized that the Liberal
electoral losses in conjunction with the budget and House
of Lords issues would cause Home Rule to rise as the
proverbial phoenix. As early as January I908 Walter Long •
warned Balfour of an inclination toward Honie Rule in
Birrell'o Irish administration. Long, who was now leader
of the Irish Unionist M. P.'s, told Ealfour in July that
the government was using the education bill merely to
obscure tiieir intentions of introducing Home Rule."^ Although
alive to the probable consequences of a Lords veto, Balfour,
as was natural to a man of his v/ealth and status, refused
to support a budget v/hich seemed to represent the thin
8sdge of Gccialism, He considered tariff reform the best
mechanise for raising the required monies to finance the
navy and social programs, but his view did not comir<and
^The Irish abstained from the third reading vote on
4 November I909 but voted for the budget in 1910. Ensor.
SnslsM, p. ^M9«
o
^Long to Balfour r 21 January 19 08, B. LU Adda 49,777,
f. same to same, 17 July I908, B, M, Add, hiS '^9,777,
ff. 7-9« 'ff(p
Q
A kSJiflX m a Qrs^ ^-^ditorr^hlp (London* Oxford University
Press, i960), p, 112-22» Hereafter cited, Gollin,
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majority support within the j^rty. m addition to hi.
personal antipathy to the Lloyd George proposal., Balfour
was vmder considerable pressure fro. Conservative landed
and liquor interests to advise a rejection.^ Moreover,
the propriety of rejection had been recommended, although
um.isely. by two leading constitutional experts. A. V.
Dicey and Sir W. H. Anson. Despite the fact that the^
Upper House had successfully challenged the Commons finan-
cial parogatives only once in 250 years, November
1909 the Lordn rejected by 350 to 75 the budget which the
Commons had approvea by 379 to 1^9 on 4 November 1910. An
election v/ar? now inrrritable.
While tliG Liberal campaign oratory concentrated on
the peersMnvasion of the Commons • financial rights. Bal-
four and most of his Tory collcaguen oonsiderGd Home Rule
the principle election issue. Balfour'b cousLn, Hugh
Cecil, urged the Tory leader to question publicly in a
letter to 51he. ilmaa the miniotry's Home Rule intentions .-'"'-^
A week later in hi.-!? opening election address Balfour
accused tiie Liberals^ of conspiring to set the people
^Roy Jenkins, Mr.. S^JJLQiir!^. 2siQdl& (London* Collins. I968).
p. 96. Hereafter cited Jenkins, B2.1^g^JXiL^l 2n^.2si,
^^Snsor,
.SiiSlsna. p. inc. In I860 the Lords rejectedGladstone
-s pmporial to repeal the iD-r»er duty. However,the repeal was carried in the foliowinn: year. Dorek
Norton! l%9)f^f^ ^ ^asllfir^. IfiJ^ (New York:
"Hugh Cecil to Balfoar. 3 Ceceraber 1909, 3. M. Add. MS
^^9»?59t f. 220,
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against the peers in order to obtain a .ingle chamber
legislature which would pass revolutionary projects. The
allegedly revolutionary projects were Home Rule. Welsh
Disestablishment, payment of parliamentary members and
Lloyd George's social legislation.
^^^^ ^^^^ .^^^^
was most central to Balfour's concerns as his speeches and
correspondence indicate. In early January the Unionist
Chief sent to the Ulster Unionist Council his assurances
that '...they (the Ulatermen) have behind them the same
resolute party whose determined resistance to the dismem-
berment of the United Kingdom has twice defeated the policy
of Home Rule.'^^ It was another matter to impress upon
the British electorate Balfour's interpretation of the real
issue of the campaign^ In his election addresses, Balfour
repeatedly charged the Liberals with using the Lords' veto
as a red herring so as to stay in office by suffrance of
the Irish and Laborites who expected Honio Rule and Welsh
Disestablishment in return. Balfour labelled the Liberal
tactics as a reincarnation of Gladstone 's opportunistic
conversjion to Home Rule in 1885~6.^^^ In addition to ques-
tioning Liberal motivationc, Balfour delved into numerous
12
Jenkins,
.SalijaurJLs. Ismlm* p. 109 j lan Colvin. C'xr^,
at^ ^talfijSiJlim (Wew York! Macraillan, 19 p. 171.
Hereafter cited Colvin, Caxiiiaa.
^ ThQ. liiofia, 5 January I910. Walter Long read Balfour's
message to the Ulster Unionist Council.
Balfour at York,
.Hia lims., 13 January 1910; Balfour at
Haddington, liia Xmiia* ^ January I910.
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financial, strategic and historical arguments against Home
Rule. He predicted that the vast amount of imperial monies
on loan in Ireland under Land purchase legislation and
economic development would be jeopardized under a Dublin
parliament. This was a rather disingenious objection con-
sidering that, when speaking in support of Wyndham's land
l5ill in 1903, Balfour assured the Commons that land pur-
chase installments had been paid with absolute regularity •
and tliat Irish public sentiment did not favor repudiating
debts, The former Prime Minister stressed especially
the strategic dangers which Home Rule allegedly would bring.
Emphasising that Britain's position was much less secure
in relation to increasing European tensions than in the
1880 's or even I90C, Balfour quostioned the wisdom of sepa-
rating England from an island which he maintained was
predestined by geographical necessity to be part of the
United Kingdom.
we prepared to make Ireland, at our very
gates, independent of all efficient, practical
and real control » when v/e are well aware that
the defensibility of the United Kingdom icj a
problem v/hich is not merely occupying the atten-
tion of the British Admiralty and' the British
Army Council, but is being anxiously considered
by foreign powers, friendly a.nd neutral? To Tne
it is incredible, absolutely incredible, that
the community, v.'hich in 1806 and in I893 rejected
Home Rule for Ireland, before these new aspects
of the question had arisen, - financial, mili-
tary and naval aspects - it is incredible to me
^ ilansanij cxxi, 12^1-5.
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that the coiTimunity which so acted vdthinthe lifetime of all I address now are changed
icixai vo xno country, lo
Balfour's use of the strategic argument was interesting,
considering that the government leaders had insisted that
naval defense requirements were a large factor necessi-
tating the unprecedented budget. Balfour's participation
on the Committee of Imperial Defense made him privy to the
amiieties which the German naval policy was causing the
Asquith ministry.
At Aberdeen, the former Chief-Secretary presented
historical arguments against Home Rule. The prevailing
tendency of modern history, he asserted, was for empires
and political units to draw together toward integration
and union. The I3 colonies and Germany he cited as exam-
ples. ;Slnce the unity of the three kingdoms was already
established, Balfour criticized Home Rule as a stupid and
unv/ise challenge to great historical forces. He used this
line of argument both publicly and pv-ivately frequently
over the next four years. At the same time, he maintained
that because Engiimdj Scotland aj^.d Ire Land had been invaded
by the same peoples, there was no justification for the
theory of racial separation:
W^hile I admit differerices of aegree, I will
never admit that the Irishman is one race of
inhabitants and England or Scoiiajjd or wales
is another rade.
16Balfour at Ipswich, ^0. Xl:jj&Ji.f 7 January I910,
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To admit absolute equality or racial unity would have been
strange for the man who tv.enty years earlier had advocated
a complete remoulding of Irish character through his pro-
gressive unionism, so he stressed that the 'progressive
and vigorous' northeast corner of Ireland had a closer
affinity through religion and blood to the Scotch. -^"^
The results of the January elections were extremely
disappointing to Balfour and the Unionists. Firstly, their-
posture on the budget had cost them the 100 seats which a
January I909 poll predicted would bo theirs. Secondly,
the most serious consequence was that the Liberal majority
of 12^4- now depended upon the consistent support of the 82
Irish Nationalists and the kO laborites.^^ This meant
that John Redmond, the leader of the Irish party, was in a
positicn to fsxtract guarantees from Aoquith* Redmond
pro7D.ised Irish support lor the budget only if the Liberals
limited the Lords' veto powers aiid ultimately introduced a
Home Rule Bill, and Asquith had little choice but to agree.
Jack Sandars' prediction to his chief that Asquith would
deal with the Irish ^ materialized on 21 March I910 when
^"''Balfour at Aberdeen,
.q^ Xims., 10 Jajnuary 1910.
^^Ens or f l^^mlzL^lB p» ^18.
19
'The final results gave the Liberals 275. the Unionists
273» Irish nationalists 82, Laborites ^fO, iinaor,
^dijilciiirl
»
P • ^18 0
20Sandars to Balfour
^ 29 January 1910, B, M, Add. m
^9»7?o» f, 177, Jack Sandars was Lalfourjs secretary
and personal friend.
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the Prime Minister announced his intention to introduce
legislation to end the peers' veto over money bills, to
limit their delay on other bills, and to shorten the life
of Parliament from seven to five years,
Balfour's imiuediate response was to suggest again
that the British people were being robbed of their consti-
tutional checks against 'temporary gusts of the moment' by
a corrupt bargain between the Liberals and the Irish. He •
warned that revolutionary legislation could be easily dis-
guised in financial bills,
While still opposed to the budget which ultimately
passed on 2? April 1911,^^ Balfour's parliamentary energies
during the spring of that year were chiefly directed to
insuring that Acquith's resolutions would not totally
destroy the Upper House, and thus sweep away the last
barrier to Horns Rule and other allegedly revolutionary
projects. This was no easy task, as the history of the
period bet^veen April 1910 and August 1911 indicates. Bal-
four *s aristocratic background instilled in him a genuine
dread oi^ any parliamentary reform which effectively invested
full legislative pov/ers in a democratically constituted
'^^Ensor, Bklglri^J-i, p. ^120? Harold Nicolson, S^DJZgfi 1, iij^Mis and. EsdJ'ji (Londonj Constable, 1952), p, 103, Here-
after cited ^'icolson, George Xa.
22
"5 ffiad.?:ir.dg xc, 1186-90 ; 5 Hansard, xvi, 1768-7^? Arthur J.
Balfour, Oj^ilalsairi Ar^iUElsnia (Garden Cityj Doubleday
and Doran, 1928), p. 87. Hereafter cited Balfour, Opinion'.5.
^Balfour's nenorandum to King Edward, cited in Lord Newton,
lilin^iJism^ (Londom ivlacnillan, 1929 )» p. 390,
17^
body. He was, therefore, willing to consider some elective
peerages U the powers of the Upper House could be left
intact.2^ Lord Salisbury, Balfour's cousin, ultimtely
pushed for an elective element to solve the House cf Lords
issue on the grounds thati
We
^ are fighting not for our hereditaryprivileges, but for the Union, and we rrepreparea to make even the greatest sacri-
The King's death on 6 ^lay 1910 put an end to any more dis-
cussions Of elective schemes among the Shadow Cabinet and
paved the way for the Constitutional Conference of 1910.
Other Unionists, however, shared Balfour's democratic
anxieties and desired to save the House of Lords. They
were prepared to accept a limited sacrifice of their Union-
ist principles by proposing federalism as an alternative
to continuation of the Union. The chief advocate of
federalism was L. Garvin, who edited Observer -
From M3.rch until November I9IO, Garvin and his associates
pushed pri-vately and finally publicly the federal compromise
as the best means cf saving the Lords and the country from
the dangers which an Irish-Socialist-Liberal coalition
allegedly entailed. Moreover, Garvin's anjciefcies over the
German challenge convinced ]iim that doiiiestic controversy
which i.iight inhibit a campaign of national efficiency had
24
'Jenkins, B^ai^mLLn £aQdl£. pp. 143-4.
Salisbury to Lord lansdowne, 6 September I9IO, B. M.
Add. 49,730. f. 10?j Jenkins, ^alXfiurla ]^iiQSlls,, p. 144.
to be avoided at all costs, a^herefore federalism was very
attractive. Immediately after the January election had
virtually guaranteed Liberal action on the Lords and Home
Rule. Garvin suggested to Jack Sandars. Balfour's secre-
tary/, that something on the Canadian model might satisfy
the Irish. 26 The 0^^^ editor believed the continua-
tion of old age pensions and the British government's help
in fighting the socialist trend so feared by the Irish
clergy would be sufficiently attractive to erode much Home
Rule support in Ireland. Garvin approached Balfour
directly on the Riveria in March, and argued that in view
of socialist and internationalist dangers, the Unionists
ought to consider dealing with the Irish on a federal
basis.. Balfour summarily rejected this as 'eating dirt.'"''
He could hardly deal with the Irish when for the previous
six months he had been attacking the Liberals for their
deals, but he had deeper considerations as well. Appar-
ently worried that a federalist approach was gaining some
sympathy, Balfour explained his general objections to
federal devolution to Grey, who passed them on to More ton
Frewen, another sympathizer of federalism.
I have heard privately from Arthur Balfour
begging me not to make up ray mind on the
subject of federation until I have had an
opportunity of discussing the whole subject
v/ith him. He regards federation as a means
^^Gollin,
.Qaixln, p. 172.
27Gollin, Can-La. p. 18V.
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of organizing separate communities into oneorganic Whole, and is inclined to regard theproposal to federate the U. K. as tending in
^he direction of disorganization - as a
irlLr^^''^^''^^^ "^"^ teaching of history.
tL?''L''^S^'F ^'O.^^PPreciate -Che conten-tion triat the Federation of the U„ K. is an
essential condition precedent to the federa-tion of the Empire. 2b
The federal idea did not die easily. During the summer
Frev/en arranged a luncheon for Balfour, lansdcwne and
Bourke Cochrane, the wealthy Irish American subscriber to
the Irish Parliamentary Party, in order to push federal-
29ism. P. S. Oliver, an ardent disciple of Joseph Chamber-
lain and a veteran of Alfred Milner's kindergarten, pub-
lished under the pseudonion 'Pacificus' a aeries of articles
in Th^ 5!iDias. touting the federalist approach in late May
and early June.-^^ When in late July the Constitutional
Conference appeared to be breaking down over whether Korae
Rule would be included in a body of legislation exempt
from the Lords' veto, A. C. Murray, the Master of Elibank,
initially consulted with Harold Harmsworth of
about the possibility of a federal solution. When Harms-
worth referred Murray to Garvin, 'Sh^ Observer editor and
Grey to More ton Frewen, 2 April I9IC, Fr^wen Collection,
Box 30, Library of Congress,
29
-^This luncheon was described in Frewen to Umsdowne,
30 January 1913 t Frewen Collection, Box 35, Library of
Congress. For Frewen 's involvement in the federalist
campaign in 1910, see Alan J. Ward, "Frewen 's An^lo-
American Campaign for Federalism." Irlnh iUsJiQrii^i
Siiillas., 15, No. 59 (March, 196? ), pp. 256-75.
Gollin, Garvin, pp. 193'^.
hxs associates seized the opportu..ity to renew the feder-
alist issue in editorials and articles. In fact. Uoyd
George
-e anxiety over the whole Lords-Irish controversy
lod him in August to press upon his colleagues that the
best way of brealcing the constitutional deadlock was a
coalition government in conjunction with a federal settle-
...nt Of the Irish Question. 31 Exactly when Balfour first
knew Of these proposals is not certain. 3^ but by .,id-
October When the final breakdown of the Constitutional
Conference was i^inent. he was under considerable pressure
from the indefatigable Garvin as well as from party friends
and associates to reconsider the federal idea. Garvin sent
Ealfour a long letter on 17 October justifying federalism,
as the best method to save the Lords, to oemont Anglo-
American relations against rising Jap^ese power, to pre-
serve imperial good will, and to gain moderate support in
the fight against sooialisra.33 Garvin sent a similar
letter to Austen Chamberlain, and Oliver visited Balfour
at Whittingehame.3^ Articles favoring federalism appeared
i'L^fi^f'"'^'^
on 22 and JO October as well as in
'-Chcunberlain suggests that Balfour knew of the coalitionproposal early, but Urs. Dugdale thinks it v/as nid-
r^r^r^r "^.^^a^^
""^^ ^^^^"^ approached, Gollin,
kSISllL., p» 219, He 1,
33Garvin to Balfour, 1? October I910, cited in Gollin.
3^Gollin, Gi^r.Yin, p. 211, pp, 220-2.
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nm^ and the Pail^ E,^^. Sandars was apparently con-
verted to the Garvin scheme, for on 18 October he asked
his Chief, if in the li^ht of greatly improved Irish con-
ditions and the need to save the Lords as well as imperial
good will, a federal solution might be possible. 35 Sandars'
contention that '...we shall hug a delusion if we imagine
that Home Rule will alarm the Orange Order of 1911 as it
did in 1886 and I895 (sic)...' was overly optimistic.
Alfred Lyttelton echoed Sandars' report that federal devo-
lution commanded the swathies of yoimger party men such
as Philip Kerr, Alfred Miiner. F. S. Oliver, and Robert H.
Brand . ^7
Despite this impressive campaign Balfour remained
obdurate in his refusal to com-ider a federalist scheme
for Ireland. Ke replied at length to Garvin on 22 October.
By posing a series of qi>estions, he repeated nis earlier
contentions that federation of the United Kingdom would be
a retrograde step tending towards disunity and ultimate
separation, Ke suggested that Redmond was inconsistent in
simultaneously maintaining loyalty to Pax^nell's position
and accepting the idea of devolution. While he admittrid
th? great improvement in Ireli^.nd's economic and social condi-
tions, Balfour suggested that it was only fear of material
bandars' arguraentr, suggest he had been coached by Garvin,
- Sandars to Balfour, 18 October I910, B, M. Add. MS
-^9,767,
ff, 7"*8,
37Alfred Lyttelton to Balfour, 16 October 1910. B. M, Add.m t^9,775, f. 66.
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disaster and loss of Briti.h credit that leapt the Home
Rule appeal fro. going the full length of independence or
practical separation. The Irish were not content with the
parliament established in 1782 so that there was no
guarantee that federalism would dimnish Irish agitation
in the future. No form of devolution, he argued, would be
effective in preventing Redmond and his followers from
making hard cash the condition of their imperial loyalty.
The question of Ulster's position he posed as another
almost insurmountable obstacle. In conclusion, while
Balfour acknowledged that the Liberals were moving in the
federalist direction, he emphasized his doubts that the
Unionist party was ready to accept this new departure
without a long lapse of time,-^^
While Balfour did not initially reject the Lloyd
George coalition offer, his letter to Garvin indicates
that he never considered the federal solution very prac-
tical or appropriate. There were other factors besides
those he mentioned to Garvin which determined him against
federalism as well as against the Lloyd George offer.
Firstly^ Balfour's position as a former Unionist Prime
Minister and as the party leader made it impossible for
him to sacrifice the principle upon which the party had
been based. During his political apprenticeship under
38
Balfour to Garvin, 22 October 1910. cited in Gollin,
.QarylUt pp. ^16-18.
Salisbury, the importance of party unity and loyalty to
party principles had always stood foremost. In 1885-6
Balfour had witnessed at first hand Salisbury's rejection
Of Carnarvon's attempts to satisfy the Home Rule sentiment
through federalism. Balfour had served as an enthusiastic
intermediary in Salisbury's rejection of Gladstone's sug-
gestions for a bipartisan effort to solve the Irish Ques-
tion, The influence of his uncle's views on party u^ity
and his disparaging remarks about Peel bore their fruit
when Balfour told Uoyd George that he could not be another
Peel. A strong sense of loyalty to Cecilian family tradi-
tion and the party reinforced his philosophical doubts
about federalism and the extent to which it would eradicate
Irish separatist tendencies. As he explained to his niece
t^rventy years later t
My own remark about Peel, that was the poir^t,
^"^ ^^^"^ ^-ay well have saidIt then. Peel twice committed what seems to
me the unforgiveable sin. He gave away aprinciple on which he had come into pov/Pr -
and mind you, neither time had an unfore^^e^^nfactor come into the case. He simply betrayedhis party,
Secondly, recent political developments had driven
home to Balfour the possible repercussions which any sacri-
fice of Unionist principles might entail, The passions
and suspicions generated by the Devolution Crisis were
indelibly imprinted upon Balfour's mind. In I909, just
39Dusdale» Baii:^, II, 555 Jenkins, Balfour's Poodle,
p • lo /
•
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prior to the January election. Lord Londonderry told
Balfour of Tho.as Sinclair's warning that
.onories of the
Wyndham-McDonnell affair led the Belfast Unionists to be
anxious that a small Conservative
.majority would deal with
Redmond and Dillon just as readily as Asquith and the
Liberals had done.^^ Moreover, any new federalist depar-
ture was virtually im.possible following the January elec-
tions. The Irish Unionist Alliance had worked very
diligently in collecting money and giving publicity to
the Unionist cciuse in the course of the campaign, and they
had recovered some of the losses of the I906 election. In
September I9IO Walter Long reminded Balfour of the great
debt which the British Unionists owed to their Irish col-
41leagues. When expressing his anxieties about Garvin's
scheme to Austen Chamberlain, the Unionise leader enclosed
two letters from Irish Unionists which he described as
'e.cthe first drops in the storm which will assuredly break
over us if any new departure will be uuiidtted.*^^
Another important factor which explains Balfour's
?i?"^\^^^f"^i^^^' Londonderry. 2k December 1909. B. wAdd. y^Ji9.802, f. 119, Sinclair was a prominent LiberalUnionist until the Devolution Crisis caused him to sub-
merge his liberalism in Ulster Tory Unionism.
41Long to Balfour, 3 September I9IO. B. Ivi. Add. MS 49,777.ff. 65-67? Pc?.trick J. Buckland, "The Southern Irish Union-ists, the Irish Question, and British Politics," Ir'Jlh.
Hl.gtori fial Sj;ij^l2£, 15, No, 59 (March, 1967), PP. 228-255.
42
Gollin, Gsxzin, p. 225,
unwillingness to consider any new departure w.s F. E.
Smith's report that Carson was not free to entert.^n a
federalist solution at that juncture. Carson had succeeded
Walter Long as leader of the Irish Unionists in Parliament
only a few months earlier, and he could hardly reco..,:.ond
such a change in policy so quickly. '^3 j^^,,^^
^^^^
Carson got wind of the coalition rumours on the hasis of
Irish devolution, he circulated among the Unionists a pro-
test petition Which was ultimately published in Iha
on 11 Kove,r,ber 193.0. Included in the list of prominent
IJnionist signers were Walter Long. Lord Hugh Cecil. Lord
V/illoughby de Broke, and Mr. J. H. M. Campbell. Carson
condemned any 'Home Rule all around- schemes when address-
air.3 the Irish Unionists on 5 Movember, and exhortoU those
Unionists who attended the party conference at Nottingham
on 17 Kovemb-r to maintain their uxialterable support :ro:.'
the Union/ ' Lord lansdowne, Balfour's old friend
.fror>>.
school days, was not enthusiastic about devolution either.
With Carson representing the more conunei-clal and profes-
sional elGVT.entrs of Irish Unionism, and Lansdowne repre-
senting the landed classas of the South and West opposed
to any new departures, Balfour undoubtedly saw little chance
for devolution to succeed. An additional factor in
fo"n2P '^^ 'I' ^^^^'^t»> 31 October I9IO, B. M. Add, N;S
•Clia Tiffi.sa » 11, 18 November 19I0r Colvin, QajinsiXit pp. ^^9~51.
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Balfour*^ rejection of coalition was undoubtedly his pe^-
sonal distrust of Lloyd George's apparent willingness
' to
set aside principles for expediency. On 4 November Sandars
reported to Garvin Balfour's firm and final decision that
he could not consider new initiatives on Ireland which
sacrificed the Union.^5 Constitutional Conference
broke down only a few days after Lloyd George received
Balfour's rejection of the coalition offer. On 18 November-
Asquith announced a dissolution and said that the Govern-
ment would take steps to implerf.ent the resolutions on the
Lords reform if successful at the polls. Although the
ministry never formally aclmowledged it. the Irish Question
was the chief barrier that destroyed the Conference. The
fact that the leading politicians, the press and interested
citizens commonly assumed the Irish Question was the root
of the conference failure added to the bitterness which
attended the passage of the Parliament Act and the intro-
duction of the third Home Rule Bill,''^^
During the December 1910 election campaign the
Liberals concentrated upon the obstacles which the peers
had thrown up against almost every piece of Liberal legis-
lation since 1906e Balfour reiterated his accusations of
a corrupt and opportunistic alliance betv/een the Irish and
h f
^Gollin, C^HYin, 228-9.
Asquith to the King, 10 November 1910, CAB^a/32/70 cited
in Colvin, CiuzSiiH, p. 4?.
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the Liberals, and warned the electorate of the imminent
destruction of their only constitutional safeguard against
rash and revolutionary changes. He pointed to Redmond's
fund raising activities in the United States and Canada as
an indication of the Liberals' willingness to destroy the
constitution at the behest of American subscribers. Con-
centrating upon the Lords ajid the Home Rule issue, Balfour
gave scant attention to the tariff issue and the need for
social reform. More pragmatic considerations than
loyalty to the Union explain this tactic. Balfour knew
that his party was sharply divided over both the tariff
and social issues, and it was much easier to preserve party
unity by attacking the Irish-Liberal alliance than by work-
ing out a Unionist concensus on these difficult queGtions
Despite their vigorous campaigning, the election
returns did not give Balfour and the Unionists any cause
for jubilationc The Liberals, in combination with the Irish
and Laborite allies, actually increased their overall
majority by 4 to 126,^'"^ Irish votes notwithstanding, it
was clear that the majority of English and Scotch voters
provided Asqulth with a mandate to introduce legislation
^''TJia IB, 23, 28, 30 November 1910,
Golj.in, Gaixui* p. 326.
The Liberals and Unionists each had 272 seats, while the
Irish held 84 and Labor 42 seats. Ensor, Kn^-Oaaa, p. 427.
The Liberals had actually lost three seats in Decornbar,
but the Irioh and the Laborites gained two seats each.
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curbing the powers of the Lords.
The Parliament Bill which Asquith introauced on
21 February I9XI raised unprecedented passions in and out
of Parliament for the next five months. Despite his frank
acknowledgement on the eve of the Constitutional Conference
of the real difficulties the peers caused the Liberal
governments, 50 Balfour made light of the peers' consistent
opposition and suggested it ought to be accepted as 'good
sporting polities'. He returned to the twin themes of
corrupt bargains and the danger of revolutionary proposals
t}iat would inevitably follow the Parliament Act at the
behest of the Irish and Labor! tes He attacked the idea
that the December election constituted a referendum for
the constitutional change proposed under the Parliament
Billj
I think it is utterly absurd to say that the
transfer of th-ise few votes at a General
Election under the violent impulse of some
hope, fear or passion of the moment is to
give a universal power of attorney to any
government to do exactlv what it likes with
the British constitution. That seems to me
to be altogether an absurd proposal. I am
violently opposed, and always have been to
this delegate theory of representation. 53
•^^Balfour's memorandum on the Constitutional Question.
22 June I9IO CAB37/102/23,
51
5 Han;aJ2a:£t» xxii, 567-70.
52
5 iknsjSLEd* xxip 565-81, I753-6/-1, XXV, 226, i^6l-j, 1700-
1710.
53
5 hm^£ix<l, xxvi, 576.
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This statement illustrates succinctly Balfour's unwilling-
ness to accept a majority composed of Irishmen and labor^
ites Who. he considered to he second-class if not dangerous
citizens. He had been perfectly willing to support the
delegate theory of representation in 1886 when the Cominons
rejected Gladstone's First Ho.. Rule Eill. Of course, this
insistence on keeping the Irish in the Union, and simul-
taneously denying them full political rights, was common
to the majority of Tory Unionists. Roy Jenkins has called
this attitude the ultimate of Anglo-Saxon hypocrisy. -5^
Balfour's subsequent parliamentary attempt to censure
Asquith for seeking and obtaining prior to the election
King George's promise to create sufficient peers to carry
the Parliament Bill smacks of the same hypocritical stance.
Early in January I9II. Ealfour admitted to Viscount Esher
and Lord Knollys that in view of the election the King
could not really refuse to comply with a request to croatc
additional peers. In fact. Balfour's ultimate refusal
to support the diehards on the Parliament Bill following
Asquith's communication of the King's promise, -^^ while
statesmanlike in some regards, was predicated on the
54Jenkins. MUmLXLLr^ Ej^^I^, p. 133-4.
^Jenkins, BalfiaiiiLLa Pood;e. p. 194.
-^'Balfour was informed by Lord Knollys of the Kin.T's promise
on 7 July 1910. This information was officially con-firmed for him by Lloyd George on 18 July I9IO. Jenkins,
MXt9urls. ZaaOIa, pp. 216-19.
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assumption that this would provide at least tv,o years to
raise the country against Home Rule and Welsh Disestab-
lishment. A peer creation would have brought the immediate
introduction of these measures. Balfour explained in a
memorandum designed to overcome the diehard opposition
that a flooded house would only diminish the dignity of
the Lords and make it less effective in resisting revolu-
tionary measures!
The attention of the country should be
to'"??f t°
^''-^^
-^P^y manoeuvres butthe absolute necessity of stemming the
revolutionary tide, by mkins such abuse
of ministerial power impossible in theiuture.->r
The passage of the Parliament Act increased rather
than diminished the bitternesB and anger which had charac-
terized British political debate since the beginning of
the Budget Crisis in 1909. Although he had resign.ed the
party leadership in early November, Balfour played a major
role over the next three years in perpetuating the atmoG-
phere of intense hostility and suGpicion.
_
In his efforts
to prevent the prospective Home Rule Bill from winning a
Commons majority^ Balfour continued to cast aspersions on
the political and constitutional integrity of the Liberal
Dugdale, Balfimr., II, 70. This r.iGmorandum was never
cxrcu-lated for fear of causing further resentment againstbalfour amongst the diehards and backwoodsniene Hu'^hCecil advised his cousin that the technical fl^tws in
the Parliament Act might enable them to prevent Home
Rule and V/elsh Disestablishment from receiving the royal
assent. Hugh Cecil to Balfour, 18 August 1911, B. M.
Add. IviS 49,759. 1. 225.
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ministry. Insatiable office hunger, he charged, had caused
the Liberals to trample on the constitution and was
responsible for their current commitment to Home Rule.
.
The government's methods were sacrificing the interests of
England. Scotland, and Wales, and represented a plot '...as
nefarious as are to be found in the political intrigued If
Which parlaimentary history gives a record '.^^ Asserting
that the Parliament Act had put the country under a provi- •
sional or interim constitution which prevented the electo-
rate from expressing their views on Home Rule, Balfour
speculated in private that the King could justifiably
pressure the government for an election. These attacks
upon the Liberals' integrity did little to impede the minis-
try, for Asquith introduced the third Home Rule Bill on
11 April 1912. Balfour spoke at length on the first and
second readings, and gave numerous public addresses attack-
ing the principle and details of the measure. For instance,
he questioned the ministry's federalist characterization
of the bill by pointing out that the provisions granting
control of customs and postal services to the Dublin parlia-
ment was contrary to arrangements in other federations.
Th&. SJjusjj., 7 November 1911,
59Balfour's iie.-crandum on the King's Position. March, 1912,B. ijl. Add. iv^3 49.869, ff. 119-22. After the Home Rule
2J111 pacGGd Its second reading, Balfour made extensive
use oi this argument in hopes of getting the King to dis-
miss Asquith and call an election. On this memorandum
IS a notation that the King was to present those argu-
ments to the government.
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He poeited that the need to supply the Nationalists with
sufficient patronage was the reason for this difference/^
The 10% customs le^/ying authority extended to the Irish
was contrary to other federal systems and threatened
England with a customs barrier, Balfour attacked the con-
tention that the Home Rule Bill was an initial step in
the eventual federation of the United Kingdom on the grounds
that there was no desire for federation in Scotland and
Wales. Any such federation, he asserted, set up in a
piece-meal fashion was bound to increase rather than
decrease the work of the House of Commons. Returning to
the historical argument that federation was attempting to
reverse the course of history and national progress. Bal-
four pointed to the struggles waged :.n Germany and the
United Statea to achieve and mintain unity. He raised
the spectre of increasing international tensions as a
further argument against division of the United Kingdorai
Every great country in the world has been
trying to draw closer the units of v.hich
it is composed, and when they have failed
their position excites the profoundecn
misgivings of their best friends ,61
Balfour criticized the financial arrangements of the
Home Rule Bill on a number of points. He suggested that
the Liberals were attempting to escape the cost and respon-
sibility of Irish social reform, thereby throwing an
u . ...
5 iianaariit xxxvii, ^o-i.
6l
5 iiaiifiariit xxxvii, 53.
i^possiMe burden upon the Irish taxpayer. The provision
calling for six years of imperial financing he considered
unfair, because the British taxpayer had no voice in con-
trolling the expenditure of that money. Conversely.
Balfour argued that the retention of Irish
.embers in
Westminster hardly gave the Irish enough representation
over decisions on general tariff policy and foreign policy.
He predicted that undorrepresentation on these vital
iosues was bound to cause disoontent.^^ In the course of
the debates. Balfour was especially critical of the govern-
ment contention that the Home Rule Bill was essential to
satisfy Irish nationalist aspirations. He questioned the
very idea of a separate Irish nationality on the grounds
that the Home Rule agitation was the product of agitators
appealing to a sentimental and mythical version of history.
If. indeed, a genuine Irish nationalism did exist, Balfour
asserted that the present aoasure was too limited in its
powers and by its safeguards to satisfy any self-respecting
nationalist. Balfour's Anglo-Saxon values and imperialist"
5 aansard, xxxvii, Balfour's anxiety about Iri=:h
underrepresentation is novel, although oratoric all
v
clever, in view of his earlier contention that tte^QO/^
Zl^Zlly^ '^^r'' '^^''^ representation 2t WestmLnsterwas laudable and understandable. Balfour to the Kir^
JlZT'l C-^S''V29/36. Lord Selborne had sug:mitted „ Cabinet memorandum in February ISOk arguin-' that
^^.llTVT °^°rrcpresented by 31 seats, and thft theseought to be redistributed to lingland and Wales. Selborn"Memorandum on Redistribution. 9 February 190^f. CAB37/69/2?.Walter Long supported this view, and was disappointedWhen plDJis to curtail Irish representation were dropopdfrom the King's speech in Koveraber, 190'+. CAB37/?3/ioii.
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pride led him to proclaim that the Union gave the Irish
full freedom, indeed more freedom through their representa-
tion in the common councils of Empire, than their numbers
legitimately entitled them to receive. ^3 course,
Balfour was missing the point that many Irish nationalists
did not consider membership in the councils of Empire a
valuable and noble privilege. Since he had no difficulty
in reconciling his own Scottish background and sympathies
with a larger British patriotism, the former Prime Minister
expected the Irish to do likewise. He claimed time,
patience and understanding had wiped away any bitterness
and resentment which the Scots harboured from English
expansion and the Union. Speaking at the Royal Scottish
Corporation on St. Andrews' Day in November 1912, .Balfour
obviously referred to Ireland when he said that no great
political fusion could be accomplished with the stroke of
a pen. Any permanent political fusion was the product of
• .fmiich preliminary toil, many misunder-
standings, some difficulties, some frictions,
and when those difficulties and frictions
are over, the welding in that furnace cannot
be unloosened, and what has been joined to-
gether never can again be separated, o--^
Speaking at Nottingham on 29 January 1913, Balfour
emphatically denied that Ireland v/as either financially
or politically oppressed under the Union. He claimed
"^5 iliinaaril, xxxvii, 56,
'Thoughts on the Scottish Union", Balfour, QpXnLom,
p. ^7.
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that if indeed anyone was exploited, he was the B>.itish
taxpayer. He believed the charges of political oppression
baseless since unlike Poland. Ireland did not have any
political independence or 'organic political past as a
single great comity taken away by the English conquest.
Moreover, he asserted that when Irishmen spoke of rector-
ing Irish institutions, they were in fact referring to
institutions established as a subsequent result of the
British settlement. Rather than resent the British settle-
ment, the Irish. Balfour intimated, ought to be grateful
for it!
fllw"? ^? Irishman asks us to restore to
fin^l1^f'fTr^''?^^^^^^"^-*-^^^ ''''ill always
c..^ laalt 01 the Irish; it iinc-lies no irferi-
Z'-l^ S^'^i^^" ^'^ cioes*ir,T.ly that th"contact between
.Sngland and Ireland tooi. place
IL civilization of England,the political organi.-.ation of finc^i.-.ncK wasfar more advanced than the tribal system^ thPt
there are no Irish institutions, there are
no ^rish lav;s, there is nothing in existence
at this moment that could Dcssibly be resto-ed
Irisrori'in'^f '''''' ^^'^^ ^^^^^^^^^
This passage illustrates Balfour's Anglo-Saxonist disdain
for past and present Celtic values and institutions. In
the same speech Balfour asserted that contemporary Irish
patriotism was caused by the perpetual nursing of sriov-
ances created by the mistaken English policy of the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries and the delays in granting
Sh^ Hmjia, l February 19 13.
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Catholic Emancipation. He claimed, however, that t^venty-
five years of progressive Unionist policy had done more
to remedy these evils than an independent Irish parliament
could do in a century. The Irish, therefore, ought to be
content with the British connection.
After the third Home Rule Bill passed its second
reading in the Coirmions on 9 May 1912 by the substantial
^mjority Of 101, Balfour displayed an increasing tendency •
to concentrate upon the Ulster issue rather than on the
more academic and historical objections to Home Rule. More-
over, he grew even more deterained than before to o^jtain
a dissolution and election by questioning the ethics and
legality of proceeding with the bill under the provisions
of the Parliament Act. Both these approaches correspond
closely with the strategy which Bonar Law and G. L, Garvin
devised after the second reading in hopes of sabotaging
Home Rule.^^ In fact, as will be shown, the evidence
suggests that Balfour was a principal agent in developing
the argument that the unprincipled actions of the Liberals
in not directly submitting Home Rule to the people was
sufficient grounds for the King to demand a dissolution.
Only t.vo weeks after the successful second reading,
Balfour foreshadowed tho increasing importance of the
Ulster issue v/hen he told the Earl of Oranmore that irre-
spective of the general arguments against Home Rule, Ulster
^'^^Gollin, Garv-nj p. 398-9.
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would never be reconciled to a Dublin parliament/^ On
11 June 1912, the former Tory leader raised the Ulster
issue again in support of T. C. R. Agar-Robartes • motion
for the exclusion of Antrim. Armagh, Down and Londonderry
from Home Rule. When this motion was defeated by 6l votes
it appeared that the government would proceed on the basis
of an all-Ireland Home Rule. This possibility apparently
exacerbated Balfour's anger, for he registered no objec-
tions to the highly passionate and provocative speech
that Bonar Law delivered at Blenheim on 29 July 1912p nor
to the obvious movements which the Ulstermen were taking
to prepare themselves for open defiance of the law.^^^
R. C. K„ Ensor suggested that Balfour would not have enter-
tained such an abandonment of party control to a small
Irish faction, but in fact, Balfour agreed with the tone
6?
MS'^^9^861^ fflSr"^
Oranmore, 23 Kay 1912, B. M. Add,
In his famous speech at Blenheim, Bonar law proclaimedthat he ana his party would not be bound by ordin'^.ry
constitutional restraints in resisting Home Rule. 'We
^'i^ ^ ^^^^'^^f whatever means seem to us most
ej^eccive, to deprive them of the despotic power whichtney have usurped and compel them to appeal' to the people
whom they have deceived. They may, perhaDS they will,
carry their Home Rule Bill through the House of Commons
out wnat then? I said the other day in the House ofCommons and I repeat here that there are thin/rs stronirer
than Parliamentary majorities,* As to the growinp mili-
tancy in Ulster, Bonar Law proclaimed '...I can imagine
no length of resistance to v/hich Ulster can go in which
I should not be prepared to support them, and in which,m my belief, they would not be sut>ported by the over-
whelming majority of the British people.* R. Blake, aiie
^Im^^m i^xiiasL lUnist^r, Lifn ^uid Siimas. n£ Andrew
Bonar Laii (London, Ji:;yre and Spottiswoode
, 1955), p. I30.
Hereafter cited Blake, Bonar hm,
^^Ensor, Sn£asjia» p. ^55
»
and substance of Bonar Law's speech and v,.. .o t,e n, was apparently
disposed to approve almost anything that the Ulster nil,-
tants planned to stop Home Rule from beooming law. His
consistent characterisation of the Ulster.en as peaceful
and loyal citizens over the next two years, despite their
obvious flaunting of the arms restrictions laws, was an
abdication differing from Bonar Law's only in degree.
Even more significant is Balfour's letter to J. I. Moore,
written only a few weeks after Blenheim, in which he vir'
tually repeated with minimum reservations the substance
Of Bonar Law's speech:
Ordinary canons of conduct necessarilybecome open to question in extreme cases;
and noboay, so far as I know, has yet been
a.Die to lay dovm any maxims of universal
app.UGation saying where the right of
resistance to legal oppression beo-ins or
T
there are such cases few would,
J perhaps fewer still woulddeny tnat the right of resistance is one
capable of great and dangerous abuse. Let
me add xhat the Government have done theirbest by the whole treatiaent of the HomeRule question, and by their revolutionary
attack upon the constitution (avowedlydesigned to pass that measure over the heads01 tne cons-uituenoies ) to iustifv anv arti nn
Stf . v'?? loyalists 'may tLe"?o';^in-tain their rights. 70
In all his public addresses on Home Rule after 1912, Balfour
used language which practically gave a carte blanche to
the Ulster Unionist Council and its military wing, the
Ulster Volunteer Force. For instance, in a major speech
f*
''"^ September 1912, B. M. Add,
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at Nottingha.i on 29 January I913. Balfour, while admitting
that England bore some historical responsibility for ore-'
ating the Ulster problem, asserted that '...handing over
Ulster to the tender mercies of the rest of Ireland is
surely dishonorable as well as idiotic. '^^ According to
the former Prime Minister to sacrifice British parlia-
mentary institutions and Ulster to Irish nationality was
an 'excess of insanity', and '...a political crime com-
pared with which all crimes of the past sink into pale
insignificance. j.^^^^^^ ^.^.^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^.^
in a speach to the East Lothian Unionists on 6 September
1913. He then demanded, in spite of the Commons' approval
of Home Rule in two successive sessions, that the govern-
ment agree to election before Home Rule went on the
statute book."^^
Public speeches vilifying the Liberals and raising
the Ulster issue were not the only tactics in the anti-
Home Rule strategy worked out by the Unionists in the
spring of 1912, A very important element in the Unionist
plan of campaign was to give full, even exaggerated, play
to the threat of civil v/ar and difficulties in the army
so as to force the King to demand a dissolution and elec-
tion before the Home Rule Bill reached its third reading
''^liia lim^., 1 February 1913.
72
2h.Q. Unu?^., 1 February 1913.
'^lii^ .YimeQ, 8 September 1913.
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xn the Cor^mons. Balfour was sympathetic to these efforts
as his
.varoh I912
.memorandum suggests. By autumn I913,
the former Tory chief began developing the rationale by
Which the King could insist upon a dissolution. In early
September Balfour confidentially suggested to Jack Sandars
that While it would be unwise and imprudent for the King
to withhold assent to the Home Rule Bill, it would be
permissible under the circumstances for the monarch to
seek a change of advisers. Balfour indicated his own
willingness to serve as a temporary minister, since the
King could not send for Bonar Law or Lansdowne without
appearing imconstitutionaJ.ly partisan. Balfour argued
that this course of seeking a dissolution and election was
the only .leans of educating the British public to the depth
and strength of Ulster's resistance. The temporary minis-
try would emphasize to the electorate the exceptional
character of the crisis and free the King from being an
accomplice in forwarding a policy which could conceivably
precipitate civil war and military mutiny."''^' Within a few
days Balfour prepared a formal memorandum which he intended
for the King. Entitled 'Can the King Change His Minis-
ters?', the document defended the King's perogative to
seek new advisers on the grounds that rare use did not
constitute abandonment or obsolescence. The memo further
7 if,,
m^l^'^^^SS^ fT%8^'-l'^
September 1913» B. M. Add,
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stressed that as the Liberals had put the country 'at the
m=rcy of a passing mjority by crippling the second
Cha„*er. there was nothing which the Executive could not
do if the perogative was deemed obsolete. Even if tlie
King personally favored Home Rule, the circumstances prac-
tically demanded that the monarch insist upon an election
prior to proceeding further with the Home Rule Bill, 75
This memorandum was intended to provide the King with the
basis fron which to write a letter to Asqulth requesting
his ministry's resignation. It is conceivable that Bonar
Law's recommendations of H May 1912 and of September I912
that the King change advisers may have been encourafpd by
Balfour. Although A. V. Dicey had defended this course
of action for Bonar Law, there is no question but that
this policy ran counter to accepted constitutional prac-
tice, and that it was diametrically opposed to tho principle
of Comirtcns' authority which the I910 elections and the
Parliament Act reaffirmed. The novelty of the proposal-
illustrates again Balfour's unwillingness' to credit the
Liberals with any political integrity in their Irish policy
as well as his refusal to accept a Commons majority in
which the decisive votes rested with those he deemed poli-
tical intruders. The difficulty which the Unionists caused
Balfour memorandum 'Can the King change his Ministers''
'
October, I913, B. iv]. Add. I-iS ^19,869, ff. 123-32.
76Blake, Bonar Lai£, p. 133; pp. 150-53.
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er
the King by these pressure tartir^c^^.ur ctics was attested by Walt
Birrell as well as by the Kir^'c,
^ ^^^^S 2 biographer Sir Harold
Nicolson,
'
'
In any event. Balfour never sent his draft proposal
to the King owing to Sandars
' fear that this idea would
be detected by «i„ston Churchill in any letter the sover-
eign wrote. I„ addition. Sandars suggested that the
proposal
.,ight take the Liberals off their Ulster hook
and thereby rob the Unionists of an issue.78 Even if this
plan had been carried out. it is highly unlikely that
Asquith would have agreed to it. He was aware of the
pressure the Unionists were placing upon George V to get
a dissolution and in September he submitted two memoran-
duBS to the monarch defending his resolution to proceed
with itee Rule. Ke contended that the two I910 elections
and the subsequent majorities in the House of Commons
demonstrated sufficient suppor. for the govorru^ent policy.
The Prime Minister also argued that an election would not
abate the Ulster resistance, for the Ulstermen had already
declared their indifference to the ve:.d3ct of the English
Jenkins. AssmLih. N^coisonM^o^.^^'v?- /'^^^"^f '^^Law attempted to influence th^-Klng tiwild alLiU ofthe liberals by painting a dark picture of armv -^hi-mand civil war v,hen he visited George at Balmorafin e^^rlvSeptember. Bonar Law to Balfour. 16 Septemberiof3 "^^^B. i.5. Add. KS 1^9, 693; ff. 32-38.
780banoars to Short, k October 1913, b. m. Add. P<3 ^9,-/68.
MS ^UlsTfU 63-4?"°"'"* " September 1913. B. a. Add.
2C01 ^ 70electorate/^ In anv +u± y event, the King had no intention of
dismissing Asquith whil^ he on-m',^^.^ • .i xi. n conmcindod a n-u3.jority in the
Coimnons, and he vreferv-d to c-o^v ^i> ti. r.c, soek a compromiHe by a joint
conference of party leaders.
By late September I913, Balfour ad:nitted to Bonar
law that the sovereign would be accused of partlson med-
dling if the dissolution and election schene were carried
out. Accordingly, when George Y sought Balfour's advice
on the Irish imbroglio, the former Tory leader supx^orted
the monarch's inclination to work for a compromise through
a conference. Balfour suggested that a basis for com-
promise lay in granting Home Rule for Ireland with an
Ulster exclusion. At this jurxcture, Balfour was anxious
that the tactics of the Ulster Volunteer Force would find
i^dtators amongst the Irish nationalists, the suffragettes
and syndicalists. This general loosening of the ordinary
ties of social obligation he feared threatened to break
up ^^ho v/hole fabric of srociety. According to Winston •
Churchill, Balfour was also worried that the whole Home
Hule controversy was compromising the crown in the
'Asquith Memorandum "The Irish Situation: the Constitu-
''''' Sovereign', September 1913?OAr.37/116/60. This IS reproduced in Jenkins. A'-,'ith
&rc^ - inn'"'^ '^^^^'.-'^^ Ulstermen'w^^ob-abxy not be flu.:no&d by a iiritlsh election so hisQJirands for an election to end Ulster resis t^nce 'were
aprjarently motivated by the hope that the Unionists
coulQ use the isnue to return to power.
Dominions. Under these circumstances Balfour thought
"
that Ulster exclusion was 'the least calamitous of all
the calamitous policies' which still remained open to the
Unionists. Carson's early October reports that anxieties
over possible business losses were making many southern
Unionists reluctant to oppose Home Rule vigorously prob-
ably was an additional factor in leading Balfour to advo-
cate a compromise on the basis of Ulster exclusion.^^
The Cherkley Court talks between Asquith and Bonar
Law resulted from the King's growing anxiety over Ireland
as well as from Bonar Law's reluctance to risk encouraging
civil war if the southern Unionist opposition to Home Rule
was flagging. Bonar Law kept Balfour fully informed of
the September and October negotiations, and of the sub-
stance of his secret sessions with the Prime Minister on
U October, 6 November and 9 December 1913 e After receiv-
ing Bonar Law's precis of the first Cherkley meeting,
Balfour expressed some misgivings that Asquith might suc-
ceed in working out a solution, and thereby rob the Union-
ists of an election. Balfour told the Unionist leader
that if Asquith offered the exclusion of the four pre-
dominantly Protestant counties, the Unionists would be in
8 0Balfour to Bonar Law, 23 September 191 3, B. M, Add,
MS 49.693r ff, /^8-63. Randolph S. Churchill, Winn tor. S.
.cai.yr£iix.U, ilie XQ]m:s ^-±ii:t££jDan» 2^Ql=13.lk (Bostom
Houghton Mifflin, 1967)9 p, 461.
8
1
"Bonar Law to Lansdowne, 8 October I913, B, M. Add. MS
ii-9,693. ff. 63-i|j Blake, BmiaL lOi, p'. I60.
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some difficulty.S^ Balfour and Bonar Law
.oth realized
that any Unionist demands for a nine county exclusion was
impossible, and that even demands for Fermanagh and Tyrone
tnight be hard to defend, owing to their large Catholic
populations. Nevertheless, the former Tory chief too], some
encouragement from reports that Redmond's opposition to
any form of exclusion would place Asquith in so delicate
a position that a dissolution would be required. ^3 j,^ ^.^^ .
same time, Balfour cautioned Boziar law not to apprise
Asquith of their doubts about a Unionist victory lest an
election occur. ^'"^ Balfour's attitude at this juncture,
while it displays an astute recognition of the effect of
Ulster militancy upon the nationalists of the south, and
of Redmond's difficulties in considering any form of
partition, represents unwise and dangerous political cal-
culating in the midst of a grave crisis. His correspondence
with Bonar Law suggests that he was not above raising the
Ulster issue as the most convenient way to force the
Liberals out of office. Indeed, only three days before
the second Cherkley meeting of 6 November. Balfour filled
in for Carson at a Unionist demonstration in Aberdeen.
Instead of delivering a conciliatory speech which might
have eased the path of negotiations, the former Chief-
82Balfour to Bonar Law, I7 October 1913, B. M» Add. f/IS
^9p693t f. 93.
'"^^Balfour to Bonar Law. I7 October 1913 » B. M. Add. ivlS
^9»<393. f. 98; Balfour to Bonar Law, 13 October 1913.
B. M. Add. U>Z 49.693r f. 77.
^^Balfour to Bonar I^w. 13 October 1913, B. in. Add. I^'IS
^9,693, f. 77.
203
Secretary waved the 'Orange riag' when he charged it was
disastrous to conpel the '.ost orderly, one of the most
industrious, one of the most able, one of the most loyal
portions Of the United Kingdom deliberately to organize
itself against the attempted legislation of the govern-
ment.
' If Ireland could claim separate treatment from the
United Kingdo.., then Ulstermen could demand the same from
the rest of Ireland on the basis of their differing
religion, ideas, aims and ideals. Returning to the old
argument about illegal means, Balfour then proclaimed that
unless Home Rule was preceded by an election or referendum.
The attitude of the Unionist party will bethat an immoral revolution in the Constitu-
''5? c^iT^e^ out by immoral means, andyna^ a^ter that was carried out it wac
imrriorally used to force upon thosp wj -s-h
whom they are in the closest agreement,
vvhose ideals are the same as their own, inIreland a forn) of government which theUlsxermen abhor and which Englishmen andScotsmen would abhor if they were put inthe same place. 83
After receiving Bonar Law's report of the second
Cherkley meeting, in which Asquith said he would take up
exclusion of the four or six counties with the Cabinet,
Balfour wrote a revealing letter in reply. Despite his
public insistence on Ulster's right to separate treatment.
Balfour expressed hi-: surprise that Asquith seemed uncon-
cerned about the finances of an "Ulsterlesc" Ireland.
Balfour believed such an exclui>ion would bring financial
8*5
'Ihu. .Tim.gLS.f ^i- November 1913.
disaster to the South and Westt
I take Devlin's view, and were I an IrishNationalist, I think. I should refuse HoneRule under the terms proposed, '^ith al?
ou? of^^nT'-^'-
"^'^^^y ^^^^ money left
in It Dut the xrish s^^nius for T3arliap;ent^rv
sle^t^rth^v'^''^^" organization I'drno?^ee thc^t they have much prospect of plavinsa satisfactory part in the world's his?o^yfBut I may be quite wrong, ^6
At the same time Balfour told Bonar Law that the Unionist
Party might resent any compromise over Ulster if skillful
negotiations or the pressure of events ultimately forced
the government to go to the co^ontry before Home Rule
received the royal assent.
On the surface, Balfour's public and private posi-
tions on Home Rule and Ulster as well as on the merits of
compromise appears confusing and contradictory. There are
perhaps two or three possible explanations for this appar-
ent ambivalence. Firstly, Balfour had always maintained
that Home Rule was against the true interests of the South
and West of Ireland as much as against England's and
Ulster 'So He had often argued that nature obviously
intended Ireland to be joined to England. To defeat
°"BaIfour to Bonar Law, 8 November 1913» B. IV), Add. IvjS
^•!'9,693» Devlin was a Nationalist member from Belfast who
adaT?iantly opposed any form of Ulster exclusion. Despite
his arfreement with Devlin, Balfour was probably influencedby Jack Sandars
'
report that the rank and file were elad
that Balfour went boldly for an election at Aberdc-.cn'.'
Sandars to Balfour, k November 1913. B. M. Add. i-iS ^^9,763.
f. 69,
87
'Balfour to Lord Oranmore, 23 May 1912, B. Add. MS
^9»862, f. 154; Balfour at Nottingham, Tll£ Times ,
1 February 1913.
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Home Rule for all Ireland was his major objective. If.
in fact, Irish political and economic considerations mde
Home Rule impossible without Ulster, then the Orange Card
was the one to play. By insisting on separate treatment
for Ulster, and by raising the threat of Opposition-backed
Ulster resistance, Balfour hoped to intimidate the govern-
ment from proceeding with Home Rule at all. This strate,o:y
had been originally conceived by Lord Randolph Churchill
in 1886 to defeat the first Home Rule Bill, and Balfour
was obviously familiar with it. Edward Carson's militant
stance on Ulster was originally conceived in hopes of
frustrating Home Rule for all Ireland. In late I913. then,
Balfour's enthusiasm for Ulster's rights was a tactical
iQeann of frustrating the whole Home Rule policy. Secondly,
Balfour entertained the hope that a general election on
Home Rule might lead to a Unionist victory, which could be
followed by a repudiation of the entire Home Rule policy,
the Parliament Act, and the social reform legislation he
deemed confiscatoj:y
,
He was, therefore, very worried that
Asquith's willingness to compromise at Cherkley might
cancel the possibilities of an election, Moreover, Balfour
believed that even if the Unionists lost, the mounting
Ulster resistance would force the Liberals to alter their
proposals so drastically that Home Rule would be defeated.
A sustained refusal to accept the 'Home Rule within Home
Rule' or the fixed exclusion suggested by Asquith at
Cherkley would virtually force the government to go to
the country before they could coerce Ulster. As Balfour
explained to Bonar Law:
Gen^arElec ti^n I'^^Mn'r' ^
HS\L-L-?h:^:iI^-
Uls.er in its present mood can never bP nn+under a Dublin parliament. 88
Besides his general and long standing opposition to
Home Rule, Balfour was obviously growing impatient with
his opposition role and longed to return to power. It
would be naive to eliminate officer huiiger from Balfour's
motivations in any attempt to explain his attitudes in
late 1913.
Balfour's anjciety over the political benefits of
comproTnlse are very significant when considered in relation
to the coUaps^e of the Cherkley Court talks between Asquith
and Bonaw Law on 9 December I913. At this third secret
meeting. Bonar Law refused to consider either Home Rule
within Home Rule or any fixed exclusion with a plebescite
to join laterr It is hir;hly probable that Balfour's
8 November I913 contention that a liQS^'niiS stance
would best secure party solidarity and a quick election
v/as a factor as importanr. as Lansdowne's objections to the
sacrifice of loyalists in the South and V.est in Bonar L-w's
stance and the ending cf jhe talks, Bonar Law's d-jtailed
88
Balfour to Bonar Law, 8 November 1913» M. Add. i.is
^9i693.
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reports to Balfour on the negotiations leading to the
Cherkley talks and their substance indicate that he was
not indifferent to the views of the former party chief.
The announcement of the collapse of the Cherkley
talks in early 191'. exacerbated nerves in both the Liberal
and Unionist camps, and drove the latter to consider the
highly questionable, if not unconstitutional, tactic of
crippling the army by amending or defeating the Army Annual
Bill. Moreover, the consistent use of the Ulster issue by
Balfour and other Unionists in their speeches undoubtedly
added to the resolve of the Ulster Unionist Council and
the Ulster Volunteers to continue their preparations for
armed resistance the minute Home Rule passed. The very
language which Balfour employed in his speeches, describ-
ing tho government as criminals conducting an immoral
revolution and the Ulstermen as loyal and law-abiding citi-
zens, exacerbated rather than diminished the threat of
civil resistance in Ulster. Balfour had enough experience
with the Orangemen to realize that language such as this
would be interpreted as a justification for their illegal
activities. To this extent then, Balfour shared aorae of
the responsibility for the dangerous turn of events in the
Home Rule crisis of 191if.
By early igiA' it was clear that the 18-month old
Unionist tacticS of forcing an election on Home Rule by
putting pressure on the King and by raising the throat of
ci'dl war in Ulster hsid proved fruitless. After the
collapse Of the Cherkley talks. Bonar Law and Balfour wore
especially frustrated because they were convinced that
Asquith was deliberately letting the Ulster issue drift.
They feared that the Prime Minister would succeed in makin
the Unionists appear unreasonable and bigoted owing to
their refusal to accept a temporary exclusion of Ulster or
Home Rule within Home Rule,^^ m this atmosphere of frus-
tration and panic, the Unionist leadership considored the
most radical and unprecedented means of sabotaging Home
Hule. The Unionists knew that there was widespread sym-
pathy for the Ulster resistance among military officers.
Indeed, from late I913 Carson and Bonar Law made speeches
which virtually invited the officer corps to refuse orders
to disarm Ulster militants. The Unionists concluded
that Home Rule could be smashed by crippling the govern-
ment's authority to use the army in crushing Ulster resis-
tance. Bonar Law proposed, therefore, that the Unionist
peers amend the Army Annual Bill so as to absolve from
military discipline those army officers who might be
ordered to crush an Ulster rebellion against Home Rule,
If the amendment failed, the Lords conceivably could
89-
-Balfcur to Bonar Law, 18 Lccember 1913, B. Add. MS
^9»693» r. I30; Balfour to Bonar Law, 13 Januar>v 1014.
B. Add. m 49,693. f. 138. '
90Bonar Law did so at Dublin on 28 November I913, iinsor,
:£nsJ.snii, p. 475. Carson used the same tactics in his
speech rejecting Asquith 's coii^promise offer of 9 iViarch
191'^ 5 H^nsanif lix, 937.
threaten the suspension of military discipline for the
entire army corps for two full years. The Unionist leade
believed that in either case Asquith could not coerce
Ulster, and would he forced to concede a general election
In late January Bonar Law discussed this plan with lans-
downe. He proved somewhat reluctant to accept it owing
to his uncertainty that the Ulster party would accept the
verdict Of the electorate, Balfour responded to Bonar
law's plan on 3 February 1914. While he had reservations
that the proposal might create dangerous precedents for
future labor members and might open the Unionists to
charges of preventing the government from protecting
Belfast's Roman Catholics from Orange rioters, he con-
sidered the proposal
J
.e.one of extraordinary interest and impor-tance, 1 fully realize how much there is to
ILTt ""-"^ ^ greatly moved byWhat I gather is Lansdowne's objection.,..
i>ucn limitation of the powers of the Grown in
respect of the theatre of ODerations where
the forces of th^^ Crown may be allowed to act-iSy I suppose, quite unprecedented. For this
1 individually care little. The circumstances
are unprecedented.
His reservations notwithstanding, Balfour concluded, 'I
need hardly say that whatever course you adopt I shall do
all I can to support it.'^^ Balfour apparently based his
tentative support for this dangerous plan upon his con-
viction that by this juncture Ulster resistance was
91Balfour to Bonar to, 3 February 1914, B. M. Add. iViS
49,693, f» 152-3? Blake, Bonar Law, p, 177.
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genuine, not bluff. The increasing militancy of Carson's
speeches, along with the Ulster Volur.teers' abandonment
Of wooden rifles for modern weapons in late I913. undoubt-
edly explain this conviction. Balfour contended that
something very dramatic was essential to emphasize this
danger and to force an election. As he explained in his
opening remarks to Bonar Law.-
fS^ 1 ! V^^^ ^^^^ Soing on in Ulster isabsolutely outside the ordinary framework ofconstitutional politics.- and every le-iti^nate
means must be used to stir their slug|ishimaginations, 92
Three weeks later at the Cannon Stre-t Hotel in
London Balfour attempted to stimulate the people's slug-
gish imaginations. In this major address to an audience
of 1000 Unionists which included Sir Edward Carson, Lord
GoscheDf Lord Aldenhara and Lord Rothschild, Balfour
reiterated his previous economic, strategic and historical
objections to Home Rule.^^ He asserted that his ministry
had conferred lasting benefits upon the Irish population
and had left no great unredeemed grievances in Ireland.
The present Irish crisis he attributed to the Liberals'
policy of attempting colossal constitutional changes under
92Balfour to Bonar Law, 3 February 191^+, B. M. Add. f.lS
^9,693» f. 1^)2. Since the Army Annual Bill v/as not due
for renewal until April, the final recommendation was
referred to a committee of the Shadow Cabinet.
93Balfour at the Cannon St. Hotel,
.Thjg. iim^, 19 February
191^-.
a transitory and inocnplete constitution. He claimed thot
the Ulster i^ilitanoy and dire threat of civil war were
the natural products of this Ho.e Rule policy and Liberal
".ethcds. Stressing his belief in law and order, he
asserted that civil war carried with it far greater evils
than the mere destruction of life and property.
with'''f^^^^-"i^*'' ^'^ """^t always carryth It, wxdcsr.refid demornl i -/-i-ti ^„ 1. ,.
the Shattering" Of old i(°^^t^ +i '
tne shaking.
Of things tSat it ?s far better lhou?d';r'^^
^questioned in any stable socL?y!""
Balfour then insisted that, while he did not abate one Jot
his Unionist principles, and •though I think Ulster is
"
right, and though if I were an Ulsterman I would do as
Ulsternien are doing....' civil war could only be averted
by the complete abandonment of Horr>e Rule or by the complete
exclusion of all Ulster. Ruling out Hoir.e Rule within Horns
Rule or a temporary separation, he proclaimed.
The ambition, the ideal, the .fixed resolve ofUlster IS not to be given the power to para-lyse a Parliament in Dublin. Their fixeddetermination and their unalterable ideaJ is
British Parliament on equal terras
with all otner citizens of the United King-
He concluded by s.dv-ising the governments
they, must r.ake a clean cut, and nothin/^bux a clean cut will do it. If they reject
t'lifj advice... they v.'ili f ind' themselvRs in
xiiG grip of a reiTiorseless current, and before
xney kncA' where they ar- entan^-led in those
Gtrea-Tis J ,
.
.they will have drafr^^od the ship
of state for which they are recsponsible intoirremediable and hopeless disa.^.te--.
21?
a own
•fir<y
ora-
While Balfour's abhorance of civil war was undoubtedly
sincere, his assertion of Ulster's rightne.s and of hi
inclination to fight if he were an Ulsterman was v
unwise, if not outright provocative. Parenthetical c
ments of this kind Ulstermen seized as proof of their
righteousness. More importantly, the Ulster Volunteers
interpreted them to mean that the Unionist party leaders
would back to the hilt their plans for military resistance
and the establishment of a provisional government.
When on 9 ^larch I9U Asquith acknowledged the Ulster
difficulty by reluctantly proposing a six year exclusion
for those counties which chose to opt out of Home Rule,
Balfour echoed Carson's refusal to consider a six year
stay of execution. Indeed, only four days after Asquith's
county option offer, Balfour abandoned his previous hesi-
tations regarding the proposed amendment to the Army Annual
Bill, As he explained to I^nsdowne;
The objections to the proposed course are
obvious f but certainly not conclusive, andin revolutionary times, I suppose revolu-
tionary measures are necessary j I confess,
however, that they are rather against thegram. 94
By this .juncture, Balfour v/as apparently so mesmer-
ized by his Ulster sympathies and his distrust of Asquith
and his Cabinet that he had lost all sense of proportion
and statesmanship in responding to the Ulster issue,
9^Balfour to Lansdowne, 13 i'.larch 191^t B, M, Add. :.:S
^9,?03, f. 269.
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Certainly there was .erit in Asquith's argument that the
six-year exclusion would offer an opportunity for the .
Dublin Parliament to assuage the Ulstermen's fear of
oppression as well as to provide the British electorate
with opportunities to register their views on Home Rule in
two general elections. Balfour's knowledge of the increas-
ingly aminous international situation^^ should have impelled
him to encourage Carson ejid Bonar law to explore the
Asquith offer so as to defuse Ulster resistance and its
inevitably disastrous consequences to military solidarity.
Balfour's rejection of the 9 ferch proposals and his con-
tinued insistence upon a general election cannot be
described as wise and responsible statesmanship. In fact,
brinksmanship is a more appropriate description of his
policy as the Ulster crisis deepened in .Viarch and April
191^.
Balfour and the Unionists were saved from the folly
of amending the Army Act and from iirmiediate criticism of
their rejection of Asquith's offer by the controversy
surrounding the 'Gurragh Incident' of 20 March 191^. After
being informed by General Paget that they might be required
95avmg to his membership on the Committee of lmr)0>^ial
Defense Balfour was kept fully informed by Churchill anddaldane of the growing dangers of a Jiurouean War. Kennethloung writes that Balfour v/as convinced by 2 912 that a
I'^uropean war would erupt by 191^K r-irs. Dugdale, Balfour's
niece, recalled that his anxieties over v/ar caused him
to react when he heard a gunshot in the countryside in
late 1913. Kenneth roung, Actliiir ilaaas. Balfour (London:
Cr. .oell, 1963), pp. 3^1-^6; Dugdale, Balfour
,
II, IO7-8.
to guard government installations in Ulster against raids
by the Ulster Volunteer Forces, General Gough and 57
Officers Of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade at Kildare communi-
cated to General Paget their intention to resign their
commissions rather than participate in operations against
Ulster. Rather than accept any Unionist responsibility for
this threat of military mutiny which Carson and Bonar Law
had practically invited, Balfour justified the actions of
Cough and his officers in the House of Commons 1
There are times, and there have been times inthe history of every country when circumstancep
sometimes over which men >uive no control -
sometimes circumstances which are the result
of ^ folly, and sometimes the result of crime, -bring about a condition of things in v/hich
ordinary rules and maxims that ought to govern
^
and must govern civil society, have to be laid
aside and each r^an has get to say to hi^nself
,
in these new and exceptional circumstances,
what IS my duty to m.y country and to society? '96
In attributing the Curragh episode to the folly of the
Liberals* Irish policy and to a government plan to win
British sympathy by provoking Ulster, Balfour failed to
acknov/ledge the degree to which extremist' and uncompromising
Unionist oratory and intrigue regarding the Army Ar.n\^^l
96
^ 5 H3J3isard, ix, 93-^0
97
-^'5 Himssxii, Ix, 133^H1^I03. Balfour related to one corre-
spondent the Unionist theory that the orders to guard
installations in Ulster were all part of Churchill's
plan 'in one of his Napoleonic moods,. ofor so encircling
Ulster with a military and naval force that it could be,"*
as it v/ere, strangled into submission. The proposed
movement of troops v/hich has led to all these resigna-
tions v/as designed to be the first stage of this ooeratioa, '
Balfour to Mr. Leo, Z^- I^Jarch 191^» B. M. Add. 49, 863,
ff. 154.
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Act had precipitated and justified the actions of the
Ulster Volunteer Force. When his anxiety over the dis-
ruptive effects of the Curragh episode on the military led
Captain Maurice Hanlcey of the V.ar Office to ask Balfour to
seek a compromise over Home Rule in private talks with
Asquith or Haldane. Balfour searched for an excuse to
refuse. Ke ultimately declined the proposal on the ground
that this might prejudice any talks which Asquith and
Bonar Law were having.^^ After the Curragh affair Austen
Chamberlain and some of the federalist sjTnpathizers of
1910 tried to revive the national councils scheme in hopes
of averting a further erosion of army discipline. Balfour
however, again rejected compromise and joined Carson,
Bonar Law and Lansdowne in vetoing the idea.^^ In his
public speeches Balfour maintained his obstinate refusal
to consider anything but an unconditional Ulster axclusion
and a general election. "^-^^
When the Larne gun-running by the Ulster Volunteer
Q8-.
^nnh'^^ ^°^'?H-^" ^^ante. Isian Sj^orslS (London. Collins
-fy/o>j pp. 1^2" 3 1 Balfour to Bonar Law, 28 Ivlarch 1914.
B. M. Add. m 49,693, f. 159.
99Austen Chamberlain, miiifiS iijai3 .tii.s Ic^iilfis pn
£ihi:mL£ils.» ISLDon^Slli (London, Gassell, 1Q?6),
p. 6J7. Hereafter cited Chamberlain, Politicq. Cham-berlain asserts that when he was pushing the devolution
Idea m fCay, Balfour was prepared to "cut Nationalist
Ireland wholly adrift and give it full colonial self-
government" if Asquith would guarantee full Ulster exclu
sion. Balfour had registered his preference for such
an arrangement over Home Rule in his I913 Nottingham
speech, but there is no evidence that he pushed strongly
for^this. The. lim&3., 1 February 1913? Chamberlain,
J:eIJlJ:j^, p. 64i^.
•^"^Balfour at Hyde Park, Tho. Times , 6 April 191^.
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Force on 2^ April I9U justified the. government' s March
plans to deploy troops to protect government installations
in Ulster. Balfour virtually ignored the treasonable
implication of this arms importation. In replying to
Winston Churchill's assertion of Unionist responsibility
for the Larne. and to J. Walton's demand for Balfour's
arrest, the former Unionist Prime Minister put his
stamp of approval on the actions of the gun-runners:
The Right Hon, Gentlemen appear to hold the
view which, so far as I know, has neverbeen held by responsible British statesmen
at any rate, not for centuries, that there
are no circumstances in which it is justi-iiable for a population to resist the govern-
ment. They must be most rare. Such circum-
stances m any reasonable community must be
of a kind which could only occur in tv/o or
three centuries without shatterin/^ the whole
fabric of society. But they may occur; theyhave occurred, and there has never been any'
question that the coercion of Ulster, in the
sense of compelling Ulster to leave a free
environment under v/hich she is happy, and
put her under a government which she detests,
IS one of those cases. I hold now, and I held
30 years ago that if Home Rule v/as forced
upon Ulster, Ulster would fight and Ulster
would be right, 102
Balfour, cf course, coiweniently forgot that the Unionists'
refusal to compromise back in the fall had precipitated
the situation in which Ulster was faced with an all-Ireland
Home Rule,
Despite Asquith's promise to introduce an amending
a, Ixi, 1576, 1539-^+0.
102
5 Hanssrjl, ixi, 173^~5.
2.17
bill following the Curragh and Larne, Balfour continued to
employ extremist language in his domandc for a complete
and unlimited Ulster exclusion and a general election.
In so doing, he completely disregarded Asquith's diffi-
culties in requesting further sacrifices from John Redmond
and the Nationalists. Balfour was ignoring the dilemma
Redmond faced in defending to the more militant Nationalist
Volunteers any further concessions to Ulster obstinacy
beyond the six-year exclusion proposed on March 9. Bal-
four's insistence on full and unlimited exclusion is all
the more reprehensible in view of his earlier appreciation
of Devlin's opposition to any form of partition. As late
as 12 June 191^, the former Prime Minister wrote a memo
opposing any Unionist or peer cooperation in developing an
amending bill so as to force the government to take all
the blame for Home Rule„ Balfour went on to suggest that
if the Unionists accepted an amending bill, they could not
get an election until the next sunmier, nor could thej' keep
Home Rule a living issue. He also maintained that unless
the Unionists refused to accept all responsibility for an
amending bill, they could lay themse3.ves open to charges
of betraying their principles and abandoning their friends
in the South and V/est of Ireland as well as in those areas
Balfour at Coventry, The Tlm^, May 1914; also see
Memorandum on Ulster exclusion, B, M, Add, MS ^9,863,
f, ISij-j 5 liaiisarji, Ixii, 986-92. Asquith had elimin-
ated opportunities for suggestions on the bill. Balfour
criticized passing the third reading before the details
of the amending bill were published.
in
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cf Ulster included in Home Rulc^O^
.For Balfour to main-
tain this uncompromising attitude, and to weigh the options
on the basis of securing an election and the apprehensions of
the few loyalists in the South seems almost wreckless
view of the implications of the Curragh incident and th(
increasing European tensions. It clearly illustrates that
loss of a sense of reality and proportion of which Danger-
field wrote. Although Austen Chamberlain argued in his
memoirs that this Unionist militancy was designed to avert
civil war by intimidating the government, Walter Birrell
reported to the Cabinet in mid-June that the Unionist
leaders' demands for an election were in fact sustaining
the resolve of the Ulster militants:
They have, of course, been told by the
British members of their coalition that a
General Election which may get rid of this
Home Rule Bill altogether is a likely event,
and until tliis contingency is removed from
the realm of probability it is impossible to
measure the full fighting force of the
Covenanteers . 105
It is clear, then, that Balfour and his Unionist colleagues
helped exacerbate the crisis which the German General
Staff hoped would diminish Britain's ability to aid France
upon the outbreak of World War I.
Perhaps the best illustration of Balfour's loss of
Balfour's memorandum on the Lords amending the Home
Rule Bill, 12 June 1914, B, 1.:. 49,869, ff. 148-53.
105
Birrel memorandum on his impression of Ulster, 15 June
1914, CAB37/120/70.
Objectivity in the Home Rule controversy was his response
to the Irish Volunteers' imitation of the Ulster tactics
When on 26 July 1914 they landed arms and ammunition at
Howth. with the resultant incident at Bachelor's Walk.
Only moments after Balfour attacked Birrell for not sup-
proting Assistant Police Commissioner Harrell's attempts
to disarm the Nationalists, which resulted in three deaths
and serious injuries to 38 Irish citizens, the former
Unionist chief again proclaimed the righteousness of
Ulster's resistance. Despite all that had occurred in
Ulster over the previous three months, Balfour attached
full responsibility for the Irish crisis to Liberal obstin-
acy and unscrupulousness
J
I say that ever since 18S6 the third ofIreland which was the most industrious, andWhich nad the greatest industrial future,
which was nearest akin to the Gentleman who
sit on the other side in blood, in ooinion -
religious and political - have never' concealed
tiieir opinions and never concealed the factthat so firmly did thoy hold those oninions
that, rather than submit to be placed under
a i-^arliament in Dublin, rather than submit
to being torn from the United Kingdom, there
v/as no persoml sacrifice to v;hich they would
not submit.
Even after the outbreak of the Vvar, Balfour refused
to acknowledge the need to place Home Rule on the Statute
book so as to encourage Irish enlistment and avert the
possibility of a Nationalist rebellion. Despite the post-
ponement of the enactment of the Home Rule measure promised
"^^^5 Hansacii, ixv, 1055.
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on
by Asquith, Balfour described the £overr..enf s decisi
to carry the bill as a Tnonstrous iniquity, m fact.
Balfour composed a lengthy memorandum on ? August in an
attempt to block any action on Home Rule, on the grounds
Of the absence of 90 M. P,
.3 in military service and of
Carson's cooperation in helping the war Office with
mobilization, -^^"^
This discussion of Balfour's reactions to and thoughts
on the IriGh Question between I910 and 191^ lead to sone
important conclusions about the man and the political and
social environment in which he moved. Firstly. Balfour's
attitude toward the Irish Nationalists expressed in the
Budget and Parliament Bill debates, as well as his con-
descending remarks about the origins and genuineness of
Irish nationalism illustrates a continuing and uncompro-
mising Anglo-Saxon disdain for the Irl.nh people, despite
the great social and economic improvenient achieved in
Ireland in the two decades before world War I, Secondly,
although Unionists in general, and Balfour in particular
^
had accused Gladstone and Asquith of majiipulating the
Irish Question to secure office in 1866 and 1909-12
respectively, Balfour and his party did not hesitate to
do the very s?7n& as a means of recapturing power e The
former Tory chief's unwillingnoas to modify the Unionist
107Dugdale, PalllQur., II» p, 121? Balfour's memorandum on
Home Rule Crisis, '.var and Ireland. 7 August 191^. B, ivl.
Add. MS /^9,869, ff. 162-7.
principles in the direction of federalism in 1910 lest
it expose the deep Unionist divisions on tariff and social
policy clearly illustrates his sacrifice of Irish inter-
ests to British party politics. Perhaps even more serious
was the former Chief-Secretary 's reluctance to encourage
Bonar Law to a sincere pursuit for a compromise with regard
to Ulster in late I913, lest it rob the Unionists of an
election issue. That Balfour could retain this position
down to mid-June 19U. despite the gathering war clouds,
illustrates a loss of perspective and reality that con-
trasts markedly with his eax-lier objectivity on such
issues as the Irish land or educational questions.
Balfour's consistent heralding of the loyalty and
progresGiveness of Protestant Ulster indicates an Anglo-
Saxon provincialism and rigidity that defies Zebel's
assertion of Balfour's flexibility. His simultaneous
defense of the Ulster Volunteers and Curragh officers and
condemnation of the Nationalist Volunteers is yet another
example of inflexibility and hypocrisy. While Balfour's
general values and past involvement in the Irish Question
Kiade him sympathetic to Ulster Protestant anxieties about
a Dublin parliament^ reason and common sense should have
impelled him to use his great political influence to mol-
lify and arbitrate rather than exacerbate those feelings.
V/hile political and tactical considerations may offer
some explanation for Balfour's raising the Ulster issue iu
1912-14 p there may we].l have been some unconscious
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psychological factors which drove this distinsuished
Cecilian to abandon objectivity and common sense in the
Irish Question during 1912-14. Virtually every value and
institution Which Balfour had cherished since early adult-
hood had been challenged by the second decade of the
twentieth century. The status of the aristocracy, the
sanctity of private property, the value of religi.on, and
the boJ.ief in a common European community devoted to the
pursuit of peace had all been severely shaken between
1900 and 1914, When faced with the disintegration of
cherished beliefs and values, it is not uncommon for even
the most rational and educated people to lose perspective
and fall inxo a pattern of rigidity and simplistic explana-
tions of the root of society's troubles. That Balfour
my have capitulated to the kind of rigidity and anxiety
described by George Dangerfield, by Walter Houghton and
by Samuel Hynes ;ls a distinct possibility. Moreover, in
1911 Balfour was driven from his almost hereditary posi-
tion as )iead of the Unionist Party as a result of the
combined challenges which the Liberals, the Irish. Labor
and tiie people mounted against the old order from I909 to
1911. Balfour's speeches over the Budget and the Parlia-
ment Bill show that he attributed these attacks on the
establishment not to real and deeply felt grievances, but
to the combined manipulation and artifice of Irish and
Liberal conspirators. It is possible that his uncomprom-
ising attitude on the maintenance of the Union in 1912-14
owed more to an unconscious but strongly felt need to
avenge the loss of his party leadership than to the stra-
tegic, historical and academic arguments he raised against
Home Rule. To sabotage Hom.e Rule and drive these arch
conspirators out of office seems to be an important govern-
ing factor behind the former Tory chiefs attempts to
inflate royal perogative and his manipulation of Ulster
provincialism.
The tragedy is that whatever the motives of Balfour
and the Uniohists between 1912-14. their use oi' the Ulster
issue provided enough time and justification for the Ulster
Volunteer Force to arm and entrench itself so that Home
Rule was frustrated for all Ireland by the threat of civil
war. Had even a temporary exclusion been accepted in I913,
it is possible that the common sacrifices that both sides
made in the Great V.'ar might have obliterated the provin-
cialism that existed in both Belfast and the South. The
Curragh Incident
» the Larne gun-running and the Bachelor's
Walk IrilDings, as well as the postponement of even trun-
cated Home Rule, destroyed the possibility for a united
and nonsectarian Ireland. In the long run, Balfour and
the Unionists did not prevent civil war, for the issue of
Ireland's ns.tional integrity led to a bloody civil war in
the 1920 's and is currently being fought on the streets
of Belfast and Londonderry.
CHAPTER VI
BALFOUR AND TH2 FINAL STRIJGG3J3, I916-I92I
22^
i) The Rising and Its Aftermath
Britain's entry into the Great War put the Home Kule
crisis on ice. The mutual accusations and recriminations
that had Characterized parliamentary debates over the pre-
vious t.vo years were replaced by promises of full coopera-
tion and consultation during the Allied war emergency.
Reassured by Asquith's promises of an Amending Bill for
Ulster exclusion and of the postponed implementation of
Home Rule until the war's termination, the Unionist peers
allowed the Home Rule Bill to complete its parliamentary
sojourn.. It was placed on the Statute Book in September
1914. For the next two years, the larger war pressures,
along with John Redmond's efforts to prove Ireland's
loyalty by encouraging enlistment, led to a gradual wither-
ing of Unionist anxiety over the Irish Question. Balfour
was no exception to this tendency. His papers contain
very few references to Ireland from the opening of the war
until the Easter Rebellion of ?Ji April I916.
Even those officials intimately connected with
Ireland enjoyed a respite from the tensions and anxieties
which tJie Home Rule Crisis of 1912-4 had nurtured. - Irish
enlistments gave no cause for complaint up until I915, and
the police reports attested the peaceful and prosperous
condition of the country. P'armers wore reaping great
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profits from the escalating prices that food scarcity
brought. The industrial segment of the Irish economy,
especially shipbuilding and linen in the North, enjoyed
the benefits of high wages and low unemplojnnent. ^ While
the Irish government noted a decline in recruitment in
1915, and more frequent Volunteer parades, there was very
little evidence to suggest that a rebellion was imminent.
Only a few days before the rising, Ifethew Nathan, the Under-
Secretary in Dublin Castle, pronounced the country quiet
and safe. Even the leader of the Irish Volunteers, Owen
MacNeill insisted in Feoruary I916 that the country was
not ripe for rebellion. The military officials in Ireland
Showed some anxiety by early 1916 about the activities of
the Irish Volunteers, but were unable to impress Birrell,
Nathan or Wimborne, the Lord Lieutenant, of the danger of
a rising.
Yet behind the scenes ominous developments were
unfolding^ Since 1912 the Irish Republican Brotherhood
.
had gradually been gaining a more militant posture and they
accomplished a slow but steady infiltration of the Irish
I'olunteer Movement by The details of the gradual
subversion of the authority of Owen IvlacNeill by Patrick
Pearse's militant republicans need not detain us.^ Suffice
^Lyons, Ireland Sijic£ ±hii pp. 359-60,
^Leon O^Brion, Uiil2lin Castls and ±h£ Risliii-, rev. ed.
U-^ondont Sidg-v/ick and Jackson, 1970). Chapters One and
Tv/o, Roy Jenkins asserts that Birrell was warned about
a risingt but chose to ignore these warnings. Asquith,
,
P« e
-^Lyons. IrjslaM ^.Ixisji. JiM iimlnsi, pp. 329-5S.
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to say that the Easter RebeUion, commencing with the
daring seizure of the General Post Office and the subse-
quent six days of street ficrh+i^o. ^ v .y ^x x fighting and bombardment, was to
shake England and its leader*? n-p +>,^-;x aers of their complacency and
indifference to Irish a-r-poi,^-, -dCO i affairs. Balfour, in the Coalition
Government as First Lord of the Adrri r--.!j-u yi cn am alty, v/as once more
brought into the vortex of the Irish Question.
Until the Irish Republican Army surrendered on
30 April, Balfour like other Cabinet members received only
fragmentary reports on the Dublin revolt. Nevertheless,
his past Irish experience as well as his position as a
leading Unionist in the Coalition virtually insured that
he would be advised and consulted on the Easter Rebellion
by all Bides of the political spectrui., from Unionists to
Nationalists. Trinity Provost, Archbishop John Bernard,
who offered the college's facilities to General IWell's
troops during Easter week, wrote Balfour expressing his
am:iety that the rebels would be let off lightly. Although
five days earlier the Cabinet had instructed Ma:>:;vell to
commute any capital sentences on women and to conclude
speedily ijhe executions .^^ Balfour showed no inclination
toward leniency in his 10 Ivlay reply to Bernard*
Tlie degree of severity, or clemency which ou.-htto be shown in cases of rebellion such as that
which has recently disgraced Dublin, is diffi-
cult to determine? but I do not think you needfear that the present Government have the least
^^CAB3?/147/13, 5 May I9I6.
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idea of relaxing the sentences as fin-llv
Which h^' tT""^^ penai?res^UT>onw e has resolved have been or v;ill befully carried out. whether it be the deathsentence as in the case of those who havealready been executed, or penal servitude asin the case of the others.
Speculating on the probable causes of the outbreak. Balfour
suggested that "...mixed up with the forces of disorder
Which indulge in purely Separatist ideals, there is a good
deal of Syndicalism at work among the Dublin rnob."-^ There
is no evidence that Balfour was familiar with James Connelly
and his advocacy of socialism, but, like many of his class,
ever since I900, he was inclined to suspect the hand of
syndicalists and anarchists in any manifestations of popu-
lar discontent.
During tlie next six weeks v.tdle the Government v/as
desperately wrestling with numerous alternatives for an
Irish policy, Balfour's hardline view was gradually modi-
fied as more information on the rebellion and its impact
filtered into Whitehall, After his six-day inspection
tour of Dublin and Belfast. Asquith told the Cabinet that
some concession on the lines of the 191^4 Home Rule Act was
essential to meet partially the government's pressing man-
power needs through Irish recruitment. Voluntary recruits
from the Nationalist areas could not be expected othenvise,^
5
-^Balfour to Archbishop John Bernard, 10 r.lay 1916, B. M.
Add, MS ^19,86^, f. 275.
Asquith 's memorandum on Ireland, 21 Llixy 1916, CAB37/1^^8/l8.
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Moreover, Ulster Protestants would no longer flocl: to the
colors for fear of a Nationalist invasion of the province.
Indeed, by late summer, most Northern Unionists wanted
conscription as the price for accepting Lloyd George's
Heads of Proposals.^ Balfour could not be indifferent to
the manpower arguments used by Asquith and Lloyd George.
In 1915, the former Tory chief had drafted a Cabinet paper
outlining his ideas for the most efficient use of manpower
during the war crisis. }le had long been concerned with
questions of manpower efficiency in the military and indus-
try.
Secondly, Horace Plunkett appeared to favor conces-
sion When he told Balfour that the rebellion was more
against the failures of the Irish Parliamentary Party than
it was an anti-British one. According to the energetic
founder of the Irish cocpDrative movement, the Sinn Feiners
were motivated by 'an old love of Ireland with a new desire
and belief in the opportunity to serve her. ' The First
Lord of the Admiralty undoubtedly attached more importance
to Plunkett 's contention that American public opinion was
badly affected against Britain by the recent rebellion.^
Indeed, the effect of the rising and its suppression on
7Hugh de F. Montgomery to William Coote, M. P., 5 SeptemberI916, Dod/627A29/58; Montgomery to Mary Folliott, 2 August
1916, Dod/627A29/51, Montgomery Papers, P. R. 0. N. I.
Plunkett to Balfour, 22 Lay I916, B. M. Add. I^IS ^9.792.
f. 100, f. 106. '
American opinion was a .ey factor in.radually
.oderatin^
Balfour's position. By June Balfour threw all Ms wei,.^
behind the Ho.e Hule proposals eventually worked out by
i^loyd George.^ Very early in his career Balfour recognized
how the Irish Question hindered cordial Anglo-A.erican
relations, m hopes of neutralizing Irish-A.erican hostil-
ity, Balfour took time from his busy schedule as Chief-
Secretary to write an article for theM A.^^ r^^,
explaining the provisions of his prospective I890 land
bill.^*^ Shortly after the Anglo-American dispute over
Yenezcla. Balfour said he recognized that ^.. large numbers
Of the most loyal citizens of America are either not of
British descent, or if of British descent, come from that
part of Ireland which has never loved England. Having
been so sensitive to the Irish factor in Anglo-American
relations in peace time, the disaffection of American
public opinion following the rebellion was bound to have a
profound impact upon the taciturn Cecilian. By early June
1915 Britain's financial and supply difficulties had
^Paul' 1068^''^' ^ -Siilan (London: Routledge Keegan andi-au , 196a p. 397. Hereafter cited Lyons, DJLUjQn.
Balfour to William Henry Rideing. AutograTDh File, Hough-icii Licrary, Jiarvard University; Curtis, C^xciiii, p. 353,
-^^Balfour to Henry White, cited in Alan Ward, Ir^lsnd andMaSL:M^rXQ^jl.R^2^,
.ISo.9-1922 (LondoArnriidenfield
and lycolson, I969;. p. 261, Hereafter cited Ward, Anri^-Ml^Qm^ :^^lsLn.Qn.^', Denis Judd. BxUsmr snil Ihe British£mpA
.r£ (London: iViacmillan, I968 ) , pp. 312-13.
~
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convinced Balfour that an Allied victory over the Central
Powers depended upon drawing the United States to their
support. Eustace Perry's report that the Irish Catholic
clergy were preaching 'no friendship with England the
Tyrant nor with France the Apostate' was only a prelude to
the disastrous effects of the rebellion on American atti-
tudes to Britain.
While the Irish Inspector General, Sir Neville Cham-
berlain, reported growing syiapathy for the rebels among the
Dublin and Leinster population, more ominous for Balfour
were the Cabinet-circulated despatches from the British
Ambassador in Washington, Sir Cecil Spring Rice. On 26 May
Spring Rice cabled that ',..the executions in Ireland have
very greatly added to the bitterness of the Irish voters
here, and any steps taken against Britisn action will be
hailed with enthusiasme Three days later Sir Edward
Grey, the Foreign Secretary, circulated another message
that further executions would stimulate a dangerous German-
Irish-American alliance. Such an alliance might conceiv-
ably produce an anti-British government in the approaching
Presidential election, or at the very least, hinder chances
of a favorable United States policy to Britain. After
12
Kustace Perry to Balfour, 6 June 1915, B, M. Add.
Ivis ff. 52-6.
^^CAB37/i47/38.
14
Arthur Link, wUsjon, Campai^ lor I^rQ&xi^Sislylmii aM
P^^a^Lfe (rrinceton: Princeton University Press, I965},
p. 14.
2.31
Grey emphasized to his ministerial colleagues the necessity
of publicizing the British government's version of the
rebellion to the American people. Balfour wrote the Foreign
Secretary:
I was painfully impressed by the views expressed
. ^r^i^S- ^loyd George and yourselFonthe effects which the Irish rebellion has hadupon Araerican public opinion - esDecially r^tn-
efeolr^f^.^^-^^ approach of a Presidentiallection... sv/aying from ^side to side in the mostdisconcerting fashion. 15 ^
Balfour was undoubtedly concerned by Spring Rice's
mid-June report that the government's propaganda had done
nothing to sway Americans toward Britain, Tht-: futility of
such efforts was explained succinctly by the British Ambas-
sador:
The fact that there was a re^-olt in Dublin
t
that an encounter took place betv/een Irish
revolutionaries and British troops, that
leaders were taken and executed by a British
court-martial - this is sufficient to o>-v.',v
the vast majority of the Irish here in ar/'
attitude of determined hostilitv to ev^pv^y-
thing English.
Even more dangerous and significant were Sprinrc dice's
reports that influential people with close coni^ections to
British aristocratic circles, such as Bourke Cockran and
Mrs. y^hitelaw Reid, wife of the former "United States Ambas-
sador to the Court of St. James, were making speeches and
inspiring articles sympathetic to the rebels. Spring Rice
further alleged that Catholic educational establishments
^^Link, 'ililzim* pp. 14-3.
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were becoming hotbeds of anti-British agitation, and he
posited that: 'There can be no doubt that the confessional
IS also used for the purpose.' m conclusion the British
Ambassador urged that Sir Roger Casement's execution be
deferred since the American people tool, a dim view of poli-
tical executions. 1^ Non-Irish Americans, he warned, would
not favor executions carried out two months after the suc-
cessful suppression of the rebellion.^''
On 12 June Lloyd George, who had been appointed on
26 May by Asquith to negotiate a settlement agreeable to
John Redmond and Edward Carson, published the results of
his deliberations. The Lloyd George scheme called for the
immediate implementation of the Home Rule Act, except
in the six counties of Antrim. Armagh, Down, Fermanagh,
Londonderry and Tyrone. In these areas, a Secretary of
State responsible to tho British cabinet would exercise
governmental authority. Irish representation at Westmin-
ster would be retained. These arrangements would re,(nain
in forca for one year following the war's termination,
provided that Parliament had made no other arrangements by
that juncture. The whole Irish Question would be referred
ll-l-^^I^^^ ^'i^iP^i^is-l Conference for a final solution.
i>pring Rice xo Grey, 12 June 1916, CAB37/149/33.
^^Spring Rico to Grey, 30 fey I9I6, cited in Stei^han Gv/ynn,
ed,, and. £j:leri^sJiij2a Qes^il Smdns: Rice (Boston:Houghton mfflm, I92.9), ii, 335. Hereafter cited Gwynn,
ahese proposals are described in detail in Lyons, Dilij^n,
pp. 485-6.
233
While the Unionist members of the coalition, most
especially Walter Long/? created tremendous dimculties
for Lloyd George during the negotiations and after their
results were published. Balfour was not a part of the
Unionist cabal that sought to undermine the proposed set-
tlement. Balfour
-s refusal to join in the sabotaging
activities Of Long, Lansdowne and F. E. Smith^O derived
from the importance which he attached to American good will,
and hopefully, to an alliance which might insure Britain's
military and financial survival. Spring Rice's despatches
to Grey continued to reinforce the seriousness of the
American position. The British Ambassador even reco^nended
that the government adopt a lenient attitude toward the
distribution of American funds to those injured or dis-
placed by the revolt. As for Home Rule. Spring Rice told
Grey J
If we are able in some measure to settle the
Korne Kule question at once, the announcement
will have a beneficial effect here, althou,-h
cl^.npt think that anything we could do would
conciliate the Irish here. They have blood
'
m oheir eyes when they look our way. All the
same the moderates, who have joined' the extrem-ists would leave them again if they could find
a reasonable excuse for so doing. ' Ivlany of ourbitterest enemies do not wish to take the side
with the destroyers of Belgium. At the same
tirae we must remember that our cause for the
present among the Irish here is a lost one.^l
19
''Lyons, Pillcu, pp. 39^.
20
liLLd., p. 396.
RiS?"iif338? "'^ "^"^^ ''^^''^ ^Prj.n.s
In addition to this conciliatory advice from America,
Balfour received a lengthy letter from George Russell, the
poet known as A. E. Ru,,ell asked the former Unionist
leader to exert his influence in both the Cabinet and
Unionist party to secure colonial self-government for
Ireland. The poet believed Balfour could convince the
Ulstermen to propose such a solution, thereby saving
Nationalists and English Unionists loss of face. Russell
held that colonial self^-government would have the advantage
of preserving Irish unity. It would also secure Irish
ports during the war. The Irish, he believed, would accept
membership in the Empire in return for guarantees of Irish
unity. The mystic poet urged an immediate concession as
the only means of checking Redmond's declining popularity
and thereby saving constitutionalism. Russell believed
the majority of the Irish would accept colonial self-
government with relief. As to the objections of ultra-
democrats, the poet said I
.. .their voices would not be lis'tened to.
I^ain an ultra-democrat myself and I sacri-
fice a good many ideals in making this
suggestion and postpone them fortjie nillin-
niui.1, Irish nationalists would accept with
gratitude any measure which Ulster would
accept and which would include Ulster. The
fact that the scheme was an Ulster scheme,
proposed by Ulstermen would go far to make
Ulster predominant in a self-governing Ire-
land. They would have the prestige of find-
ing a solution which the Nationalists could
not find,^^
George Russell to Balfour, 1 June I916, B. M. Add. iV^
49,865, ff. 3-/f.
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While no record of Balfour's reply exists in his papers,
his later statements in support of the Lloyd George scheme
suggest that he was influenced Dy Russell's contention
that Ireland could accept active and loyal membership in
the Empire. On the other hand. Balfour was not receptive
to A.E.'s warnings about partition.
Meanwhile the pens of the militant Unionists were
not idle. In early June when Lloyd George was deep in
negotiations with Carson and Redmond, the Southern Union-
ists mounted a most effective propaganda campaign against
the Heads of Proposals, and Lloyd George reported to Dillon
that they were 'moving heaven and other places to thwart
a settlement. '^^ Using a barrage of letters, inspired
newspaper articles and a series of deputations, the Southern
Unionists attacked the Lloyd George scheme as a betrayal
of the party truce promised in August, 191^^. They accused
the government of exaggerating the importance of the Ameri-
can argument, and maintained that the Minister of Munitions
had misled them into thinking all the Cabinet favored
immediate Home Rule. These Southern loyalists held that
an iinmediate grant of Home Rule would be interpreted as a
concession to rebellion, and would do nothing to bolster
Redmond 's^eclining popularity. "' The intensity and vigor
'"3Lloyd George to Dillon, 12 June I916, cited in Lyons,
£ii.lQn» p. 39^.
Oh
Patrick Buckland, irisJi Unipniaii] It Ths. Anrlo-lrigh aDi
ihe Ir_eJ.ii.n(i» 2MS iQ .1522 (Dublin: Gill and I^aclvfillan,
19?2;, p. 73. Hereafter cited Buckland, Irlsii Unix^ai^ni.
Of this Southern Unionist offensive was effective in
getting long and Lansdowna to be their advocates at the
Cabinet level, even though Long, in particular, had not
oeen especially hostile to the idea of negotiations in
early June. 5 i„ ,,3
^^^^.^^^^
^^^^^
Government Board, Long was the focal point of this Southern
Unionist campaign. Closely linlced to Ireland through his
mother's family. Long had been intimately associated with
militant Southern Unionism ever since he replaced George
Wj-ndham as Irish Chief
-Secretary in I905. Once convinced
Of strong Southern and Western Unionist opposition to
immediate Home Hule. Long told Balfour and Lloyd George
that he could not support the scheme. Long wrote a bitter
and lengthy letter to Balfour repeating the general argu-
ments of the Southern Unionists. He seemed to resent
especially Lloyd George's use of the American argumenx.^'^
Long's resentment probably derived from Sydney Broo::'s
m.essage that he was '...absolutely positive the Irish
Americans and the German Americans would not obtain an arms
embargo...,' and that the Americans would '...never sacri-
!^!-!!!!!f
^^^^^^ policies. '2? concluded
Biicitiimd, Irish
.ilaiaaiam, p. 73.
1 1 • .1.0 ( \j »
27Long to Asquith, 8 June I916. cited in Link, Wilson,
p. i.;>. iiroolc s estimate of American opinion was based
on his presence m the United States for the previousSIX months, ^ '
by telling Balfour that Ireland needed a good dose of
resolute government. Balfour was not the only recipient
Of Long's protests. Lloyd George reported to John Dillon
that Long had told the Ulstermen that they were induced
to accept the Home Rule scheme under the false pretense
of the war emergency and American opinion.
Balfour received protests from other representatives
Of Southern Unionism. Lord Midleton, who was encouraging
Long and Lansdowne in their efforts to thwart a settlement,
warned Balfour of the dangers of confiding governmental
powers in the hands of the weakened Redmondites .^^ Arthur
Slliot of the Irish Unionist Alliance sent Balfour a copy
of an address allegedly representing ^00,000 loyal people
who begged cancellation of any Homo Rule scheme. The
address criticized the proposed partition as contrary to
Unionist and Nationalist wishes. -^^ Long's efforts to dis-
credit the American argument apparently made little impres-
sion on Balfcur, for on 20 June Lloyd George wrote Dillon
that AJB would stand by Asquith and himself as long as
Carson stuck to his side of the bargain and brought Ulster
along,
^^LyonSf DjXUa, p. 396.
29Midleton to Balfour, June I916, B. M. Add. m ^+9,7?1-
S'^'^Si''!®
^''^a^^^owell, ^iia ixl2h CxmireixiiQn (London!
Rcutledge, Keegan and Paul. 1970), p. 56. Hereafter
cited I/.acDowell, T]i£ IrXsih jSiiiii^siiJu^a.
30Arthur Elliot to Balfour, 15 July I916, B, hU Add. IfS
^9,865, ff. 16-20.
^••Lyons, Dillfin, p. 396.
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Austen Cha.berlain joined Long in trying to convince
Balfour that Uoyd George had gone too rar in negotiating
a Hce Rule scheme. Lord Unsdowne submitted a lengthy
Cabinet niemorandum arguing that Home Rule was futile
because it would not satisfy the rebels. He thought that
Redmond's position was too weak to carry partition. Simi-
lar to Long, the Kerry landlord contended that the American
complication had been exaggerated, and that the only result
to be gained from Home Rule would be further disloyalty. 33
Ions submitted a Cabinet meraor.^dum virtually echoing
I^nsdowne's objections. The Irish Attorney-General,
James Campbell, having regained his Unionist convictions
after a brief flirtation with concession during Asquith's
visit. 3i sent Balfour a copy of his Cabinet memorandum in
which he attacked the partition arrangements as an adminis-
trative nightmare. He insisted that partition had been
reluctantly agreed to in the North. Campbell then identi-
fied a.s the scheme's major wealcnass the Ulster Unionist
belief that the partition would be irrevocable, and the
^'Nationalist belief that it would be ten.porary.
'^rS^w^Sf""Sr^oi? Balfour, 22 June 1916. E. M. Add.
^"^Sbt^/SoA
r-'ieraorandum on Ireland, 21 June I9I6,
Long Cabinet Memorandum on Ireland, 23 June 1916,
^%uckland, Irish iJaioaisia, p. 6^f.
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The Attorney-General predicted that one side or the other
v;ould be driven to further agitation when this ambiguity
Of the duration of partition was removed. Campbell charged
that John Dillon's 11 May speech in the House of Coiranons
and Bishop O'Dwyer's characterization of the rebels as
heroes and martyrs had increased the Irish people's sym-
pathy for Sinn Fein. Campbell told Balfour that to proceed
with the Lloyd George scheme would convince the Irish that
rebellion pays,-^^
Despite the vigorous opposition of Selborne, Long and
Lansdovme-^^ and these various Unionist protests, Balfour
threw his weight behind the Lloyd George plan during the
critical v/eek of 21 June I916. Preparatory to the Cabinet
meetings of 2k, 27, 28 Jime, the former Unionist chief
drafted a lengthy paper refuting the catalogue of objec-
tions enunciated by Long, Lansdownc, Campbell and Austen
Chamberlain in their memoranda,-^ Balfour began by aclmow-
ledging the impossibility of a complete reversal on Home
Rule. He favored an immediate implementation of 'the Lloyd
George proposal because it gave the six counties exclusion
by mutual consent. He doubted whether equally favorable
-^^Jaroes Campbell to Balfour, 19 June 1916, B„ M. Add.
r.S ^'-9pB65, ifo 31-8; see also CAB37/I50A.
^"^T, P. O'Connor to Dillon, 21 June I916, cited in Lyons
,
Dillon, p. 39?.
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Balfour's Cabinet Ivlemorandum on Irish Situation, 2^1 June
1916, CAB37/150/I7.
2.1^0
terms could be secured if the settlement were delayed
until peace was declared. Balfour emphasized especially
his belief that the present scheme offered the best oppor-
tunity to avoid civil war and bloodshed.
^hat rather than submit
di^rui^Pd-^r^'^ right. But I hfve neversg ised from myself that this extreme
measure would be so permanently damaging tothe orderly constitution of a civilifed
country that the least of the eviJs ^hichIt would entail would be the sacrifice oflife and property, by which alone its obiectscould be accomplished. Very stron-, there-fore, must be the arguments which Sould'induce roe to run the hazard of civil war.
when we have offered us voluntarily all that
successful civil war could give.
Having seen the Ulstermen and many English Unionists on
the brink of civil war in 1914, Balfour apparently believed
these circumstances might recur again. After witnessing
the further disintegration of his class and societal values
under the war pressures, the aristocratic Cecilian was not
prepared to risk further erosion by engaging in the brink-
manship that had characterized his actions in 1913-1/^,
In reply to some of the specific objections raised in the
Cabinet, the First Lord of the Admiralty confessed that,
while conditions in Ireland might indeed be bad, he doubted
that the Irinh representatives v/hen established in Dublin
...are going to eat all their own words, or are
likely to adopt the suicidal policy of taking
Germany's part against the iimpire. I call it
suicidal because it was certain to fail and
because in its failure it will drag dov/n the
whole policy of Home Rule with it. ^9
39Balfour's Gc'binet Memorandum on Irish Situation, 2i4- June
1916, CAB37/150/17.
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Balfour reminded his colleagues that the government's
present military strength and control of police provided
a far better position to deal with potential difficulties
than would be possible in peace time. Arguing that delay
would only increase the potential for serious intervention
by the Central powers, Balfour saidi
At the present moment no hostile Dreparation-have been made which could be of the^least use00 our enemies except the introduction of
?hli '^^^^""^ ""^^ ^^"^ submarine stations:there are no aerodromes; through the ooliceand military we can retain control of' all mecui--
communication.If the ^ Home Rule larliament is ever likely tobe a military danger, it is after years ofquiet preparation have put it in a positionto Threaten our ocean trade.
Since continued disorders were to be expected during the
war, Balfour preferred to charge a Home Rule government
with their suppression. Unlike his colleagues, Balfour
did not believe a Home Rule administration would tolerate
disorder:
If in the very first months of a Dublin
parliament Irishmen of the South and the
West prove conclusively to th3 world that
they are as incapable as i^iexicans of carry-ing out the elementary duties of a civilized
state, and prove conclusively to the Empire
that they are an Imperial danger, Home Rule
will perish p never to be revived. Personally,
I do not think that there is the least
chance of the Irish representatives deliber-
ately making themselves willing instruments
in the hands of our enemies, and this par-
ticular danger may, I think be ignored.
Moreover, Balfour argued that the Nationalists' hope of
ultimately wooing Ulster depended upon their controlling
Sinn Fein and preventing the republicans from seeking
further German aid. Balfour was certain that John Redmond
and his followers were astute enough to realize this.
Balfour urged his colleagues not to reject this 'unique
opportunity for settling peacefully and permanently the
problem of Ulster.
Balfour's memorandum suggests that the war had
altered his political priorities and his view of the Irish
Parliamentary Party, He clearly recognized that extremist
support would increase if the constitutional nationalists
did not secure Home Rule, An immediate concession was the
only way to prevent further Nationalist defections to Sinn
Fein republicanism. Indeed, after the initial shock of
the rebellion faded, Balfour, like a few Southern Union-
ists, began to support Home Rule as infinitely more toler-
able than any system the Sinn Feiners might set up./''""-
Second^.y, Balfour's memorandum shows that he was not dis-
posed to risk American and dominion cooperation by capitu-
lating to the clamour of the militant Southern Unionists
as automatically as hv2 had done in 1910 and during 1913-4.
On the other ha.nd, the memorandum clearly illustrates that
in 1916 as in 1914, Balfour was determined to secure an
Ulster exclusion. This is explicitly shown in the strong
emphasis he placed on Redmond's and Carson's agreement
40Balfour's Cabinet Memorandum on Irirsh Situation, 2i| June
1916, CAB37/150/17.
Buckland, Irish ilrumlsiUi Chapter Four,
that exclusion of the six counties would be an essential
component of the settlement. Despite the Nationalist
belief that partition would be temporary, Balfour undoubt-
edly hoped that its very enactment would provide a validity
difficult to challenge after the war. At this point.
Balfour was ignorant of the discrepancies in the period
Of exclusion promised to Carson and Redmond by Lloyd George.
Balfour obviously had changed his opinion of John Redmond^
and the Irish Parliamentary Party, Redmond was now por-
trayed as a practical and sensible man, rather than the
corrupt blackmailer of English Liberal politicians. Undoubt
edly Redmond's recruitment activities helped to mitigate
Balfour's former hostility. The former Unionist chief
astutely observed that the goal of a u.nited Ireland depended
on Redmond's fighting religious intolerance and disloyalty
to England as energetically as he had fought the Castle
system. In fact, the Irish leader proclaimed this when
speaking in support of the Lloyd George proposals/''-^
The Cabinet finally considered the Irish proposals
on 27 and 28 June, In two days of stormy debate, Balfour,
like Austen Chamberlain, Curzon, and Bonar Law, did not
waiver in the face of threatened resignations from Long
and Lansdowne. According to Lloyd George, Balfour fought
In fact, Balfour was not consulted at all by Lloyd George
during the negotiations that preceded the publication
of the proposals, Balfour to Salisbury, 1^;- June 1916.
B. M. Add. r.:s 49,753, f, 309,
^^Inish IM^-QSMriXit, 24 June I9I6.
for the settlement '...as if he had been a iio.e Ruler all
his life.' Asquith. Who believed Balfour was responsible
for the failure of the Buckinghara Palace Conference,
reported to the King that;
Mr. Balfour delivered the most effectivepronouncement in this prolonged conclave.
hLlJt '''^'^ Unionist, he disassociated
Lni^ ^^^^r^^ -^'^^ "^^^ position taken upby i.ord x^ansdowne and iv.r. Vvalter Lons;. Ke
~r]v^h-:^ "^^^ proposed arrangement^^ould
SfSfiT^^ regarded as a 'concession to
T?^J-nif'>^' r "^^^ contrary, in his view,It might be far more fairly represented as
triumph,- the exclusion of the
dplnd^nr+S''''n^^^^^^^"S then the maximumemand of the Unionist members at the Buck-ingnam i-alace Conference. He pointed outwith unanswerable force the absurdity of the
contention (already refuted by Sir J. ilaxwell)tha t the estaoiishment
. . . of a Hom.e Rule
Parliament would seriously embarrass our
acTion in the War. Sir J. I^axwell had alreadydeclared tnat with one Division we could holdin check or repress any possible rebellious
rising, i-ir. Balfour laid stress on theimportance of not alienatin-^^ the American
opinion at this juncture, and declared"'^
himself a whole-hearted supported of the
policy of Sir S. Carson.
Balfour's written and vocal support for an irranediate
settlement was undoubtedly helpful in reinforcing Asquith 's
pleas against the threatened resignations. The views of
the former Chief
-Secretary probably persuaded Bonar I^w
and Robert Cecil to abandon their staunch opposition, and
to sit on the Cabinet sub-committee established to
Lyons, DiJj^Qn, p. 399.
•'4 5
-^Asquith to the Kingf 2? June I9I6, CAB37/150/23.
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investigate possible alterations in the scheme.
Despite continuing protests from Southern Unionists^'^
and reports of English rank and file reluctance,
^^^^^^^
urged the party regulars at the 7 July meeting to accept
the Cabinet plan as a wartime necessity.^^ However, the
Southern Unionist propaganda campaign was so effective that
the seige mentality in Ireland was paralleled in the cor-
ridors of the Carlton Club. According to W, a. S, Hewins
:
The speeches of the Ministers justified theHardinge heport. They were just old stuffana showed no knowledge or appreciation ofthe situation in Ireland or anywhere eLe.
llfl rr\'^^^ presentsta.te of Ireland, no analysis of the Sinnrein movement, no account of the proposals.
no discussion of the military aspects 0^ theproposed settlement. It was just ooliticsLansdowne^and waiter Lone: repudiated all
responsibility for the iDroDosals. The'
-re'-li^iA-
amongst the rank and file was very fene^-al
.
against the proposals
...
.50
^^In his Cabinet Memorandum of 26 June 1916. Robert Ce-nsaid he felt obliged to defer to Balfour's ??ews cor-s.dering the latter's wealth of Irish exDerienne. Cecil'sCaoinet I'^emorandum 26 June I916 CAi337/l50/21,
'Jenkins
.
MriUU^Ja, 401; 31ake, Bon^j: L^w, d. 236. oelborne was
threlu^
rn^nister who followed through on his resignation
B^'^M '^f^\''-f^''io''lt^ ^'l^^^^oe to Balfour, 28 June I9I6,
?A t' ^"^'^ •'^•^•te^ Cluinoss to Balfour30 June 1916, B. M. Add, MS 49,865. f, 59? Buckland,
'
AlLLSh
-kJll^IliJLffi, Chapter Tliree,
^'^^r^!'to''i'?^"^i^''?o^°
^^-ilf"^^* 28 June 1916, B. M. Add.
i;;-^ 49,t355, f. 58. i.laitland was the Tory <x^cnt at theCentral Conservative Office.
^^Carson and Boiar La.w spoke in favor of the Lloyd George
arrangement,
c.Q.
.V A. S. Hewins, Ai^^IULi^ M bj2 Il3iLGjd,a2ifi.t : llor.t^ Yej^rs
-SX msJ.r^ iiPJj^^ { London 1 Constable, I929), ii', 83'.'
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After this party meeting Balforr. nn i'^^ iiour o longer pushed for an
Irish settlement in 1916 Tn +v,^ t ^lyiD. i the last analysis he was
probacy unwilling to go again.t English Unionist feeUng
Moreover, his old friend lord lansdowne was Mtterly opposed
to the Lloyd George scheme as a concession to rebellion.
After I^nsdovme insisted in his 11 July speech on a per-
manent Ulster exclusion, there was little chance of contin-
ued Nationalist support. Shortly after Lansdowne's speech.
Robert Cecil, Herbert Samuel and Walter long emphasised in
memoranda the dangers of proceeding with Horn. Rule during
the war.51 Reports of rising Sinn Fein popularity from
^
Long, 52 and from the Inspector General of the Royal Irish
Constabulary, may have been an additional factor in Balfour's
reticence after the Carlton Club meeting. Sir Neville
Chamberlain believed that the rapid gains made by Sinn Fein
in Belfast, Cork and eastern Galway was evidence tliat the
Irish people were now convinced that physical force was
more effective than constitutionalism. ^3 a private corre-
spondent, Sir Lancelot Storr, seemed to confirm this when
he told Balfour on 21 July 1916 tliat the Sirm feiners had
increased thirty-fold since Easter, and that the country
"
r^o^^^"^^-^'^
Cabinet Kemorandun, 1? July 19I6,
CAB37/i52/lo'
Cabinet We.morandurn, 20 July I916,
Long's Cabinet Memorandum, I5 July I916, CAjb3?/l 52/52
.
^"Sb37/15^^^^^
''^^'''^'^
'''' ^""'^^ conditions, 20 July 1916.
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wao a veritable arsenal. Storr maintained that the cler,y
were encouraging the people to prepare for another rebel-
lion. He warned that the arrival of sufficient German
and American funds would precipitate new outbreaks. Storr
echoed Long's sentiments in his pleas for resolute govern-
ment rather than leniency. 5^* These reports were probably
enough to convince Balfour that a Home Rule settlement was
ise\erxn£.lebs, the common hostility which
Nationalists, Sinn Feiners and Southern Unionists showed
for partition did not alter Balfour's conviction that an
Ulster exclusion was essential to any Irish settlement.
In reply to Horace Plunketfs lament over the abortive 1916
negotiations, Balfour wrote:
...the point where yuu and I aiwavs differ -W-
reached When the alternative has to be faced"'of keeping Ireland one under Home Rule and anon Home Rule fragment. 35
In any event, by mid-July the fate of the Lloyd George
proposals was sealed, when Asciuith's capitulation to Union-
ist demands for reduced Irish represencation at Westminster
and a permanent Ulster exclusion forced Redmond to break
negotiations to save his remaining credibility. The Cabinet
officially abandoned the scheme on 2? July. The old Castle
system was reinstituted with the appointment of H, E. Duke
li''t4]865^'^7''7l''
'^''^y 19^^' 3. M. Add.
^|-Ifour^to Plunkett. ? September I916, B. M. Add.
21^8
as Chief-Secretary and the return of Lord Wi.borne as Lord
Lieutenant. Nevertheless, Irish matters continued to
agonize and divide the Cabinet regarding the fate of Sir
Roger Casement who had been captured off the Kerry coast
three days prior to the rebellion. Although Spring Rico
had warned the government of the disastrous effects which
further executions might have on the prospects of drawing
America to the Allies, Balfour was not among those advo-
cating leniency.
ii) The Irish Convention, 1917-1918
During tiie fall of I9I6 disastrous military reverses
and the gradual erosion of confidence in Asquith's leader-
ship diverted attention from the Irish Question. Yot the
very gravity of the military, manpower and supply situa-
tions soon forced the government again to seek an Irish
settlement. Pressure to reopen negotiations came from the
United States, the dominions, and from Ireland itself. '
The restoration of Castle government and General Maxwell's
martial law had onl.y succeeded in driving many moderate
Nationalists into Sinn Fein. Consequently recruits from
Ireland virtually ceased. Moreover, frequent rumours of
'.Balfour had received a letter from Iviajor North, 35 Fitz-
roy Square, '.Westminster, which included a statement by
a i-ather Ryan that Casement was ax tempt in.'^ to stoD the
rebellion. North to Balfour, 16 July I9I6, B. Ivi/Add.m 49,865, ff. 65-70. f.^axwell told Asquith to disre-
gard^ Spring Rice '3 warnings for '...although U. S.
feeling would be bitter, it was not of great importance
to Great Britain or the U. S....' v.'ard, Anglsi-^orlsiJMl
RfiJ^aii^ma, pp. 112-13,
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imminent risings kept badly needed front line replacements
in Ireland. With the collapse of Rumania, the stalling
of the Russian army at Moldavia and the virtual deadlock
on the Western front. Britain faced an extremely dangerous
manpower shortage by late 19I6. In his very first speech
as Prime Minister, Lloyd George said an Irish settlement
was imperative to facilitate the utmost American and
dominion cooperation.-^"^ He also stressed that the general
principles of self-determination demanded a renewed effort
to solve the Irish imbroglio. After visiting the front,
Sir Maurice Hankey of the War Office echoed the Prime
Minister's viev/s when he insisted that Irish negotiations
were essential to free the 150,000 troops stationed in
Ireland and to enlist additional recruits in the dominions
and Ireland. -^^
Cecil Spring Rice confirmed the Prime Iv'iinister 's
assessment of the American situation when he v.'arned i3alfour
upon the latter 's assumption of the Foreign Office in
December:
...the Irish question here assumes a most
dangerous form. The Irish leaders are in the
pay of Germany and the ?rank and file of the
Irish are no longer indifferent but hostile.
It is interesting to remark that one of the
chief parts of the joint Irish-German pro-
grammes is the establishment of a naval base
in South-Vvest Ireland under German auspices,
to be an outpost of the Central powers on the
^''5 HlDSfira, Ixxxviii, 1338, 1353.
^^MacDowell, Ttua Irish Convention, p. 68,
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^o^^^'^'tS T'^ ^^^^ British tyranny atsea. It does not seem to be pe-ceived that
?he Uni^^fsr^'^ ^ German base againstt u ted tates as much as against i^n^iland.But: It 13 significant that this is part^'ofthe programme, and it would be difficult to
exaggerate the ferocity of the language held
laeetings. I understandthat^ i.he attitude of the lower clergy is fullvas violent, although the official heads of
^
the Church try to Maintain an attitude of
neutrality. But this recrudescence of theIrish question has a very unfortunate effect
on puDlic opinion, on Congress, and on thepress. However favourable to France, public
opinion here is, it cannot be said to be favour-
able to iingland.59
Although aware of Spring Rice's tendency to exaggerate,
the new Foreign Minister fully appreciated that, in addi-
tion to the manpower and supply problems. Britain faced a
financial collapse v/hich could only be averted by an
American rescue operation. Balfour told the United States
Ambassador, V/alter Hines Page, that he saw 'blue rain'
unless the Americans rendered assistance .^^ Something
had to be done to keep Irish-American anger from manipu-
lating Congressional and public opinion into an anti-
British posture. Balfour's primary foreign policy objec-
tive from January to May 191? was to secure additional
American aid 5 and, if possible, direct American interven-
tion on tj-iF. Allied side. Jfii.^ forwarding of the Zimmerman
telegram on 2^j. February was designed to secure this
- Gwynn e , Spxin^ I^ioe , i i , 366.
60
Burton Hendricks, Ttxs. IW^ Slid L^_t<2i:a 51 'ilPj^tiir: hlms.
P^-^e (Garden City: Doubleday and Fage, 1924), ii, 261.
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American intervention. However, during these tense month
Balfour was continually reminded that the Irish Quosti
hindered Wilson's efforts to swing American opinion behind
Britain. At a luncheon on 2? Llarch 191?
. Ambassador Page
stressed this as the cause of anti-British feeling, and
asked Balfour why the question was left unsettled for so
long. Although he admitted the problem, Balfour offered
Page no encouragement that he could effect a solution.
These informal approaches to Balfour and his col-
leagues soon gave way to more official communications
regarding the American government's difficulties with the
Irish-Americans, Ever since the rebellion, Judge Cohalan,
John Devoy and other influential leaders in the Irish-
American Democratic cominunity had put great pressue on
Wilson to use his influence on Britain, while initially
Wilson v/as reluctant to respond to these requests, the
American President saw clearly in the Congress ioiial Debates
on tho War i^e^ol^ticn ths gravity of the Irish issue.
During these early April debates, many non-Irish Congress-
men displayed marked sympathy for Irish self-determination
Moreover, V/iison had received in early March a direct appeaJ
from John Redmond on benalf of the Irish people. Conse-
quently, on IC April 191?, Wilson ordered Ambassador Page
to tell Lloyd George that the only obstacle hindering
^^r.'iacDoweii, Ths. Irish c^iiYfiniiPii , p. 71 ; Thsi Jiiisa,
8, 9 rv:arch 19^6.
2 ''2
cordial and enthusiastic cooperation with Britain by
practically all Americans was the failure to secure Irish
self-government, i^he President concluded by saying that
quick and successful action would divorce the Irish-
Americans from the German sympathizers with whom they had
been associating/^ Page conveyed the message to Lloyd
George, and the Prime Minister replied, 'God knows, I'm
trying
'
.
By early I917 support for renewed Irish negotiations
emanated from some English and Irish circles. In February
L. S, Amery called for a conference of all segments of
Irishmen to hammer out a federalist settlement .^^ A month
later Archbishop John Bernard acted as the spokesman of a
grov/ing number 01 Southern Irinh Unionists when he called
for an open Irish convention in a letter to Th^ limegi.^^
After the initial shock of the rebellion subsided, many
Southern Unionists began to reassess their former opposi-
tion to Homo Rule. The :.9l6 proposals had convinced them
that som.e form of Dublin self-government was inevitable.
The Lloyd George scheme had demonstrated the willingness
of li'nglish and Northern Unionists to sacrifice the southern
62,
«^ard, An^-Aii]£xiii5.n ^i5LtJ^>*iU» p. 1-^^6-7.
^•^liia ^Cime^, 18 February I9I8.
6^
Tixa ^ijnaa, 21 March I9I8; 5 H^ii^-cd, xci, 201^-5. The
Cabinet had discussed the possibility of a convention
on 2, 7 and 22 Karch and announced tJiis on 22 I-iarch.
Cabinet Iviinutes, CAB23/2.
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loyalists in exchange for an Ulster exclusion. Many
Southern Unionists, being dedicated Imperialists, favored
a renewed effort at settlement to facilitate active Irish
cooperation in the imperial war effort. Of equal signifi-
cance was the probability that the first postwar elections
would produce a more radical Parliament which would be
indifferent to Southern Unionist claims for protective
devices. Lastly, many southern loyalists now believed that
an immediate settlement was essential to stem the growing
moderate Nationalist defections to Sinn Fein.
By late March Lloyd George apparently felt that
Carson and Balfour were the chief ministerial obstacles
to renewed negotiations. He v;arned Carson, who attended
the 27 iviarch luncheon with Page that 'V/e've got to scttlcj
the Irish question now - inspite of you.' Pago reported
to Secretary of State Lansing that the Prime Minister
fully appreciated the Irish difficulty, and that ho vranted
V/ileon to communic£ite his views to Balfour as soon as the
latter arrived in V^ashington. Page stressed that since
Balfour had been a leader in the Unionist party before the
War, the Prime Minister believed a frank explanation of
American opinion by yv'ilson would ease the path of renewed
negotiations. - Three days later Spring Rice v;arned
Balfour's chief Foreign Office assistant, Sir Robert
^^ward, AazlQ~Airi.eri£an Jklalipni, p. I'l?. Balfour was
scheduled to journey to -Vashington for military and
financial consultation.
Cecil, that V/iison would undoubtedly raise the Irish dif-
ficulty as the root of English troubles with the United
States, The British Ambassador stressed that Ireland was
continually quoted against the English as proof that the
war was not being waged for the sanctity of treaties or
the independence of small nations. In conclusion he warned,
bv%ducat?nn^'p ^^^^v^'^^ an Orangeman andDy educ ion a Presbyterian. Eut he is a
lrKr.?L'S^^'^''^^^3^^ ^^^^^y -^^-^^^ the
in evpSv w.,^
prominent part, and he is bound
dernlSr^ ^ive consideration to their
Spring Rice's predictions materialized when two days prior
to Balfour's arrival in Washington. Joseph Tumulty asked
Wilson to put some pressure on the visiting British Foreign
Secretary, Lloyd George and Lord Northcliffe had asked
Sydney Brooks to insure that Tumulty urged Vvilson to talk
to Balfour.
^"^
A few days after Wilson duly raised the Irish issue,
Balfour attended a meeting of influential Irish-Americans
arranged by Sir Horace Plunkett in New York. In attend^njice
were Morgan O'Brien, a former New York Supremo Court Jus-
tice, Colonel Robert Temple Emraett of New Yoriv, John F.
Fits'.gerald. I.^ayor of Boston, and Lawrence Godkin, the
journalist. These men v;arned of the steady erosion of
^*^Gwynn, Sx!.ning Rioa, ii, 393.
6?
J. P. Tumulty, Woodrow. lis on aa I Emm Him (Garden City,
Doubleday and Page, 1921), pp. 398-9. Hereafter cited
Tumulty, ilils^.
^33
Hedmonite support in Anierica caused by the repeated Home
Rule postponements. They gave equal emphasis to their
abhorance of partition. Having been apprized of the
gravity of American views on Ireland in Washington. New
York and on other occasions, Balfour acknowledged that
demands for an Irish conference could no longer be ignored,
and he cabled the Prime Minister:
The Irish question is apparently the onlydifficulty WG have to face here, and its
settlement would no doubt greatly facili-
tate the vigorous and lasting cooDcration
of the United States Government in the war. 70
Notwithstanding Balfour's ignorance of growing Ameri-
can sympathy for Sinn Fein,^^ the support of this distin-
guished Unionist removed the chief barrier preventing
Lloyd George from announcing the Cabinet's desire to
attempt an Irish settlement. Accordingly, on 21 I.lay
191?? the Prime Minister emphasized the military dangers
of neglecting Ireland any longer, and told the House of
Commons that the wartime cooperation of tlio Irish race
68
Mm. In2Zk ILLraGii, 5 -^ay 191? i Ward, Au-lQ-Amacicoii Rela-
iJLQUS., pp. lif8-9; Plunkett Diaries. 2^ April 1917,
Plunkett House, London,
^9One of the mission officials wrote 'You hear a terrific
amount of the Irish question discussed and we get shoals
of letters about it.' Dugdale, Balfour, ii, 203.
^^Balfour to Robert Cecil for the Prime Minister, 7 May
1916, cited in Ward, An^Q-Aiaerili£in Relations, p. Vyj,
72
Cabinet Minutes, 22 Miarch 1917 » CAB23/2.
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throughout the world depended upon a rapid settlement. He
was anxious to enlist the Irishmen's 'passionate love of
liberty' in the Allied struggle for freedom. ^3
' Balfour apparently did not take much interest in the
initial proceedings of the Irish Convention, even though
his name was suggested as a possible chairman. "^^ In any
case, he was far too involved with the details of Anglo-
American financial and military cooperation upon his return
from Washington. Despite the Sinn Fein boycott. Sir Horace
Plunkett, the convention chairman, drove the 95 representa-
tives to find a compromise which would avoid partition and
preserve the fiscal unity of the United Kingdom. The
levying of customs, excise and income taxes by Westmin-
ster was a crucial issue for Ulster business interests and
Southern Unionists who feared a Dublin parliament would
tax thera out of existence. The Nationalists, fearful of
incurring additional Sinn Fein criticism, asserted that
any respectable self-governing scheme demanded full taxing
pov/ers. Both sides considered customs and excise powers
important symbols of nationality. Since most of the initial
discur.Gions centered upon this fiscal issue, the Ulstermen
and tlieir chief spokesman. Lord Barrie, were able to con-
ceal until mid-I'.^arch their absolute determination to remain
^^5 Hansard, xciii, 1999.
Plunkett to Balfour, 19 June 191? » B. \L, Add, L:S 49,792,
f. 128.
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independent of a Dublin parliament. "^^
When Lloyd George was informed of the convention's
serious customs impasse, he ordered his chief-assistant,
S. Adams, to try to salvage the convention by per-
sonal talks with Barrie, Carson and the Ulster leaders.
In fact, the Prime Minister met with Bonar law, iwidleton.
Dr. Bernard, Lord Desart and Carson het-.veen 6 and 13
February in hopes of encouraging an agreement ."^"^ Ax this
point Carson and the Ulstermen were under heavy pressure
to appear cooperative, and Carson subsequently toyed with
federalism for the United Kingdom as a means of preserving
Ulster's connection with Britain. If V/estminster
' s suprem-
acy was active, Carson believed that the Ulster Unionists
might accept federation. Undoubtedly Carson was cognizant
^^acDov/ell, ThR Xcisii .aonv5.2i.tiQii, p. 170.
76Dennis Gwynn, iXlJhn Efiiiiafmii, 1932 ed. (Freeport, N, Y.,
Books for College Libraries, 1971), p. 583? Buckland,
ll^J^li ilTLLXmsiil, p. 122; LiacDowell, Tha Irish Convention
,
p. 156.
''^Lloyd George told them there were only three considera-
tions essential to a settlement: first, United Kingdom
fiscal unity must be preserved during the war; secondly,
there would be no partition, and lastlv safeguards were
to be included to protect the industrial, commercial and
religious interests of Ulster from the agricultural and
Roman Catholic South and v/est, KacDowell, The iri^ih
O^liysJXtdsixif p. 1^2. David Savage maintains that i^loyd
George consistently believed federalism to be the best
means of reconciling Irish nationalism with the need to
maintain unity and centralisation on fiscal, economic
and strategic policies. David Savar^e, 'The Parnell of
Vv'ales has become the Chamberlain of £nrland; Lloyd George
and the Irish Question,' Jourml J2l Brlii^ih ^tiidi^, 12,'
No, 1, 86-108. Hereafter cited ravage, 'Lloyd George and
the Irish Question.
'
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of sympathy for a federal solution- among certain Southern
Unionists, notably Dunraven, as well as from Austen Cham-
berlain and Walter Long.^^ Although Carson doubted an
Irish settlement could await a general British federation,
he forwarded his ideas to Balfour and Lloyd George on
1 February 1918.'^^ Balfour's reply demonstrated his con-
sistent belief in partition as the only acceptable solution
for Ulster. Emphasizing his equal disdain for Home Rule
and federation, he advocated keeping the six counties and
. . .disinteresting ourselves from the South and
V»est of Ireland, except, in so far as it may
be necessary to prevent its coast lines being
used by enemy powers. I fear, hov/ever, that
this bold piece of surgery will find little
favour an;^^.vhere. I recommended it in I913
before the war rendered a solution impossible .^0
Despite Lloyd George's February warnings of the mili-
tary and political urgency of an Irish settlement, Barrie
clearly told the Irish Convention that Ulster would insist
upon exclusion from any Dublin scheme the Convention might
devise. It is probable that in 1918, as in 191^+, Carson's
knowledge of Balfour's views on Ulster may have provided
MacDowell, Iha Irish Il^mzaniion, p. 1^2; Tom Jones, White -
iiaii Diary:, IrelaM, 1918-25, ed, Keith Middlemas
(London J Oxford Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 6-7. Hereafter
cited Jones,
.wbiitsJiall .Diary; D. G. Boyce, En^lishrr,en
siM .L^iiili TrOillil^ (London J Jonothan Cape, 1972), p. 38
Hereafter cited Boyce, j^>i-xlishmen.
'^Carson to Lloyd George, B, K. Add. K3 ^9»709, f. I63.
80Balfour to Carson, n. d,, B, W, Add. ^9,709,
f. 166.
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additional incentive for the Northern Unionists to resist
the Prime Minister's pleas for concessions through taxes
or federalism. Despite Barrie's declaration, the Conven-
tion recommended colonial dominion status to the Prime
Minister on 5 April 1918.^^- Meanwhile the Government was
wrestling with a critical manpower situation following
the vigorous German spring offensive against Amiens.
Staggering British losses beginning on 21 iviarch forced the
Cabinet to consider extending the conscription age limit
from 42 to 50 years. Since Ireland had been exempt from
the first call, the government anticipated great domestic
opposition to the new limit unless Ireland was required to
bear some of the burden. It v/as feared that labor opposi-
tion would be especially serious. When on 28 l.-arch Lloyd
George suggested a simultaneous introduction of Irish con-
scription with the Irish Convention's anticipated Home
Rule scheme, Balfour along with Smuts and Curzon supported
this plan.^'^ It was> of course, a delicate decision. One
of the last resolutions of the Convention opposed Irish
conscription vdthout the prior approval of the future
8legislature. " Within a fc;W days, Balfour apparently had
second thoughts. On 1 April, he warned his colleagues of
8lMacDowell, T2l£ Irish Convention, pp. 181-2; Buckland has
a full dsscription of the convention recommendations.
IrisJi Unionisiia* p. 127.
^^Cabinet Minutes, 23 r.arch I9I8, CAB23/14.
^^MacDov/ell, Shs. Irisli Ci^iimiLls^. p. i?6.
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possible American opposition. Balfour was delegated to
explain to Colonel House the British government's dilemma.
His telegram is interesting as an illustration of his
doubts about the possibility of satisfying the contending
factions at the Irish Convention, and as an illustration
of his astute awareness that conscription might engender
more domestic and international difficulties than it would
solve. Nevertheless Balfour told House that an Irish
measure was essential to the proposed British extension:
The severity of the sacrifices that would beimposed on iin,^land and Scotland are obvious and
oo asK this island to bear added burden while
Ireland bears no burden of conscription at aJl
seems almost an insult. At this moment Irelandhas not only suffered less than any iiuropean
belligerent, she has suffered less than rny
^.'uropean neutral, ^/ouid i:;ngland and .Scotland
toxerate merely continuance of this unfair
distinction but its serious aggravation? On
the other hand, objections from a practical
point of view to include Ireland in a measure
of conr^cription are manifest. It is certain
that the j.aw can only be enforced at cost of
rioting^ and possibly bloodshed. It is not
cei-tain that the 150,000 troops we may expect
to obtain will prove useful and trustworthy. •
Against conscription will be united priests.
Parliament, nationalists and ^inn Feiners, and
the only scheme for mitigating their objec-
tions v;hich we can devise (i.e. Convention
scheme) may not impossibly alienate Ulster
and all that Ulster and shipyards of Belfast
means for the effective conduct of the v/ar.
For this scheme consists in associating a
bill for giving immediate effect to the forth-
coming report of the Irish Convention with a
bill for extending Conscription to Ireland.
The report will be out this week. Unionists
and ilngland and Scotland may accept it but it
is far from certain that Ulster will. It is
even doubtful if it will satisfy Irish rJ..tion-
alists, for there is a powerful nationalists
minority on the Convention including all the
261
0^!!^;!^^^^^°^^^ bishops Who want more than theReport propoGes to give them. If. thereforewe quarrel with the North of Ireland o^er oneOf these associated measures and with Se
clTLi^n °^ ^^^^ bothfthe warUo puc a.t mildly) will not be improved.
..
.8/^
Two days later Balfour still appeared anxious over
the probable impact of Irish conscription, and he told his
colleagues that if they decided against it, they would have
to tell the British people the naked truth that, '...Ireland
is a sheer weakness, but it would be a greater weakness if
we did something than it was if we did nothing. '^^ Balfour's
anxieties were echoed by Colonel House and Lord Reading,
the new British Ambassador, both of whom feared increased
German-Irish intrigue in the United States. The Frime
Minister, however, followed the advice of William
.viseman,
a British diplomat in Washington, that Americans would
tolerate a delicately handled conscription if it were
accompanied by Home Rule. Wiseman believed most Irish-
Americans were still Redmondite Home Rulers.^'"'' Encouraged
by Wiseman, and under great pressure from the generals and
the Unionists, Lloyd George announced Irish conscription
on 9 April I9I8. To sweeten this bitter pill, he promised
84Balfour to Colonel House, 1 April I9I8, B, Add. T-'iS
^1-9, 092, f, 228.
-'Cabinet Minutes, 3 April I917, CAB23/lJlf.
86Ward, AnglG-AiQorixian R^ialifina, p. 159; Cabinet Minutes
16 April I9I8, CAB23/6.
87
'Ward, AnpOja-Am^riGan i^slaileas, p. 169.
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a simultaneous measure of self-government based on the
Irish Convention's recommendations,^^
Balfour's anxieties were realized when, following the
passage of the Military Service Bill on 16 April, John
Dillon led the Irish party cut of the House of Commons and
into alliance with Sinn Fein and the independent National-
ists. A common national front against compulsion developed
in Ireland within a few days. On 18 April, Laurence O'Heill,
the Lord I-.'^yor of Dublin, led various nationalist groups
in planning a one day general strike and a nation-wide
publicity campaign protesting the right of England to con-
script Irishmen. This i^-lansion House Committee eventually
requested the use of British diplomatic channels to regis-
ter their protests v.'ith President \'iilF,on. Balfour, ever
consciouR of the inflam.atory Irish issue in America,
arranged with the American Embassy in London, that the
Irish resolutions receive no publicity. Secretary of State
Lansing quietly handed the messages to the V/hitc House on
13 August 1918.^^
McanwhilG, in early Way, Lloyd George attempted to
appease Southern Unionist complaints of disorder with the
appointments of Lord French and Edward Shortt as Lord-
Lieutenant and Chief-Secretary respectively. Both
^^5 Hans^JTii, civ, 1.337-1366.
^^The Zimaa, 23 Niay 1918; Ward, Anglsi-i
p. 16^.
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Officials recommended one last voluntary enlistment cam-
paign in hopes Of avoiding further Irish alienation. They
set a goal of 50,000 by 1 October I9I8. Balfour, worried
about British domestic reaction and resentful over minimal
Irish help in the war effort, agreed to the voluntary
campaign provided the principle of conscription was not
abandoned. 90 in any event, the combined impact of Irish
resistance and American warnings turned the postponement
into an abandonment.
By early June, the two major planks in the government
Irish policy, conscription and the implementation of the
Irish Convention's recommendations, were opposed by too
many factions for any parliamentary success. The Ulstermen
remained unalterably opposed to any rule from Dublin.
Although imperial and military consideration made him
desperate for a settlement, the Prime Minister soon real-
ized that this Ulster opposition nullified the 'substantial
majority' necessary to obtain a settlement. Sinn Fein
strength had increased during the conscription crisis, and
their dem.ands for full customs control were not acceptable
to Lloyd George. 92 On ^- June I9I8, the Cabinet postponed
ciny action on the convention recommendations, Balfour did
not lament the collapse of the proposed scheme, for,
90Cabinet Minutes 10 r.ay I9I8, CAB23/l/f.
91Jones, Ihiieimli Siaxi:, iii, 9.
IlUii., p. 9; '.vard, AniO-Q-Ameriiian i^-B.tJ.j?ris , p, 163.
contrary to that of I916. there was no provision for
Ulster exclusion. The scheme rested too firmly on federal-
ist principles which Balfour always maintained were
inappropriate to the Irish situation.
iii) Preparing for Partition
By early fall I9I8 the government returned to its
traditional law and order policy. No new initiatives
emerged until the last stages of the Paris Peace Conference.
Balfour's only public comment on the Irish Question from
May I9I8 until November 1919 was a rebuttal of Joseph
Devlin's accusation that Britain was hypocritical in simul-
taneously fighting for self-determination and exercising
tyranny and militarism in Ireland. Balfour labelled
incredulous Devlin's contention that Ireland threw herself
into tlxe war as vigorously as r^ngland and Scotland.
Undoubtedly, the government's recent conscription diffi-
culties and the abortive voluntary enlistment campaign
explain the Foreign Secretary's vehement reply. ^'^^ Balfour
had been kept informed of the campaign's progress and v/as
able to cite figures supporting his view.^-^
Balfour's December 19I8 election address concentrated
^^5 Jisns^, cix, 696-703.
Hansard, cix, 708-7l^K
^•^F, L. Frawley to Balfour
» 9, 20 August 1918, B. M. Add.
FiS A'9,768, ff. 172-77.
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on postwar economic recovery and international security
problems. There was no mention of Ireland. However,
the December elections in Ireland clearly emphasized the
high cost of failing to settle, through constitutional
means, the Irish Question. The Irish Parliamentary Party
was virtually annihilated in the wake of the anti-conscrip-
tion campaign and the failure of the Irish Convention.
Joseph Devlin and Captain Redmond, John Redmond's son, were
the only successful candidates against Sinn Fein opposi-
tion. The four additional parliamentary nationalist seats
were captured as a result of a Nationalist-binn Fein agree-
ment o Sinn Fein won 73 seats, while the Unionists captured
26 seats of which 23 represented Ulster constituencies.^'^
These results were probably highly significant to
Balfour. Firstly, the geogx-aphic solidarity of Unionists
in the Northeast must have strengthened his conviction that
Ulster must be given 'a clean cut' from any Dublin domin-
ated scheme. Secondly, the election results clearly
demonstrated the obsolescence of Home Rules and that Sinn
Fein would never accept the limitations on Irish autonomy
proposed in 191'4, 1916 and 1918. Republicanism had become
too deeply ingrained in the Irish populace for anything
less than full independence. The Sinn Fein boycott of
Westminster and their support for the Easter Proclamation
^^Iho Ticisa, 2 December, 1918.
97
^^v.acDoweil, Irii^ llonyjeatlon » p. 162.
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at the first Dail Sireann session on 21 January I919 left
no doubts about the growth of Irish republican sentiment .^^
Over the next two years, Balfour took full cognizance of
this in his written and oral contributions to Cabinet
deliberations on Ireland.
During the first half of I919 the government's Irish
problems increased tremendously. The guerrilla warfare
initiated by the 21 January attack on police at Solshead-
bag, Tipperary soon spread across the country, and created
a first-class military crisis. The Irish people boycotted
British administrative and judicial organs, and threw their
support to the embryonic ^inn Fein units. A Sinn Fein
republican cabinet was formed in April, and by summer Sinn
Fein represented the ' defacto' government of Ireland. "^^^
However, Lloyd George and his Cabinet colleagues were so
absorbed by preparations for and attendance at the Peace
Conference that they sought no alternatives to the tradi-
tional law and order formula. Now that the military
urgency of the war was over, most British politicians
showed more concern for unemploirment, housing and labor
problems. Even xhe attempts of the Irish and Irish-
98Lyons, Inaljind ^Insio. ihs. iilamina, p. ^00.
^
'^Balfour's Cabinet I'emoranda on Ireland, 25 November
1919, CP 193, CAB2V93; 19 February I920, CP 69I,
CAB2V98.
100Growing republican strength is described in Lyons,
In^Jjxoil SJviKiii Uis 'Ismino-f pp. 381-99.
.ze
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Americans to use the Paris meeting, as a forum to publici:
Irish claims failed. In I919, John Devoy and Judge
Cohalan again urged Wilson to use his influence on the
British. The passage of a Senate resolution sjonpathetic to
Irish independence impelled Joseph Tumulty on 6 June I919
to cable Paris that Wilson should do something quickly.
Wilson replied he could do nothing because the British
delegates were enraged by the press release of the American
Committee of Irishmen which accused Britain of barbaric
cruelty in Ireland. ^"^^ In any case, Wilson was loathe to
stress the Irish issue lest he lose British support for
the League of Nations.
However, by the fall of I919 it was clear that an
alternative to coercion was essential. Rather than crush
Sinn Fein? the repressive measures of the Royal Irish
Constabulary and the British Army increased the fighting
resolve of the Irish people and invited widespread foreign
and domestic criticism of Britain's Irish policy. American
pressure for an Irish settlement increased in the last
stages of the Paris Peace Conference. William Wiseman
warned Balfour, who v/as still in Paris, that the Irish
factions v.'ere cooperating with Senator Lodge's anti-treaty
foixes, and that they might support isolationist Republi-
cans in the approaching elections, Wiseman suggested that
Lloyd George inform the Commons that some settlement short
^^-^Tumulty, WiI.s.Qn, p. ^02.
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Of a republic should be attempted soon.^O^
^^^^
had accepted his American ambassadorship on the condition
that an Irish settlement would be forthcoming. Upon
his arrival in Washington, the new British envoy lost no
time in re-emphasizing the need of a new Irish initiative.
On i| October he cabled Curzon that the Irish Question was
poisoning Anglo-American relations. He warned that, but
for the peace treaty controversy and labor troubles, the
Irish-Americans might succeed in organizing a serious m.ove-
ment critically affecting Anglo-Am.erican relations. Althou
he reported that opinions differed as to an appropriate
Irish settlement, Grey concluded that because
...Irish hostility is at present an active
and might become a critically unfavourable
influence in American politics... a statement
of Irish policy on self-government lines is
now very desirable and might at any time
bee ome urgent , 1^^^
While Grey acknowledged that the Sinn Fein goal of complete
separation was impossible, a fortnight later he directly
warned Lloyd George of growing anti-British feeling. Grey
argued that the time was ripe for renev/ed negotiations
since many Unionists had dropped opposition to Homo Rule
and many Home Rulers had now recognized the claims of
^^^E. L. Woodward, ed., DosijnerLjS m Irliisil Jicrej^'rn Policy
,
1st Series (London: H, M, S. 0., 195'^), v, 982. Here-
after cited Woodv/ard, Documents .
103
999-1000; Cabinet Minutes, 11 November I919,
CAB23/I8.
'^^Voodv/ard, Dacuinenis , v, 1003-^.
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Ulster. The British Ambassador' obviously overestimated
the acceptance of partition among the Irish in America and
Ireland. As Balfour had respected Grey's judgment on
American opinion in I916, he was not indifferent to these
warnings when the fate of the League of Nations was hang-
ing in the balance. Indeed, by October many Unionists
began to favor a reexamination of Irish policy because
the 1914 Hom„e Rule Act did not provide an Ulster exclu-
sion, Bonar Law reminded Balfour on I9 October that some-
thing had to be done for Ulster security before the rati-
fication of the last Paris peace treaty made the 191/+ act
operative, ^'^'^
Lloyd George seemed to be searching for an alter-
native to coercion in early August when he acknowledged
to the Cabinet the critical state of American and dominion
opinion. The Prime Minister believed that Britain's labor
problems v.'ere partially the result of Irish agitators
stirring up their British counterparts."''^^ The Prime
Minister, therefore, established a Cabinet committee to
formulate Irish proposals consistent with imperial unity
" ^Grey to Lloyd George, 1? October 1919, CP 89, CAB2V92.
Balfour's iviemorandum on Ireland, 25 November 1919,
CP 193 f CAB2V93.
107
Buckland, IrJjLll Unionism, p. 208; Blake, Bonar ioEi
p. 1^8; Jones, v/hitghall Piary, iii, 9.
'^^Cabinet Minutes, 5 August 1919, CAB23/15,
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and acceptable to Ulster. This was no easy task, as is
evidenced by the committee's six month struggle to carry
out their assignment. The basic skeleton of the Govern-
ment of Ireland Act. I920, more commonly known in Ireland
as the Partition Act, emerged from these deliberations.
The committee, chaired by ^Valter Long, first eliminated
continued British control of Ulster as inviting world
criticism, Overrepresentation of Ulster in an all-Ireland
parliament was vetoed as undemocratic, and as an open
invitation for Ulster to frustrate an Irish Parliament's
work. The committee finally concluded that the best solu-
tion lay in establishing two Irish parliaments, one in
Dublin, and one in Belfast for the six counties. British
domestic rule was to be eliminated from boUi aieas. The
committee believed this would satisfy
...the fundamental demand of the overwhelming
majority of Irishmen ever since the days of
O'Connell. It is entirely consistent both
with the fact that there is a majority in
Ulster as opposed to Dublin rule as the
nationalist majority in Ireland- is opposed
to British rule - the fact which has wrecked
the three Home Rule Acts,,.,
The committee argued that the call for Ulster to govern
herself was not coercion, and was, therefore, consistent
with government pledges to Ulster. A Council of Ireland,
composed of representatives of both governments for ques-
tions of mutual interest, was to be established as a
stimulus to ultimate Irish legislative unity. Authority
over agricultural and technical education, transportation.
Old age pensions, health and unemployment insurance was to
reserved to the Imperial Parliament for one year, and
then delegated to either the Council of Ireland or the
-parate legislatures. Ireland was to bear lAo of imperial
expenses, while customs and excise would be retained by
Westminster to recover the war debt. As a gesture of good
will, the Irish v/ould >-eceivp i^n^s r^,,v,«'
_Lcei\e land purcnase proceeds. The
retention of 6k Irish seats at Westminster was designed to
preserve imperial unity. The committee hoped this scheme
would soothe Anglo-American and dominion relations . ^"0?
Balfour attacked these proposals from the very begin-
ning. Although he admitted the failure of Unionist policy,
and that pledges to Grey and the public made retreat
impossible^ he preferred to keep Ulster an integral part
Of the United Kingdom. The rest of Ireland could have
independence, provided British naval privileges and the
imperial debt were secured. By this juncture, Balfour was
apparently interpreting the December election results at
face value. Unlike his Cabinet colleagues, the former
Chief-Secretary willingly accepted that separation was the
desire of Sinn Fein and the Irish people, excepting, of
course, those in the northeast corner. There was just no
way of reconciling Sinn Fein opposition to partition with
109
nTnof^/?^"^ Committee on Ireland, 6 November I919,30, OaL^/V92. The financial arrangements and tem-porarily reserved powers are fully described in the
report, 2/.". November 1919 1 C? 190, CAB2V93.
272
Balfour's consistent belief that an Ulster exclusion was
essential to any settlement. The former Unionist chief
strongly attacked the committee's assumption that their
proposals could or should pave the way to a single Irish
legislature. His dissenting memorandum^^O succinctly
summarizes his views on Ulster and the general Irish
problems
My objections to this have thoir roots in the
strong dislike I feel to the doctrine assumedthroughout the Committee ReDort, and morethan once explicitly proclaimed, that Ireland,
all Ireland has a desperate national existence,
and should naturally and Drcperly be orranized
as a single undivided political unit. The
committee admit, of course, that so lon^^ as
Ulster remains the Ulster as we know, such
an ideal cannot be realized. Hence, their
very artificial scheme of Home Rule Parliaments
and^an Irish Council. But they rer^ard thisdivision as a misfortune; and evidently think
it rather perverse of Ulster to throw obstacles
in the v/ay of complete unification. In their
recommendations they carry this view to such
length that while, on the one hand, they make
it as easy as possible for Ulster to join
itself with the rest of Ireland in forming a
Dominion state, on the other they give it no
power what ever to remain what it is, and as
I think, ought to be, an integral part of the
United uingdom. This they call ' resoecting
the principle of self
-determination and fol-
lowing the Peace Conference.' The Peace Con-
ference has done some odd things, but never,
I submit anything quite so odd as this.
According to Balfour, the Committee had misread Irish
History and failed to appreciate a basic British right to
remain in the United Kingdom until overwhelming reasons
made separation necessary. Defining United Kingdom
Balfour's Cabinet MemiOrandum on Irish Proposals,
25 November 1919. 193, CAB2V93.
/as
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membership as a 'noble privilege Balfour felt it v.
intolerable to deprive the Ulsterrnen of it simply bec=
they lived on the same island with 'those who proclaim
their disloyalty in every quarter of the world...' Having
developed this two-nations theory. Balfour recommended
cutting the six counties out of the bill and requiring
the remainder of Ireland M:o endure Home Rule', This would
eliminate that 'singular political experiment', the Council
Of Ireland, as well as Irish representation at Westminster.
Balfour opposed continued Irish attendance lest they deter-
mine the composition of future British governments and
influence important labor, land, church and educational
questions affecting England, Scotland and wales. If the
Cabinet would not agree to 'turning disloyal Ireland out
of the Empire', Balfour preferred domination status over
The committee's recommendations. Besides confining
'Southern Irish talents for parliamentary strategy to a
domestic tJieatre
' ,
dominion status would end British finan-
cial obligations to Ireland. The former Unionist Prime
Minister argued that, in the event of renewed war, dominion
status would free Britain from the humiliating decision of
compelling Ireland to do her duty or yielding to the clamour
of traitors. Balfour believed that it also would liberate
Britain from the recent 'monstrous attacks' by iCnglish
speaking countries across the seas. He alleged his scheme
was in strict harmony with the principles and practices
of the Peace Conference, and that it would make Ireland as
27 k
free as Canada and Australia. Regarding Ulster he claimed.
No one can think that Ulster ou.-ht to join the
''k''^^/?'^ ^^"^ ''^^'^ that Jugo olavsshould be separated from Austria. Ho one canthinl: that Ulster should be divorced fromBritain wno believes in self-determination
ihe only people who will ./-rumble are those whoimagine that this scheme deprives lrela.nd of
a unity to which she has a historic cJaim.
But these people ignore the fact that such
unity as Ireland possesses is mainlv the work
of ^ngland, that she has never in all the cen-turies, been a single, organized, independent
state, and that if she were not surrounded by
water, no human being would ever think offorcing the loyal and i-rotestant North into
the same political mould as the disloval and
Roman Catholic South.
Balfour's memorandum illustrates his appreciation of
the strength of Sinn Fein separatism. Ke favored dominion
status for the South as the best means of ridding iingland
of the perpetually expensive and embarrassing Irish prob-
leiT), rather than because Ireland earned or deserved it.
Similar to T. w. Freeman in 1886, the former Unionist
chief apparently favored the bolder course to keep the
Til
'Paddies* out of London." Although Balfour admired the
war-stimulated Canadian and Australian nationalism as
imperially constructive, he would not credit contemporary
Irish nationalism with any legitimate or progressive
elements. The mounting intensity of the Anglo-Irish v/ar
along with the wartime experiences of the Easter Rebellion
and the anti-conscription campaign undoubtedly added to
Balfour's bitterness and hostility at this juncture.
"^^""Curtis, Anglo-SaxQua ancl Q.^s., p. 139, n. 17.
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Balfour's memorandum appears, to have influenced the
final Shape of the Government of Ireland Bill,
.vhen the
Cabinet's original aim of ultimate Irish unity^^^ ^^^^
reaffirmed at discussions on 3, 10 and 19 December.
Balfour requested that '...it be placed on record that he
was not in agreement with this view.'^^^ ?rom these early
discussions until the March introduction, he continually
stressed his partition views. This provided convenient
Cabinet leverage for those Ulctermen who wanted to insure
that partition would be permanent if they could no longer
prevent a Dublin parliament. The duration of partition
obviously depended on the area of jurisdiction assigned
to the Northern Parliament. If all Ulster was included,
eventually there would be sufficient Catholic and Nation-
alist electors to overturn partition, or, at least, to
agitate constantly toward that goal.^-^ If only the six
northeastern counties of Amargh, Tyrone, Antrim, Fermanagh,
Down and Derry were included, Nationalist strength would
be insufficient to challenge the Unionist political estab-
lishment, and consequently partition, when, despite
1 12
Fourth and Final Report of Cabinet Committee cn Ireland.
2 December 1919, CP 2/^?, CAB2V9^.
1 13,Cabinet Minutes, 3, 10, 19 December 1919, CAB23/18.
^"Cabinet Minutes, 10 December 1919, CAB23/18.
-^oaD3-net iwemorandum on situation in Northern Ireland,
January 1920, 571, CA]32V97j The i-^ontgomery .^apers
are full of expressions of support for the six as opposed
to the nine counties.
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Lloyd George's reports that James Craig and the J ster
leaders preferred the smaller Ulster/^^ the 19 December
Cabinet ceerrodto favor the larger Ulster, they were of a
prior agreeiaent that the final decision would be condi-
tional to the Ulster leadership's views, ^""'^ In addition,
it -was argued that, while the geographic Ulster seemed
more logical for parliamentary defense, the six county
schoir^e would command more general acceptance. Few consti-
tutions j it was stressed, were theoretically perfect.
While only the Prime Minister^ s remarks are identified
specif ically» xhese objections were expressed in typical
Balfourian phraseology. It is possible that Balfour, who
attended this session, was responsible for preventing a
definite Cabinet commitment to the larger Ulfiter at this
point 0
Iloyd George's 22 December speech describing the
government's Irish proposals shows a striking resemblance
to Balfour's thinking on the Irish Question. -"-^^ After
deccribing the financial arrangem.ents of the I91/J Act as
obsolete, xho Frirae iviinister emphasi-/.ed some of the stock
points which characterized Ualfour's rhetoric on Ulster.
Maintaining that the Ulstermen were alien in religion,
'1 2.6Craig expressed this view on I5 and I9 Decem.ber 1919,
Cabinet Minutes C/il-23/l8.
-'-''^Cabinet ICinutes, 10 December 1919, CAB23/I8,
1^8
5 Hsi}.sa2.is:U cxxiii, 1169-83.
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culture and outlook to the re.t of Ireland, the Prime
Minister charged it would be an outrage against self-
determination principles to place them under the South and
West. The Prime Minister employed a I917 statement of
Father O'Flanaghan, a Sinn Fein Vice-fresident, that senti-
ment and religion, rather than geography, were the major
determinants of nationality. After building this argument
for partition, Lloyd George presented the six and nine
county optio2is. The government, he said, preferred the
six county scheme so as not to deprive the Roman Catholics
of Donegal, Monaghan and Cavan of association with their
co-religionists. This was a rather disingenious argument*
considering the prospects of Catholics in the six counties.
No mention was made of the Northerners' contention that a
larger Ulster would facilitate a Nationalist challenge
to the Unionist establishment, .vhile Lloyd George may
have had some personal sympathy for the two-nations theory,
Balfour was probably influential in reinforcing them, or
at leastp making the Prime Minister more receptive to
Craig and the Ulster leaders.
By early February, considerable criticism of the f:ix
county scheme emanated from Southern Unionists, National-
120isxs and the Irish bishops. These groups were also
J 2 9
" 5 Hanaaxiij cxxiii, 1171,
120Buckland, Iriiih UllionirLH: » p. 226? see also Cabinet
Memorandums on Irelfcind, January 1920, CP 57I, CA132V97;
8 IViarch I920, Ci- 825, CAB2V100.
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convinced that future Irish unity was impossible unless
the Northern Farliament was cancelled or was assigned
historic Ulster. Accordingly, at Lloyd George's request.
the Irish Cabinet Committee entered a long deliberation
on 1? February I920 and emerged recommending the larger
1 3 2
1
Ulster. The subcommittee also recommended that the
Imperial Government finance the completion of land and
transfer the yearly profits from completed purchases to
the Irish government. As soon as Balfour heard that the
Cabinet approved these recomraendationG
, he fired off a
strong dissenting paper in hopes of reversing the deci-
3 22
sion. This memorandum is especially significant because
five days later the Cabinet reverted back to the six county
123
scheme. Balfour began by asserting that the inclusion
of the homogenous Catholic areas such as Donegal in the
Protestant state would violate the Peace Conference prin-
ciples. The six county scheme, he argued, would diminish
the 'chronic nuisance' of Irish agitation in English speak-
ing countries, and would '...show the world that the prin-
ciples we apply to other peoples are those we accept for
ourselves,' Developing his rationale further, he saidi
121Bonar L&.w's I'-lemorandum for Irish Cabinet Committee,
17 February I920, CP 664, CAB2V98.
122Balfour's l.lemorandum on Ireland, 19 February 1920,
Ct 681, CAB2V98.
Cabinet Winutes, 24 February 1920, CAB23/20.
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If you have a Hibernia Irredenta within theprovince Of Ulster, you will greatly add to thedifficulties Of the Ulster parliament, you willreproduce on a small scale all the trouble whichwe have had at Westminster during the forV yearsoetween the advent of i^arnell on the politicalstage^in IS78, and the blessed refusal of the
^o"??
to take the oath of allegiance in1910 { and you will throw on the ii:xecutive atijelfast the same embarrassments from which thei^xecutive m Dublin is now suffering.
If this or anything like this haopens, there
will be no Irisn settlement. Vvhereas, if you
carry out logically the princit)les of self-determination, you need fear no effective agi-tation either outside Great Britain or in Iri-landfor re-unitmg the two fragments of the Ireland
which you Home Rule Bill divides. Any movement
on behalf of the oouth and west to force the
North-east into an unnatural unification wilJ
be without excuse, and will appear to be what
it really is, a mere struggle for domination.
Regarding the Committee's decision on finances, he hoped
that
...we shall not be absurdly lavish. I have not
the least desire to be vindictive, and I would
treat the rebels as one gentleman treats another
in matters of pure business. But 1 would neither
give them more money xhan they are entitled to,
on the wholly false ground that they have been
ungenerously treated in the past, nor would I
overpay them on the principle which induces a
T^an to give a large sum to an organ-grinder in
order to induce him to play his too familiar
tune in somebody else's street rather than in
his o^'/n. I would pay neither conscience money
nor blackmail.
Besides illustrating his continuing disdain for the Roman
Catholic Irish, this memorandum shows Balfour as an effec-
tive advocate of Ulster Unionist interests during the
drafting process. His November and i^ebruary interventions
appear to have been crucial in determining that the final
Government of Ireland Bill provided for the six counties
our
erriDts
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and very limited powers for the Council of Ireland. Balf
undoubtedly helped to foil the Southern Unionists' att
to have Lord Midleton secure either the abolition of the
Northern Parliament, or a significant extension of the
Council Of Ireland's powers. ^^z. 3^,,^^^.^ objections to
continued Irish representation at Westminster as well as
those of his cousin, Robert Cecil, may have been effect
in. influencing Lloyd George to reduce these seats from the
original 6^ to 1,2^^5
..^^ Cabinet's decision to turn over
000, 000 in land annuities rather than the , 000 , 000 to
^5.000,000 originally suggested^^-^ by the cabinet committee,
may have been due to Balfour's warnings about 'conscience
money' or 'blackmail' as much as to ordinary Treasury thrift
During the second reading debates on the Government
of Ireland Bill, Balfour's influence seems evident in the
government speakers' insistence on Ulster's right to remain
separate as long as she liked. Considering his contribu-
tions to the Cabinet deliberations in November and February,
it appears that Balfour must share some of the responsibil-
ity traditionally assigned to Lloyd George as the villain
of the piece in the 1920 partition. As his public speeches
2 2^f-.^
Auckland, rdJih Unimisni. pp. 226-30. i/Iidloton had met
several times with the sub- committee and with the rrime
Minister and Long in hopes of preventing partition, or
at least to insure that it would be as short-lived as
possible
,
12
'5
-^Cabinet Minutes, 10 December I919, CAB23/18.
126Cabinet Minutes, 22 December 1919, GAB23/I8.
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in 1913 and subsequent cabinet memoranda indicate. Balfc
was a stronger advocate of the tv;o-nations theory than
the Prime Mnister. Lloyd George, on the other hand.
1918 and during the 1921 treaty negotiations, was willing
to work for Irish unity if Sinn Fein would accept imperial
membership in return. ^ ^^^^^^ ^.^ experiences
with Ulster during the Home Rule crisis, in I916 and during
the Irish Convention, the Prime Minister had no great
affection for the Ulstermen. Patrick Bu.ckland had shown
that the Southern Unionists 's influence and prestige in
Tory and ministerial circles was most effective when they
had advocates such as Long and Lnasdowne in the Cabinet. ^^'^
By 1919-20 only Long remained to defend the southern loyal-
ist desire to preserve Irish unity. Iviidleton attempted to
protect his southern colleagues from his position in the
Lordr^, Hov^ever, Balfour's presence in the Cabinet probably
did T.iuch to override the strenuous Southern Unionist efforts
to prevent partition. As a senior party man intimately
associated with the Iris}i Question for forty years. Balfour
was bound to have a considerable influence over the Irish
policy of the Prime Minister. Balfour had been, after all,
127
Boyce, SrisliSiinLGll * Chapters Six and Eight: Savas^e,
•Lloyd George and Ireland,' J^umai oX British Siidiss.
12, i\o. If 80-103,
^Patrick Buckland, 'The Southern Irish Unionists, the
Irish Question and British Politics.' Irish iils-tiirixal
SliUlisrir 15 f No. 59 (March, 19^7 ), 228-255.
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a close colleague of Lloyd George X>oth during the v/ar and
the peace negotiations, and his view must have been
respected.
The Ulster Unionists were undoubtedly grateful to
have a distinguished minister who espoused the two-nations
theory, and who insisted that Ulster be allowed a
-clean
cut' if a Roman Catholic dominated Dublin parliament was
inevitable. That the surgery was arranged to prevent
future nationalist agitation in Protestant loyalist areas
was in no small measure due to Balfour's influence. In
1919-20
»
Balfour emerged again as the strong and effective
champion of allegedly threatened Ulster Unionist interests.
Even if Lloyd George can not be completely absolved of the
partition of Ireland, Ealfour must bo rscognir.ed as a
major accomplice in this crime against the republican
idea of 'Ireland, a Nation',
iv) From Partition to the Anglo-Irish Treaty
The introduction of the Government cf Ireland Bill
in Iv'iarch only encouraged rspublican zeal and precipitated
more frequent and fierce attacks upon the Crown forces by
the Irish Republican Army, Between this intensified
guerilla v/arfare and Sinnj'ein's total usurpation of Irish
governmental functions, Lloyd George's ministry was in a
quagmire over its Irish poJicy by early I920. Contemporary
international enthusiasni for ' self-determi.nation ' made it
difficult xo apply a poJ.icy of 'thorough'. Nevertheless,
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Lloyd Gecrge, weary of the parliamentary and international
difficulties engendered by the Anglo-Irish war, was con-
stantly urged by Generals Sir Henry Wilson, Sir Neville
Iv:acGready and Tudor as well as by southern loyalists to
apply full martial law. 1^9 ,,.^3,^^ Churchill, now i.iinister
of vVar, also wanted to abandon 'leniency' for vigorous
measures against the rebels. ^30 Criticism of the Home Rule
proposals along with this concern over chaotic Irish con-
ditions impelled the Prime Minister to appoint in late
June yet another cabinet committee, the Irish Situation
Committee.
After a month of weekly meetings, the new committee
called for full martial law. Only this policy, they main-
tained, would convince the world, the Southern Unionists
and the Sinn Feiners, of England's determination to sup-
press the republican movement. Minimum recommendations
included limiting railroads to government usage, closing
post offices, cancelling pensions in Sinn i'ein counties,
and rounding up all Sinn Fein activists . "^^"^
Two lines of thought, one coercive and one
129-
ii.". C. Caldwell, Diary P£ sir Mnry. iillsm (New York:
ocriDners, 192?;, ii, 329-31; Bonar i^aw's reoort on
^^uthern^ Unionist deputation. 29 April 1920,*Cr 1195,
2 30On 22 April 1920, Churchill circulated to the Cabinet
General F. Shaw's plea for a more forecful government
policy. CP 1672, CAB2VIO9.
13.1
-^"Report of the Irish Situation Committee, 22 July 1920,
CP 1672, CAE2V109.
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conciliatory, emerged from the ivdnister's lengthy 23 July
deliberations on the Irish Situation Committee's recom-
mendations. On the one hand, IvlacGready, Tudor, Chief-
secretary Greenwood, and Winston Churchill pushed for
country-wide martial law. In addition. General KiacCready
supported General Strickland's proposal to arrest and
deportr under the new Criminal Justice Bill, all Sinn Fein
agitators. Churchill advocated raising 30,000 Ulstermen
to supplement the Black and Tan forces approved by him in
TOO
late May. There was even a proposal to regularize the
Ulster Volujiteer .^orce to fight the republicans . -'"^^ Viewing
martial law powers as the most violent conceivable, Balfour
recommended that martial law be confined to districts only
where absolutely required . "^^'"^ He was also opposed to
Churchill's proposal to recruit Ulstermen as well as
another suggestion to fill the depleted Royal Irish Con-
stabulary with iinglishmen. The former Unionist chief
feared these extreme suggestions would further weaken the
government's position before the world. Three days later
Greenwood wanted to establish military-manned court-
martials to deal with ordinary and extraordinary crime
in these Irish areas where juries refused to convict and
132Jones, V/Jiiiejiail Diary, iii, 22.
134Report of a Conference of Ministers on Ireland, 23 July
1920, Ci- 1693, CAB 2V-O9.
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judges were reluctant to impose the death sentence.
Again Balfour questioned the application of extreme
measures as potentially damaging to Britain's already
tarnished international reputation. Greenwood's proposal
"...to use war machinery after peace is declared
.and
hand over the administration in Ireland to soldiers..."
absolutely staggered him. Balfour warned that such steps
were appropriate only when necessity drives the Govern-
ment to apply it. This is going to be attacked in this
country and the Dyer debate has not helped us to govern
by soldiers. It Is a most tremendous power. ""'"'^ Balfour's
anxiety did not derive from any recognition of the Irish
Republicaii Army as gallant soldiers waging a justifiable
v/ar. He considered them murderous, criminal rebels, cind
Ills hesitancy emanated exclusively from his concern for
the ministry's domestic and international prestige. Bal-
four evidently appreciated the mounting domestic criticism
of Irish policy by labor leaders as well as from leading
intellectuals such as J, K. Green, Sir John Simon, Arthur
F» Basil V^HliaimvS and James Bryce, Perhaps Robert Cecil's
invol\''t;r-ent in t}ie Irish Teace Council's efforts to ter-
minate the Anglo-Irish v/ar by negotiations had some impact
upon nis distinguished cousin.' His own experiences as
J ones,
.,^Vj2ii£]i§jj. Diacy. iii, 27.
^'^''Ihi^..t p. 33.
' Boyce, .::^nglishmen, Chapter Ihree*
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Irish Chief-Secretary apparently taught Balfour the
dangers of investing more power in the police and the
military than was absolutely required. He had spent many
nights in the Commons defending zealous constabulary men
from Nationalist and Liberal attacks. The failure of the
generals to secure at this juncture Lloyd George's per-
mission for full martial law may have been partially due
to Balfour's hesitant views.
Support for a conciliatory solution to the deepening
crisis came from the Irish civilian administrators attend-
ing the late July deliberations. Sir John Anderson,
Mr. J. 0. wylie, the Law Advisor, and Mr. Alfred Cope urged
the ministers to seek a dominion Home Rule settlement by
negotiating with Sinn Fein leaders
. They acsertod that
the 'de facto' Sinn -ein government had proven the Irish
capacity for self
--government , and that it commanded the
people's support. Indeed, iVir. Cope predicted that Sinn
Feiners would be loyal imperialists v/ithin two years, and
added that Cardinal Logue was inclined to the dominion
138
solut:,onc Curzon and Fisher were sympathetic, the
former urging consultation with Sinn Fein leaders, the
latter positing that Sinn Fein might be satisfied by an
immediate or future addition of excise and customs powers
138Anderson's iuemorandum on Irish Situation, 25 July I920,
CP 1639, also conference notes of 23 July 1920, CP I693,
CAB24/IO9. Anderson v/as Under-^'Ccretary to the Viceroy.
Cope was an assistant Under-^:>ecretary
.
to the Government of Ireland Bill. When these various
suggestions for concession seemed to be gaining Lloyd
George's sympathy, ^^9 Balfour abandoned his silence and
vigorously attacked any deviation from the government's
established bill. He did not believe Fisher's customs
and excise proposal would mitigate republican separatism.
You can not stop there if you go so far. Thebroad lines of the Irish case were clear. It
was based on the idea of 'Ireland a nation',
and thjs was at the back of the growth of theRepublican Party. So far as the South was
concerned, he would like to go as far as pos-
sible, but the giving of Customs and Excise
was a ruinous concession, and if frranted we
would be forced to go further. It had never
been^ thought that Customs and Excise should
be given to the states in America or evGn in
the Dominions. At the heart of Sinn Fv.m the
real ideal was a separate Republic, and nothing
would^be got by seeing their leaders but
humiliation. It m^jy bo that you can hold on
a little by grasping at one tuft of grass
after another in hope that you will not go
over the precipice, but over the Drecipice
you will go, and the tufts of grass wil not
help you.
Moreover, Balfour opposed negotiations lest Ulster's posi-
tion in the present bill be compromised:
In his previous policy Ulster was to remain
part of the United Kingdom, and his worst
opponents were those who hated the idea of
dividing Ireland, whereas he liked it. It
was a geographical accident that Ireland was
surrouiided by sea. This should be ignored,
and their inveterate religious and rr^. a
prejudices recognized. On any other
an Irish settlement was a pure illusi
Jones, WJiiigiiali piajcx* 2?
'lid,!., p. 30.
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To reinforce his oral objections, Balfour immediately
drafted a Cabinet memorandum to prevent the advocates of
conciliation from endangering the six counties' separation
from the South. He charged that neither negotiation
toward dominion status nor the abandonment of the northern
parliament would diminish the Sinn Fein campaign of out-
rage and assassination. He insisted upon retaining the
Home Rule principle in the current bill, not out of love
it, but because an abandonment at that stage would bring
serious discredit, disgrace and infamy upon the government.
It would be viewed as a concession to organized assassina-
tion. The former Unionist chief reminded his colleagues
of Craig's recent declaration to the Cabinet that Ulster
now intended to make their northern parliament work.
Balfour believed that reverting back to six-county union
with England would play into Sinn Fein hands. He feared
that Sinn Feiners would be able to manipulate the small
frictions and petty jealousies between Ulster representa-
tives and English members to create even some Protestant
sympathy for reabsorption into the Irish system. He again
charged that concessions tov/ard dominion status or some
'new Utopia' would simply invite continued agitation in
Ireland and among the Irish abroad. It v/ould diminish any
remaining chance of the current bill settling the Irish
l'|]
'Balfour's Cabinet Memorandum on Ireland, 2k July 1920,
CP 1683, CAB2V109.
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Question. Ke was also concerned that granting additional
powers to the southern legislature would produce an
irresistible deraand for similar concessions to the northe
legislature. As a result, he predicted, 'Ulster, unwill-
ingly, will be driven far along the road to separation,
'
Balfour concluded by emphasizing the persistence of
republicanism in Irish agitation, and of the futility of
eradicating it by limited concessions
«
All through Irish history since the rebellion
of 179« the men who have been Dremred to run
most risks and to commit most crimes onbehalf of the Ireland of their drea.ms are
the extremists; and to them nothing short of
a Irish republic will be really acceptable.
This party has constantly been crushed, but
It has never been destroyed. It has formed an
essential element in all the movements fordestroying the Union. The leaders of these
movements have first silently used it and
then openly denounced it; and all in turn,
after having denounced it, have themselves
lost po>//er and prestige. If when we let it
be understood that our Home Rule Bill is no
more than an installment, we invite further
agitation; we give the extremists the occasion
they seek; and we shall have before us a long
perspective of Heme Rule amendment bills to
which no term can be assigned exceot that of
complete separation. Holding this' view, I
have to admit that neither the present nor
any other Home Rule Bill is going to settle
the Irish question. The party of assassina-
tion will still be there ready for action
under some new alias whenever" the opportunity
occurs. The most we can hope for is' to v/eaken
the chances of an alliance, always temporary
but alv/ays formidable, between them and the
moderates
,
Although it is difficult to determine exactly the
impact of Balfour's viev/s, some conclusions can be drawn
on the basis of ultimate government policy and' written
290
evidence. Lloyd George's decision' to limit the Criminal
Justice Bill to specific areas and powers may have been
influenced more by Balfour's response to the generals'
recommendations than by agreement with the conciliation-
ist in the Irish administration. Having disregarded
Castle advice on conscription in I9I8, the Prime Minister
probably was no more inclined to accept it in 1920. On
the other hand, Balfour's opposition to extending the
proposed Dublin parliament's powers toward dominion status,
and his insistence on the preservation of the northern
parliament seems to have been crucial, waiter Long,
Chairman of the Irish Situation Committee reported on
2.5 July that his colleagues were impressed by Balfour's
rationale, and that they wanted to proceed with the bill
l'-!2intact. " This is significant in view of Long's acceptance,
albeit reluctant, of a more moderate Unionism in I9I8
.
Besides checking the conciliatory views of Wylie, Ander-
son, Cope, Fisher £md Curzcn, Balfour was undoubtedly
influential in frustrating Tom Jones' efforts to press a
negotiated dominion solution upon his boss, the Prime
Minister. Immediately after sympathy for concession was
aired at the 23 July Cabinet, Jones suggested conferring
full powers to Dublin, excepting only those over defense
1^?
"Walter Long's report of Irish Situation Committee keeting,
25 July 1920, CP 1689, CAB2V109.
•^^'\.ong to Balfour, l''r A^ril 1918, B. ivi. Add. I.'IS 49,777,
ff. 197-98.
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and ports. Jones, closely linked to the imperial federa-
tionist Round Table movement, already had sounded America
and dominion opinion. Ke told the Prime Minister this
would probably be accepted abroad as a just Irish ^.ettle-
ment. The dominion solution commanded support
.from
some Irish quarters. On ^ August 1920, Richard Beamish,
a prominent Cork Unionist told Lloyd George this was the
only alternative to the present anarchy. Sir Stanley
Harrington, a Roman Catholic Home Ruler, recommended
scuttling the present bill as the only means of preventin
civil vs'ar.-^^'^ However, Lloyd George still refused to
negotiate with Sinn Fein and to contemplate any increase
in the powers assigned under the Government of Ireland
Bill. In defending his position, the trime Ihini ir cite
strategy, imperial fiscal needs as well as the . 3ated
promises that Ulster would be protected. He argued that,
to retain Ulster in the United Kingdom, would constitute
financial coercion since Irish and Ulster taxes probably
would be substantially lower than British
-taxes
. This is
the kind of difficulty which Balfour anticipated if the
northern parliament were abandoned. Now that the Ulster
Unionist Council and their leader, Jaines Craig, were con-
vinced that their salvation lay in a northern parliarnent
,
Balfour v/ris again available to prevent Ulster interests
Jones, w^j-tejiaJJ. Diax^r, iii, 32.
'-^Ibld.f p. 35.
)rge
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being sacrificed to British and dominion opinion. Given
the heavy Tory complexion of the Ministry and the Commons,
Lloyd George could not afford to ignore the views of the
eldest and most distinguished Tory leader. Lloyd Geo]
maintained his hardline approach well into 1921, and i,
doing he was in full agreement with Balfour.
These faltering attempts toward negotiation in July
were followed in the autumn by the most violent episodes
of the Anglo-Irish War of which the incidents at Balbrir'-aan
Croke Park and the burning of Cork are tlie most infamous.
The government's reprisals for republican violence only
served to drive the moderates, whom Balfour hoped would
accept the government bill, into the republican ranks.
Despite his distaste for country-wide m.artial law, and
even thou-7;h he preferred transportation of Sinn Feiners as
opposed to execution, -^^"^^ Balfour's unfaltering opposition
to concessions in July I920 means that he shared with
Lloyd George a major responsibility on the British side
for the prolonged Anglo-Irish War and its attendant costs.
In April I921, prior to the elections scheduled for
the two parliaments, another move to extend the Government
of Ireland Bill's powers was initiated. This would have
necessitated postponing or cancelling the first elections
under the Government of Ireland Act. Balfour opposed this
idea, and also any truce negotiations with Sinn Feiners,
146Jones, ibiisiisil Dj^ary, iii^ 76.
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whom he considered murderers, not belligerents
. Refusing
to recognize any group not sanctioned by the Imperial
Parliament, he considered a southern parliament, not Sinn
Fein, the proper machinery for negotiations. An additional
motive for Balfour's desire to proceed with the schedule'
was probably the idea that a completed election would give
a Belfast parliament and the six county exclusion a 'de facto'
status. The long and delicate negotiations between Lloyd
George and the Sinn Fein leaders during November and
December 1921 eventually proved the trem.endous difficulty
of challenging this northern regime's existence after June
1921.
Again on 12 Kay vihen Edwin Kontagu, H. A. L. Fisher,
Robert Munro, Christopher Addison, and even Winston Chur-
chill favored investigating possibilities of a negotiated
truce with Sinn Fein, Balfour insisted upon implementing
the Government of Ireland Act. He reiterated his belief
that concession v/ould only :lnvite further agitation by
irreconcilable republicans for full independence. Although
acknowledging the salutary effect of a 'beau geate' on
English opinion, he v/arned it would demonstrate '...we've
never stood in any entrenchment we dug..,' He wanted to
end '...this uphill, sordid, unchivalrous , loathsome con-
flict. not by concessions, but by making '.«.our Irish
policy on all fours with our European policy of self-
^^'"'^^
Jones, iL]ijj;r.}--j2 Ilisxr^.t III, 61.
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determination.' The Home Rule Act, he believed, would cut
away the American, Australian and Canadian supporters of
Irish agitation. Balfour's insistence that ^in Feiners
had no right to expect concessions^^^ was undoubtedly
reinforced by the detailed weekly reports on the Anglo-
Irish War which Hamar Greenwood and General LlacCready
submitted to the Cabinet. Immediately following Balfour's
speech, Lloyd Georf^e echoed his colleague's hardline
approach. By a vote of 9 to 5 the Cabinet dashed any
hopes that the recent decline in violence and the 5 May
1912 talks between DeValera and Craig might generate pesice^^^
V/ithin a few weeks, however, Lloyd George was forced
to recognize the futility of repression. The combined
impact of General Crozier's rebruary resignation, Asquith's
pleas f and rising domestic and dominion criticism, demanded
that the Prime Minister attempt to open truce negotiations
with De Valera. VAhen, on the eve of the Imperial Confer-
ence, General Smuts identified the Irish Question as the
greatest obstacle to imperial solidarity and loyalty,
Lloyd. George agreed to extend an olive branch via the
King's forthcoming speech at the opening of the Belfast
parliament. After Balfour objected to the 'gush' of smut's
'""^
J ones, WhiicJiall Siary, iii, 65,
1^9
"^^BoycG, j^islishm^Uf pp. 131-33
These reports are in CAB 2^;-, and date from early I920
till miQ-1921.
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suggested draft, the Prime Minister assigned the elderly
Cecilian with the revision. Ironically, it was Balfour's
version that was delivered by King George V on 22 June
which led to the 11 July 1921 truce, and the subsequent
British offer of dominion status to De Valera tc ^ iays
later. Over Tom Jones' protests, Lloyd George i \ ^Ived
Balfour in drawing up the truce and dominion proposals
because he '...believed in implicating in the negotiations
'thxi most extreme exponent of his policy .' '[^^ Balfour
seems to have exerted some critical influence even at this
stage. In arranging for the truce negotiations, a three
way conference between De Valera, Craig and the Prime
Minister was suggested. De Valera had asked the Southern
Unionists of Midleton's Anti-Partition League to persuade
Craig to meet with him a second time."^^^ Balfour, anxious
that British and dominion pressure might lead to an Ulster
sell-out, vetoed the tripartite meeting saying '...he was
all for meeting De Valera apart from Ulster and doing
everything to mark the division between them,'^-''-^ Once
••^\ioneSf :?lbit(ihall Diary, iii, 80; Cabinet Ldnutes, 24 June
1921, CAB23/26.
Jones, 'Iihii^h2ll Diiiry, iii, 87.
"^•^-^John D. Fair, 'Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921,' isi-i^nml
British ^iu3J.ea, xii, No. 2, p. I37.
'-^'^Buckland, Irish Uni^mlsjB, p. ^39.
-'-55jones, vVhitehall Diary
,
iii, 86. Even if Craig had met
with Dg Valera, the Irish republican leader v/ould still
have insisted that he v/as SDokesman of the Irish nation,
and therefore that he should conduct the direct negotia-
tions v/ith the British government.
2Q6
again the Ulstermen apparently benefitted from Balfour's
advocacy of their cause. Thus De Valera never got an
opportunity to attei.pt a via media with Craig by modify-
ing his republican demands in exchange for Irish unity.
The eventual truce and treaty negotiations remained sepa-
rate, and the resulting Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921
preserved the partition which Balfour had believed essen-
tial since I913,
Although undoubtedly pleased to secure Protestant
Ulster's exclusion from a Dublin parliament, Balfour was
not enthusiastic about the dominion status offer. Tom
Jones reported that Balfour had been the most 'irrecon-
cilible Minister' during these negotiations On 22 Julv
follcvdng the Cabinet's approval of the offer, Lloyd George
commented that
...Balfour squirmed .when the terms were
discussed preliminary to sending them to
De Valera. They were so contrary to all
the views the old man ever had on Ir-eland.
But he gave in gracefully in the end.... 157
Despite Balfour's absence in America during the treaty
negotiations, the Nort}i9rn Ireland Parliament was protected
by Austen Chamberlain and Bonar Law who supported Craig's
refusal to ccnsider Lloyd George's suggested compromise
"^^^Buckland
, Irisll .Unionism, p. xi,
] 57Francos otevons on, Lloii^ Geoil^e, A D.la.ry, cd. A. J. P.
laylor (London: Hutchinson, 1971), p. 231.
297
of an all-Ireland parliament within the Empire.
Balfour demonstrated his strong sympathy for Pro-
testant Ulster in 1922 when the bloody Belfast pogroms
and the proposed Free :3tate constitution absorbed Lloyd
George in the Irish Question again. Although concerned
lest the world think Britain approved Belfast sectarian-
ism, Balfour opposed an official inquiry which put Ulster
in the dock and called the South to V/itness.^^^ When the
constitution submitted by the Bail cabinet seemed too
republican for the British Cabinet, Balfour recommended
stern warnings by Britain. Ke suggested blockading the
North against potential republican incursions, and even
called for refugee centers for soutJ).ern loyalists . "'^^
Afraid that the republicans were securing arms from Belgium,
the United States and even England, Balfour told the
Cabinet of Craig's anxieties that a great republican con-
spiracy was aj-ming to destroy Ulster by exacerbating
Catholic-Protestant tensions in the North for its propa-
ganda effect.''"^"'' Balfour's prior advocacy of the North
made him the logical person to carry to Craig Lloyd
George's v/arning that the Belfast pogroms were threaten-
ing the whole Irish settlement and the resulting
J ones, sihLLehall Difiryr iii, 15^^- Blake, Bon?.r Law,
p. i|'32<.
159Cabinet Minutes, 30 I^iay I922, CA323/30.
-'^^^Cabinet I-dnutes, 1 June 1922, CAB23/30.
i^lCabinet L^inutes, 2 June 1922, CAB23/30.
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improvement in Britain's international reputation. It
was not uncharacteristic that in reporting to the Cabinet,
Balfour again echoed Ulster's suspicions and disdain for
the Southern Irish. Balfour had been instrumental in
laying the foundations for the Unionist dominated six
counties, and the next fifty years were to prove just hov/
effective.ly this political monopoly of the Protestant
loyalists and partition had been secured.
"^^^Cabinet Minutes, 2 June 1922, CAB23/3C.
CONCLUSION
299
Arthur Balfour's response to the Irish Question
between 1835 and I921 leads to a number of important
conclusions about his statesmanship and his ability to
rise above class and environmental prejudices in pursuit
of a permanently constructive and realistic Irish policy.
His thoughts and actions provide useful insights on the
general Unionist posture towards Ireland and help to
explain England's failure to solve the Irish Question with
the success which was simultaneously marking the evolution
of the British Commonwealth.
Although one of the foremost champions of the Union
during this era, Balfour never really accepted the idea
that Ireland and j^lngland could or should be integrated into
the free and equal partnership v;hich the Act of Union
allegedly intended. When first forced to take cognizance
of the Irish Question, Balfour thought that the native
Irish were inferior to the British in virtually every
respect. His disdain was exacerbated by the apparent
prevalence of clerical influence and persistent rural dis-
order, both of which offended his intellectual and aristo-
cratic sensibilities. Despite the significant improvement
in Irish economic, Locial and political conditions by 1910,
Balfour had not significantly modified his Anglo-.Saxon
disdain and contempt for Hibernia. As the Budget and
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House of Lords controversies illustrate, he resented the
Irish members' ability to use their legislative equality
to influence British politics and achieve their own cher-
ished goal, Home Rule. .Lven though some of the Irish
representatives of the early twentieth century, like
John Redmond, had acquired respect for and skill in
British parliamentary traditions, Balfour would have
preferred in 1912 to jettison all but the irotestant
Kortheaat. This is hardly consistent with theories of
equal partnership, or for that matter, with his previous
contentions that time, patience and mutual tolerance
would create a bond between the Irish and the iinglish
similar to that between the iinglish and the t.cotch. while
his hostility to J^edmond and hi? c-.ollepgues had mellowed
during the vvar, Balfour's support for the I916 Home Kule
proposals was predicated more on the American factor than
upon recognition of legitimate Irish nationality or the
rights of s!i:all :-i3ticns. In his inveterate suspicion of
the Irish, he considered the anti-conscription campaign
simply as another manifestation of Fenian disloyalty. He
refused to see this cainpaign as Ireland's attempt to
uphold the principles for which the Allies allegedly were
fighting. V/hen. the Sinn Fein victory in the ^:>outh and
Vv'est in I9I8 gave j.nconter^tablc ric-oof of Ireland's refusal
to t-v: Gutservient to Britai;:; .L-a.i.iOui' reiterated liis
preference for cutting out the Roman Catholic Irish
instead of working for a comprcmije on V.Ui basis of
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equality and Irish unity. The evidence cugsests that this
erudite Cecilian could accept democratic nationalism only
when it subscribed to traditional British values and
institutions. His praise of Canadian and Australian
nationalism, during and subsequent to the war, undoubtedly
was facilitated by the common British assumption that the
dominions were inherently loyal to the British imperial
connection and all its as:-5ociated traditions and values.
Since the Irish did not accept automatically, especially
after I900, the allef;ed superiority of British civiliza-
tion, Ba3-four's response to rising democratic nationalism
across the Irish Sea lacked the flexibility and magnanim-
ity which characterized his attitude toward the dominion:;.
His opposition to the I.iorley-kinto reforms in India tends
to substantiate the degree to which his advocacy of par-
liamentary democracy was conditioned by Anglo-Saxon
racism. If Balfour's inclination to ,iud,9;e the Irisli
people as well as their institutions and achievements
exclusively by Anflo-Saxon standards was typical of most
British politicians, it is small wonder that a success-
ful integration of Ireland and England under the Union
was neve r ac h i 0 vc. d
.
:L'hrou{;;}ioat his career Balfour dealt with the Irish
Question principally from the English perspective. Aside
from htr. response to the land and educational issues, he
never v/as motivated to a pen- .'..tin;^ and sympathetic
in,vesti<";ati on of other causes of contemporary Irish
30?
alienation. Although he acknowledged the disastrous
effects of English policy in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, after I903 he consistently asserted that con-
structive unionism had redressed all legitimate Irish
grievances. Similar to G. M. Trevelyan, he often attrib-
uted continued disaffection to the remarkable historical
memories of the Irish people. This attitude demonstrates
his insensitivity to consistent political nationalism as
well as to the growing manifestations of cultural national-
ism which surfaced in Ireland in the two decades prior to
World v/ar I. His English and aristocratic perspective
prevented him from responding more generous ].y to the
plight of the Irish town and urban laborer. This was a
critical mistake
^ for after I903 the separatist ideas of
the Irish Republican Brotherhood and Sinn Fein were enthu-
siasticclly received by this neglected segment of the
Irish population. While laborers' grievances received
some satisfaction through the local government reforms, •
the Irish urb^n. workers alv/ays resented that the farmers
had been CuOre liberally dealt with by xhe British govern-
ment. V/hile Balfour recognized the importance of the
lanci question in the Irish Parliarstentary Party's i)rogram,
his .'Un'id purchase schemes were essentialj.y conservative
measures designed to save the English private property
system from an rillegedly contagious socialistic challenge.
Besides delivering the Irish landlords from financial
ruin, the conservative intv-rntion of land purchase is
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illustrated by Balfour's contention that ownership would
convert the Irish fanner into a staunch advocate of law,
order and private property
, In other words, the Irish
farmer would become more English. The reprimands which
Balfour hurled at recalcitrant landlords did not emanate
exclusively from altruistic sympathy for the tenants.
They derived also from Palfour's recognition that accounts
of evictions and hi.eh rents during depression tended to
justify, in the mind of the British public, the policies
of Michael Davitt and his lieutenants. That land pur-
chase was part of the Nationalist program tends to cast
Balfour's land policy in a more generous and responsive
light. Certainly Balfour deserves recognition for his
consistent tenacity and determination in implem.ent,i ng this
policy arcainst the objections of conservative colleagues,
radicals
J.
the Treasury and some Irish landlords. Kevei-
theless, the beneficiaJ. c.ffects of land purchase on the
Irish political arid eoonorrlc scene siiould not obscure the
fact that this program served English interests to an
equal, and perhaps greater, degree.
Iri the last stages of the Anglo-Irish imbroglio,
Balfour's anxiety for Britain's international reputation,
rather than sympathy with the innocent victims of guerrilla
warfare, was the principal factor causing his reluctance
to apply full martial lav/. Likewise in 1921, he accepted
truce negotiations with bimFein i^niy because of dominion,
Amerlcarx and some domestic pres.^ure. The former Unionist
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chief never accepted the legitimacy and capability of Sinn
Fein leadership, despite the overwhelming evidence of
popular support and his professed belief in self-deter-
mination. This inclination to view the Irish as inferior
and alien, and to approach the Irish Question principally
from an English perspective, suggests that, in the last
analysis, Balfour considered Ireland more a subservient
colony than an integral part of the United Kingdom. Of
course, the economic, geographic, demographic and politica
realities made a consistent colonial approach difficult
and inappropriate. This ambivalence in determining
exactly the nature of Ireland's relation to England
undoubtedly hindered a consistently constructive and
realistic Irish policy. This ambivalence was not the
monopoly of the Unionists, for there were many Liberals
v;hose support for Heme Rule emanated from their disdain
for the Irish os much as from traditional liberal tenets.
Balfour's involvement in Irish affairs provides
evidence of a common British tendency to use the Irish
QuGi-rcion for partisan political purposes. During Vne
winter of 1885"6, he enthusiastically supported Salisbury 'i
tactic of forcing Gladstone to commit the Liberals to the
perilous Kome Rule course. The Conservatives rejected
bipartisan efforts to solve the pereiiniai Irish diffi-
culty on the assumption that Gladstone's conversion would
precipitate a liberal fissure. The Conservative's antici-
pated thereby a stror"'; i^.sjority rather than the precarious
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position which they held during the Caretaker Ministry.
Balfour's espousal of democratic local government reform
for Ireland in 1892 was largely predicated upon the need
to preserve Liberal Unionist support. Although constructive
unionism continued during the tenures of Gei-ald Balfour
and George v/yndham, it would be naive to eliminate the
importance of the Liberal Unionist factor, or Balfour's
hopes of remoulding Irish character according to Anglo-
Saxon likes. When this policy seemed a party liability
after 1903, Balfour withdrew his previously enthusiastic
support. During 1910-11 Home Paile provided a convenient
issue to camouflage the deep divisions within the Unionist
party over questions of tariff and social reform. Defense
of the Ur.ion, however s v/as a policy which could command
support from both the conservative and liberal wings of
the Unionist party, iiven though there was evidence of
federalist sympathies in boxh parties, partisan political
considerations destroyed perhaps the last chance for a •
peaceful solution of the Irish Question. 'As late as I913,
when war clouds hung ominously over Europe, Balfour's
response to the Cherkley meetings illustrates a tendency
to use the Ulster aspect of the Irish Qu.es ti on to engineer
a Liberal defeat. Notwithstanding the complicated (eco-
nomic,- i^eligious and social dimensions of the Irish Ques-
tion during this era, the persistent refusal of Balfour
and other Unionist politicians to seek a bipartisan solu-
tion exacerbated Irish alienation toward i::ngland and
helped to precipitate the dangerous Ulster crisis of
191^-1'. The separatism advocated by ^inn Fein before 1916
probably derived as much from their refusal to be the
pawns of British politicians as from the Fenian republican
tradition,
Balfour's role in shaping the character of early
twentieth-century Irish society was considerable. His
anxieties about the effects of Irish rural disorder in
conjunction with his economic interpretation of Irish
discontent encouraged him to devise a more constructive
and practical Irish policy than had any Irish adr.iinistr-.-
tion in the late nineteenth century. His economic and
social amelioration was an important antidote to the indif-
ference which had characterized Irish policy during
Disraeli 'ii ministry. lie was astute enough to realize
that represoion had to be tempered with concession.
Although conciliation did not quench Irish nationalist
aspirations, it did alter significantly the features of
rural life, rlie economic and political conservatism of
Irish rural cOi^munities is largely the result of the suc-
cess of Balfour's land purchase program. Constructive
unionise effectively eroded the foundations of agrarian
socialism which Michael Davitt and his disciples strug-
gled to build during the land agitations of the late
'seventies and early 'eighties. Although peasant propri-
etorship has not proved especially appropriate to the
realities of tv/entieth-century economic organization, the
30?
land purchase policy was a tremendous success from the
perspective of the late Victorian British Establishment.
The Local Government Act of I898 delivered a decisive blow
to the political and social power of the Protestant
Ascendency. The diminishing influence of the gentry
along with improved educational facilities and land pur-
chase increased the economic, social and political oppor-
tunities of many Irishmen. Moreover, the ostracism of
the Anglo-Irish encouraged a more Celtic, if not provin-
cial, atmosphere within the local power structure and
among the people. At the same time, constructive union-
ism generated in many Ascendency people and in Protestant
Ulster a siege mentality which proved incapable of accept-
ing democz-atic Irish nabionalism. Balfour's appointrr.ent
of V/alter Long in hopes of soothing ultra-Unionist discon-
tent in 1905 » nevertheless, gave a temporary sense of
security to the disgruntled Ardiluan clique. This delayed
and complicated the inevitable accommodation which the
resident Anglo-Irish would have to make v/ith Irish nation-
alism and modernization. Moreover, the abandonment of
conciliation during 1904-5 encouraged the Ulster Unionists
to believe that their English Unionist brethren would
respond favorably whenever Belfast raised a hue and cry.
As the events of 1912-14 illustrate, Protestant Ulster was
not disappointed.
The partition of Ireland is the most dominant and
disturbing feature of modern Irish society. Balfour's
role in encouraging and manipulating Protestant Ulster's
anxieties about Dublin rule was considerable during the
debates on the second and third Koine Rule Bills. Although
the social, political and religious cleavages in Ulster
were the products of multiple factors, Balfour's actions
from 1912 to 191^ helped to perpetuate and exacerbate
these divisions. He made no sincere attempt to heal this
breach by lowering the temperature of political debate or
by serious mediation during 1913-^. Thus the leaders of
Ulster resistance were given a unique opportunity to
frustrate the Home Rule policy which commanded the sympathy
of the majority of the Irish people and the House of Com-
mons. Unionist strategy having paralyzed the Army and
the Asquith ministry in 191^-, it was inevitable that some
form of partition would accompany
-any future efforts to
establish a Dublin legislature. '2he Rebellion and the
subsequent growth of Sinn Fein support apparently deepened
Balfour's conviction of the validity of the two-nations
theory r At the same ti.in?, he never admitted how greatly
Unionist policy had nurtured and encouraged the religious
tensions in Ireland and especially in Ulster, Iff from
the beginning, Balfour and other Unionists had emphasized
the rather more significant differences in economic struc-
ture and organization as well as the more urbanized
Cxharac tor of the Northeast, perhaps the violent passions
and emotiont-i complicating the Ulster issue might have been
defused, and a compromise found. As the Cabinet discussions
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illustrate, however, Balfour played an important role in
insuring that the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 per-
manently institutionalized these cleavages in Ulster and
in Ireland as a whole, /roia its birth in I921, the poli-
tical history of Northern Ireland has been dominated by
partition. The constant manipulation of the border issue
by the Ulster Unionist leaders has proved disastrous to
the interests of Northern Catholics as well as the poorer
Protestants, It has perpetuated the rule of a narrow clas
and sectarian clique in the Stormont government. The
strength and longevity of this .monopolistic Northern Irish
regime is the result of arranging partition on the basis
of six counties as opposed to the historic nine or the
predominantly Protestant four counties. In attempting to
trao.e tha origins of the contemporary violence anl destruc
tion in Northern Ireland, one is inevitably drav/n back to
the decisive legislation of I920. The six county division
in conjuriv:; tion v-ith Stormont 's abolition of proportional
represontrrrion for local and r)o.rliam.entary elec"'*ons in
1922 and 1929 respectively. conderiLncd Northern .o.'j.cc
to a perpetual and futile minority status , 1^. "^r, it
mad') the one party Unionist regime virtually impregnable.
xhe periodic re/ival of guerrilla warfare by the 3rish
RepuL'ilcan Aray during the past fifty years was perhaps
the nitui-al sequel xo the political cstracinm suffered by
Northern Roman Catholics and nationalists. To the extent
th?.t the current r;orth^:r:T Irish tragedy is t>ie product of
the Government of Ireland Act, I920, Arthur Balfour c
tinues to exercise a pervasive influence on twentieth
century Ireland.
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